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vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study examines the ongoing efforts to convert a former biological weapons (BW)
facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. The facility, known in the Soviet period as the Stepnogorsk
Scientific and Experimental Production Base (SNOPB), was the USSR’s largest mobilization
facility dedicated to the production and weaponization of anthrax bacteria. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government has demonstrated its commitment to nonproliferation
and international security by opening and providing full transparency into the facility. The
Kazakh government has issued mandates for a number of restructuring changes and conversion
efforts at the facility. Subsequent U.S. and international assistance have played key roles in dis-
mantling the facility and redirecting its personnel to peaceful purposes. Yet, the continuing eco-
nomic and political instability in Kazakhstan maintains concerns regarding the threat of
proliferation involving former BW personnel from the facility.
Because biotechnology is inherently dual-use, many have touted the conversion of former
Soviet BW facilities as more simple and straightforward than converting other Soviet defense
facilities. This study shows the contrary. Because of the unique characteristics present within
BW facilities, as well as the peculiar political, economic, and social environment in the former
Soviet Union, conversion of BW facilities like Stepnogorsk will likely be as difficult, if not more
difficult, than their nuclear or chemical counterparts. These factors, as well as a general lack of
understanding about what is needed for conversion of Soviet defense facilities, can help explain
why all conversion efforts at Stepnogorsk have failed thus far.
Today, perhaps the most serious proliferation threat from this facility comes from the
knowledge possessed by the forty bioweaponeers that remain. Several of these individuals have
20 or more years working on all stages of BW development, production, and weaponization.
Although this “brain drain” problem is poorly understood, addressing this threat should remain a
U.S. and international security priority. One of the most important instruments to deal with this
threat involves converting these personnel to peaceful, economically sustainable activities. Al-
though this fact is well recognized by the U.S. and Kazakh governments, all conversion efforts to
date have failed.
vi
In spite of these previously failed efforts, this study will propose specific recommenda-
tions to address these difficulties and recommend new approaches and strategies to re-start con-
version efforts at Stepnogorsk. The Stepnogorsk case does not imply that U.S. and international
assistance must fund long-term economically sound conversion at every former Soviet BW facil-
ity. Instead, each BW facility will have different characteristics influencing their proliferation
potential and ability to convert. These characteristics must be identified and analyzed to design
appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient nonproliferation policies for each facility.
vii
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11 There are other pathogens that could be developed as weapons to harm plants and animals and incapacitate hu-
mans. A list of these potential biowarfare agents can be found in Central Intelligence Agency, The Biological &
Chemical Warfare Threat, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 13-14.
2 To date, there are conflicting perspectives on the interest and ability of non-state actors to use BW to cause mass
casualty attacks. See Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality? The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks
(Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000).
3 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weap-
ons Program in the World, Told From Inside By the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random House, 1999); Milton
Leitenberg, “Biological Arms Control,” Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (April 1996): 1-79; Anthony Rim-
mington, “Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and its Implications for
Contemporary Arms Control,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 13, no. 3 (September 2000): 1-46.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biological Weapons (BW) are defined here as the use of living microorganisms or their
derivatives to cause incapacitation or death in humans. Some factors that are important for
microorganisms to be used as biological weapons are virulence, infectivity, stability/ruggedness,
ease of producibility, and ease of controllability. History reveals that only a small number of
microorganisms have possessed the right combination of these characteristics to be useful as bio-
logical weapons against humans. These agents include anthrax, plague, smallpox, glanders, and
tularemia.1 Key steps involved in obtaining a potent BW capability causing large-scale deaths
include: (1) acquiring virulent strains; (2) growing biological agents; (3) formulating the biolog-
ical agents for weaponization; (4) developing a means of delivery; and (5) effectively dissemi-
nating the agent. Achieving all of these steps is difficult. A study of state-sponsored offensive
programs indicates that production of potent and effective biological weapons has involved a
significant investment of expertise, infrastructure, and resources.2
It is clear that the Soviet BW program developed the largest and most advanced offensive
BW program in history.3 Through intelligence information and defectors we know that the Soviet
BW program involved thousands of scientists and technical staff, spread across multiple insti-
tutes and regions. These Soviet bioweaponeers utilized new fermentation processes, molecular
biology techniques, and engineering methods to develop sophisticated tactical and strategic bio-
logical weapons. Due to the unstable economic, political, and social situation now facing the
former Soviet republics, there is concern that the materials and expertise associated with the
Soviet BW program could be acquired illicitly by other states or terrorist groups.
24 U.S. General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Effort To Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits,
Poses New Risks: Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-00-138 (Washington, DC: U.S. General
Accounting Office, April 2000), p. 14.
5 Judith Miller and William J. Broad, “Iranians, Bioweapons in Mind, Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists,” New York
Times, 8 December 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress; Judith Miller, “Flying Blind in a Dangerous
World,” New York Times, 6 February 2000, p. D5.
This prospect has not gone unnoticed. A recent U.S. government report finds that since
1997, countries of proliferation concern have intensified their efforts to acquire biological weap-
ons expertise from at least 15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes.4 In particular, Iran has
been aggressively recruiting former Soviet BW scientists. In 1991, Gennady Lepyoshkin, the
former director of the Stepnogorsk BW production facility, said that he had been approached by
Iranian middlemen who disguised themselves as private businessmen looking for joint biotech
commercial ventures. Although Lepyoshkin was looking for foreign investment, he states, “Their
proposals were such that we immediately declined and ceased contact with them.”5
Although rebuffed in Kazakhstan, Iranian officials continued their recruitment efforts. A
scientific advisor for Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and delegations of Iranian clerics
have traveled to several former Soviet BW facilities seeking research collaborations involving a
variety of pathogens, as well as exchanges for broader scientific training in genetic engineering
techniques. These discussions have included proposed salaries of $5,000 a month.6 Russian
scientists have acknowledged that at least five of their colleagues have gone to work in Iran for
either consultancy or teaching contracts. For example, in 1997, Iranian officials visited the All-
Russian Institute of Phytopathology in Golitsino, Russia. This visit was designed to explore
possibilities for scientific exchanges on plant pathology projects. It is known that four scientists
from this facility have visited Tehran on business trips. That same year, the Russian Ministry of
Science and Technology sponsored a biotechnology trade fair in Tehran. More than 100 leading
biologists from former Soviet BW institutes attended the meeting. American and Russian gov-
ernment officials admit that these recruitment efforts have continued.7 This raises the concern
38 In addition to the recruitment of Soviet scientists, other instances have been documented of proliferant countries
seeking expertise from former state offensive BW programs. U.S. intelligence reports that when the offensive por-
tion of the Ft. Detrick BW facility closed down in the early 1970s, some U.S. bioweaponeers formed a consortium
and approached a then-friendly foreign government to offer their services. Fortunately, the proposed venture was
thwarted by the U.S. government. Milton Leitenberg speculates that the country involved was Iran. Reports emerged
in 1995 that Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi was trying to recruit Woulter Basson, head of South Africa’s BW program.
The U.S. and U.K. governments put pressure on the South African government to block these efforts. See Wendy
Orent, “After Anthrax,” The American Prospect, 8 May 2000, p. 18; Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons in the
Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis,” at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/bw20th.htm; Chandre Gould and
Peter I. Folb, “The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,” Nonproliferation
Review 7, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2000): 20-21; James Adams, “Gadaffi Lures South Africa’s Top Germ Warfare
Scientists,” Sunday Times, 26 February 1995.
9 Milton Leitenberg, telephone interview with Kathleen M. Vogel, 19 October 2001.
10 Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century.”
that some knowledge associated with former Soviet BW technology may be transferred to coun-
tries hostile to the United States.8
To date, however, it appears that few BW scientists have left the former Soviet republics
to work in countries of proliferation concern. Milton Leitenberg, a biological weapons expert,
finds that by 1997 a few hundred scientists had left the Russian Biopreparat BW establishment.9
Of these, approximately 90 percent had gone to either Israel, Western European countries, or the
United States.10 Of the remaining 10 percent, the majority of these scientists had gone to work in
developing countries that do not have BW programs. Therefore, as of 1997, only a small number
of former Soviet BW scientists were either known to be working in countries of proliferation
concern or whose whereabouts were unknown. Yet, it is difficult to gauge the impact that these
scientists or additional “brain drain” cases might have on developing state BW programs.
The transfer of BW-sensitive technology from Russia and the New Independent States to
countries of proliferation concern is troubling. For example, Iraq is known to have sought dual-
use biological equipment from Russia. In the fall of 1997, the United Nations Special Commis-
sion on Iraq (UNSCOM) discovered a confidential document outlining negotiations between
Russia and Iraq to construct a single cell protein (SCP) factory in Iraq. The proposed factory
would have included the installation of 50,000-liter fermentors. Both Iraqi and Russian sources
state that the facility would have been used to support the production of animal feed. From
UNSCOM investigations, however, it is known that Iraq has previously used SCP plants, such as
its Al-Hakam facility, for clandestine production of anthrax and botulinum toxin. Richard Butler,
former chairman of UNSCOM, has stated that, “the documents show that the Russian side pre-
411 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Russians Admit Firms met Iraqis; Plant That Could Make Germs Weapons at Issue,” Wash-
ington Post, 18 February 1998, p. A16.
12 Judith Miller, “Standoff With Iraq: The Dealings,” New York Times, 18 February 1998, p. A8.
13 Iraq is known to have received strains of BW agents such as Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum, Brucella
melitenis, Yersinia pestis, and other pathogens from the American Type Culture Collection. A Danish company sup-
plied Iraq with two spray dryers; Italian, Swiss, and German firms supplied fermentors to Iraq. Italy also supplied
Iraq with several hundred aerosol dispersal systems. Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington, “Foreign Suppliers to
Iraq’s Biological Weapons Program,” at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/flow/iraq/index.htm, accessed 1 De-
cember 2001; Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: The Past as Future?” in Biological
Weapons: Limiting the Threat, ed. Joshua Lederberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p. 141.
14 Sonia Ben Ouagrham, “Biological Weapons Threats from the Former Soviet Union,” (forthcoming); Michael
Beck, “Russia and Efforts to Establish Export Controls,” at http://www.uga.edu/cits/ttxc/nat_eval_russia.htm,
accessed 8 August 2002; Keith D. Wolfe, “An Evaluation of Export Control in Kazakhstan,” at
http://www.uga.edu/cits/ttxc/nat_eval_kazakhstan.htm, accessed 8 August 2002.
sented an offer to the Iraqi delegation and that Iraq’s Military Industrialization Corporation later
decided to accept it.”11 The Russian government has admitted that representatives from Russian
companies and one Russian government official met with Iraqi officials in 1995 to negotiate this
sale, although official statements declare that these negotiations never resulted in a signed con-
tract.12 If successful, this transaction would have violated a UN authorized embargo on sales of
such dual-use equipment to Iraq. Although Russia and Iraq both deny that any sensitive exports
occurred, there is continuing suspicion that some fermentation equipment was exported. Exports
of dual-use materials and equipment from a range of countries have benefited Iraq’s prior offen-
sive BW program.13 Poor implementation of export control and customs systems in Russia and
the New Independent States raise continuing concerns over leakage of BW technology.14
During the Soviet period, the republic of Kazakhstan became an important location for
extensive research and development (R&D), production, and testing of the USSR’s weapons
systems. Approximately fifty military facilities in Kazakhstan were associated with the former
Soviet weapons complex. Although small in comparison to the thousands of defense enterprises
in Russia, several of these Kazakh facilities emerged as key elements in their own right. For
example, two of the most famous Soviet weapons facilities were the Semipalatinsk nuclear test
site and Baikonur Cosmodrome, both located in Kazakhstan.
515 In April 2001, the Anti-Plague Institute was renamed by government decision. The new name of the facility is The
Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Infections.
Less commonly known is that Kazakhstan housed several important components of the
Soviet BW program. The Almaty Anti-Plague Research Institute,15 Otar’s Scientific Agricultural
Research Institute, the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Experimental Production Base, and the
Vozrozhdeniye Island test site played key roles in Soviet BW activities (see Figure 1). Due to the
secrecy and compartmentalization of the USSR’s BW program, many of these facilities were not
known to local Kazakh Communist party officials. In fact, many of the directors and personnel
of these Kazakh BW facilities did not even know about the existence of other BW facilities
within Kazakhstan.
Fig. 1: Map of Kazakhstan and Former Soviet BW Facilities Located on Kazakh Territory
Source: personal communication, U.S. government official
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the new independent country of Kazakhstan in-
herited key facilities, equipment, and personnel associated with the USSR BW program. During
the early years of nation building the new Kazakh government strove to find out about the Soviet
616 Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard; Igor Domaradsky, “Znanie—Sila, The History of One Risky Venture,”
November 1996, unpublished manuscript; Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov,
Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future, Occasional Paper No. 1
(Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999); Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons Arms
Control,” Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (April 1996): 1-79; Milton Leitenberg, “The Conversion of Bio-
logical Warfare Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses,” in Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The
Vaccines for Peace Programme, ed. Erhard Geissler and John P. Woodall, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare
Studies No. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 77-105; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague
Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Rimmington, “Invisible Weapons
of Mass Destruction.”
weapons legacy left within its borders. As the magnitude of the remaining military-industrial
complex was realized, the Kazakh government struggled to determine how to deal with these
weapons personnel and facilities. In the transition period and thereafter, Kazakhstan’s dire eco-
nomic situation has led to downsizing and restructuring of these facilities. Such changes under a
short time frame have made it difficult for these facilities to adapt to a market economy and con-
vert to peaceful work. This environment has created an unstable and uncertain future for many of
these facilities and their weapons specialists. These conditions raise the concern that technology
and expertise associated with former Soviet BW facilities in Kazakhstan may leak to hostile
entities, posing a serious threat to international security.
To date, much attention has been directed at the risks of proliferation involving nuclear
weapons and weapons expertise from the former Soviet Union. Yet, few studies in the open liter-
ature have examined the complex interplay of economic and proliferation problems associated
with the residual BW establishment left in Russia and the New Independent States (NIS). Part of
the reason is the continuing secrecy regarding Soviet BW activities in these countries, as well as
the small number of researchers who have undertaken concerted efforts to study this program in
detail. In spite of these issues, several core academic papers on the general subject have been
published.
The primary academic work covering historical aspects of the former Soviet complex are
found in papers and books from Ken Alibek, Igor Domaradsky, Tom Mangold, Gulbarshyn
Bozheyeva et al. from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Milton Leitenberg at the
University of Maryland, and Anthony Rimmington at the University of Birmingham.16 These
studies have provided a wealth of information on the history and structural organization of the
BW program. Other recent studies have examined the current situation of former BW facilities
717 Bozheyeva et al., Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan; Milton Leitenberg, “The Possibili-
ties and Limitations of Biological Weapons Conversion: Personnel and Facilities,” in Conversion of Former BTW
Facilities: Development & Production of Prophylactic, Diagnostic & Therapeutic Measures for Countering Dis-
eases, ed. Erhard Geissler, Lajos Gazsó, and Ernst Buder (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 119-33; Judith Miller,
Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (Simon & Schuster,
2001); Anthony Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex? The Conversion of Biological Weapons Facil-
ities in the Russian Federation,” Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (April 1996): 80-112; Anthony Rimming-
ton, “Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Programme,”
Contemporary Security Policy 20, no. 1 (April 1999): 86-110; Anthony Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities
in Kazakhstan,” in Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, pp. 167-86; Amy L. Stimson, Toxic Archipelago: Pre-
venting Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes, Report No. 32
(Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999).
18 Vlad E. Genin, ed., The Anatomy of Russian Defense Conversion (Walnut Creek: Vega Press, 2001); Kimberly
Marten Zisk, Weapons, Culture, and Self-Interest: Soviet Defense Managers in the New Russia (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1997); Sonia Ben Ouagrham, “Conversion of Russian Chemical Weapons Production Facili-
ties: Conflicts with the CWC,” Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 44-62.
and the existing proliferation threats.17 These studies have primarily focused on aspects of the
former Soviet BW complex from a macro perspective, to include overviews of the effectiveness
of U.S. nonproliferation assistance.
The literature, however, lacks a detailed look at particular institutes as case studies to
evaluate specific factors influencing conversion and proliferation threats. The BW institutes
within Russia and the New Independent States operate in local environments that are still in flux
as these countries adapt to new political and economic situations. These environments differ in
each country. From studies of the former Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons complexes it is
known that the interplay of technical, political, social, and economic influences in the local
environment creates unique conditions affecting conversion and nonproliferation.18 To date, no
studies have conducted a detailed investigation of these influences on specific Soviet BW facil-
ities. Identifying and understanding these influences is crucial to crafting and implementing
appropriate and effective policy responses towards these facilities. Furthermore, because inter-
national assistance to these facilities is relatively recent, few studies have followed the process of
policy implementation to analyze the extent to which these policies have been effective in the
local environments, both from economic and nonproliferation perspectives.
To fill this gap in the literature and create a better understanding of the situation facing
former Soviet BW facilities, we have undertaken a study of conversion efforts at the Scientific
and Experimental Production Base in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. Our decision to study this facil-
ity stems from the fact that: (1) it was one of the largest and most important BW production
8facilities in the Soviet Union; (2) the Kazakh government has renounced its need to retain a bio-
logical weapons capability and has opened this facility to the international community; and (3)
significant redirection and conversion efforts have been initiated under the support of the Kazakh
and U.S. governments to address the economic and proliferation concerns at this facility. These
conditions provide an opportune research setting for in-depth study and analysis.
In this study we will evaluate the Stepnogorsk facility from a number of perspectives: (1)
historical context of the facility; (2) how the facility fits into the new Kazakh political environ-
ment; (3) past efforts to convert the facility and its people to peaceful work; (4) current status of
scientists and research activities; (5) proliferation concerns involving technology and expertise;
(6) role of U.S./international assistance in promoting conversion and nonproliferation; and (7)
future prospects of the facility. Questions that are raised and discussed in this study include:
What are the economic difficulties faced by the facility? What are the economic, political, social
and other environmental factors that present obstacles or challenges to its conversion? How do
internal and external politics, both in the United States and Kazakhstan, affect conversion efforts
on the ground? What are plausible alternative economic activities for this facility? What are the
specific proliferation concerns at Stepnogorsk? What are the proliferation implications of a failed
conversion? Part of this work will also put the conversion of the Stepnogorsk facility into a
larger context. What lessons are specific to our case and what can be applied to future conver-
sion efforts at other former Soviet BW facilities? How important is the subject of conversion in
addressing key U.S. and international security concerns?
This study has relied on open source material, as well as extensive interviews in Kazakh-
stan and the United States. We have spoken with scientists and officials from the Stepnogorsk
facility and Kazakh government. In addition, a series of interviews were conducted with key
American private sector representatives and U.S. government officials involved in converting
and redirecting the facility. U.S. government officials greatly assisted in facilitating several inter-
views both in the United States and Kazakhstan, allowing us to participate in official U.S. gov-
ernment visits to Stepnogorsk, and inviting us to U.S. sponsored conferences and meetings both
in the U.S. and Kazakhstan.
In the following pages, we show that, owing to the special characteristics and local envi-
ronment in Stepnogorsk, conversion will be an important instrument to deal with the long-term
“brain drain” proliferation threat from the bioweaponeers that remain. The arguments for this
9conclusion are presented in four sections. The first section provides background information on
conversion involving past offensive BW facilities in other countries. The second section intro-
duces the Biomedpreparat facility that we are using as a case study, and provides details on its
historical context during the Soviet period. We then describe the restructuring and conversion
efforts undertaken at the former BW facility by the new Kazakh government after the break up of
the USSR. The failure of these early efforts to convert the facility, along with the awareness of
the proliferation threats from its sensitive BW technology and expertise, brought U.S. and inter-
national attention to the facility in the mid-1990s. In this section, we also describe the role and
effectiveness of this international assistance in addressing the security concerns and subsequent
conversion attempts. The third section outlines other important external factors influencing the
long-term economic sustainability of the facility and its weapons scientists and discuss appro-
priate future strategies for conversion at Stepnogorsk. In the final section, we take a step back to
look at the larger picture of conversion in Soviet BW facilities. Based on our research findings,
we suggest specific policy recommendations for the future role of U.S. and international
assistance for conversion efforts at these facilities.
II. A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
Before analyzing conversion at the SNOPB facility in Kazakhstan, we must first discuss
general principles and concepts that underlie conversion of biological weapons facilities. Due to
the growing influence of biotechnology in science and worldwide commerce, as well as its dual-
use nature, many would argue that it should be easier to convert Soviet BW facilities than their
nuclear or chemical counterparts. The information we present in the following pages, however,
illustrates the contrary—converting BW facilities presents unique problems and is likely to be as
difficult, if not more difficult in some cases, than converting other defense facilities. This will be
illustrated by examining the historical record regarding conversion of former offensive BW
facilities in other countries. For those interested in more detail regarding defense conversion, as
well as some specificities related to former BW facilities and a Soviet context, we have included
a section in the Appendix describing various economic, political, and technical issues.
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A. Historical Precedents
The historical record documents few examples of successful commercial conversion in-
volving BW facilities. To date, most of these examples have occurred under a political decision
made by a government to end its offensive BW program. It is useful to briefly examine the con-
version experiences of other state BW production and research facilities and determine whether
they can serve as models for conversion in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, there is a
dearth of information on former BW facilities in non-Western countries. Therefore, the follow-
ing information will be based on British, German, and U.S. examples and used to discuss some
general observations in converting former BW facilities. These examples will also be very help-
ful in highlighting the peculiarities of converting former BW facilities in the Former Soviet
Union, particularly in Kazakhstan.
In the United States, one of the earliest BW conversion projects occurred soon after
WWII. The Vigo pilot BW production facility was initially constructed to produce large scale
weaponized anthrax and other agents. However, problems with the facility prevented it from ever
producing BW agents. After the war, the American pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, Inc. took a
lease on the plant in order to produce veterinary grade antibiotics. The plant is now owned and
operated by Pfizer and still uses the original 20,000-gallon fermentation tanks to produce some
of these antibiotics.19
When the U.S. government unilaterally ended its BW program in 1969, plans were made
early on for conversion of Fort Detrick and the Pine Bluff Arsenal. Conversion at Pine Bluff pro-
ceeded relatively smoothly because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had selected
the facility as the location for its proposed national center for food and drug safety evaluation.
The FDA utilized most of the buildings and virtually all of the former scientific and labor per-
sonnel in the new Center. In spite of this, a 1972 GAO report found that new research funding to
convert the Pine Bluff facility into the National Center for Toxicological Research would cost
11
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approximately $8 million; demilitarization would cost an additional $10 million.20 Conversion of
the Pine Bluff plant was completed by summer 1972.
Conversion at the Fort Detrick facility was more problematic. Some difficulties that were
encountered involved: (1) the size of the research facility and its work force; (2) the problem of
finding an agency willing to assume responsibilities as landlord for the facility; (3) lack of firm
plans and available funds by prospective users; (4) historical association with warfare research
activity; and (5) concern that the buildings would require substantial repair to bring them up to
standard.21 In comparing the Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff facilities, the degree of success of these
conversions was dependent to a large extent on whether firm operating plans for the facility had
been developed by the prospective user.22 In spite of the initial difficulties, Fort Detrick was
eventually converted. Conversion was accomplished by dividing the facility into different com-
ponents and relocating various personnel to other sites.23 For example, approximately 20 percent
of the former personnel at Fort Detrick were relocated to either biodefense related programs at
the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah or the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. Other personnel,
equipment, and facilities dealing with plant sciences were transferred to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to work on defensive research against crop diseases. The largest portion of personnel
and equipment were transferred to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick. This institute was tasked with work on biodefense and civil-
ian research to develop medical treatments for a variety of infectious diseases. Finally, a branch
of the U.S. National Cancer Institute was established at Fort Detrick, which employed 200 weap-
ons personnel and used former laboratory space and equipment to conduct nondefense related
cancer research.
By comparison, smaller BW conversion projects were initiated in Britain and Germany.
By the 1970s, Britain’s Microbiological Research Establishment (MRE) had already expanded
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its activities from purely biodefense research to work on civilian public health issues.24 For
example, a center for arbovirus research was established, and gradually more work at MRE
involved fundamental research with civilian applications not aimed at biodefense. After WWII,
Germany’s largest dual-use BW facility, the State Research Institute Insel Riems, was totally
dismantled.25 In 1946, however, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany issued an order
to reconstruct the facility to provide vaccines and antibodies to treat infectious animal diseases.
This new work at the Riems facility was an extension of the former civilian R&D and production
that had been carried out in parallel with prior wartime activities.
These conversion examples reveal interesting elements that will be helpful in determin-
ing whether previous experiences can serve as models for conversion in the former Soviet Union.
One of the common points of these experiences is that conversion was generated by a state deci-
sion caused by strategic changes: the renouncement of BW use in the United States and Great
Britain, the end of the war in Germany. Conversion was also initiated and conducted by state
authorities, with significant government resources and support invested in these programs.26
Except for the Vigo plant, which was leased by a private company, these facilities remained
under the control of the state and their new activities were determined by the state.
In most of the cases, conversion was not conducted by the previous managers of the facil-
ity. Instead, an outside agent—be it a government agency or a private contractor—conducted the
conversion of the facility. For instance, in the United States, the Fort Detrick facility was oper-
ated by a private contractor but remained state-owned. In Germany, the Insel Reims facility was
reconstructed and supported by the Soviet government.
Another important characteristic is that demilitarization, (decrease or end of defense
activities), demobilization (destruction of excess military resources), and restructuring (moderni-
zation of equipment and buildings, hiring of new personnel) preceded the conversion process
itself. From this point of view, the Fort Detrick example is very enlightening. Soon after the
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decision to convert the facility, the military personnel were relocated to other facilities, part of
the civilian personnel were fired, the equipment and buildings were modernized, new agencies
settled in the emptied buildings, and the new contractor was provided with a clear list of the
resources available for conversion.27 Finally, apart from Vigo, none of these facilities was
expected to become profitable or operate as a commercial enterprise. We must remember also
that in most of the cases presented above, conversion occurred during relatively stable economic
periods and happened relatively quickly.
B. Are Western Conversion Models Appropriate for BW Facilities in the Former Soviet
Union?
Similar to what occurred in western countries, conversion of BW facilities in the Former
Soviet Union was triggered by a political decision to stop national offensive BW programs. In
1992, President Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s commitment to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) and stopped lingering offensive activities.28 In Kazakhstan, there has been
no official declaration specifically mentioning the BW program.29 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s
President Nazerbaev has clearly stated his country’s intention to eliminate the Soviet offensive
BW legacy within its borders. Since the break-up of the USSR, some of these facilities have
remained as state-owned facilities. Other facilities have been transformed into joint stock com-
panies, but even in this case, the State remains the only or major shareholder.
Contrary to western examples, conversion in the former Soviet Union typically has been
conducted by the former Soviet management team. These teams are generally composed of mili-
tary personnel, who have little market experience. They have not benefitted from the guidance of
an outside agent, such as a private contractor, who understands the principles of a market econ-
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omy. Also, they have to convert in an environment where market institutions (a sound banking
system, clear and applicable rules, developed communication and transportation systems, to
name a few) are underdeveloped or non-existent. On top of this, conversion has also been
launched without a prior restructuring; it has to take place without state support or involvement,
and all converting facilities have been required to start operating as commercial enterprises.
These are obstacles difficult to overcome, more particularly for former BW facilities, which
unlike nuclear and chemical facilities cannot re-use their equipment and buildings due to the
risks of contamination.
Finally, conversion in the former Soviet Union has been launched before a proper demili-
tarization. This implies that these facilities still house resources that can be used for military pur-
poses (BW-specific equipment, personnel, material). In the absence of State support, a failed
conversion may lead to increased proliferation risks. To illustrate this, we will use as a case
study the former BW production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.
III. SNOPB AND BIOMEDPREPARAT: A UNIQUE CASE STUDY
As described above, because there are virtually no historical examples of conversion of
biological facilities, we are left with a poor understanding of what is involved. The BW facilities
left behind from the legacy of the former Soviet BW program provide one of the most interesting
opportunities to examine conversion from a first-hand perspective. There is no way to accurately
predict the future outcome of these on-going conversion efforts. Yet, examining how conversion
has been implemented and how it is progressing in the former Soviet Union can shed light on the
challenges, requirements, and prospects of converting BW facilities in unstable political and eco-
nomic settings.
In the following pages, we will describe the conversion of the Scientific and Experi-
mental Production Base (SNOPB), Biomedpreparat, and the National Center of Biotechnology
(NCB)—three important components of a major Soviet BW production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, which is currently attempting to convert to civilian production. To begin, we will
provide the historical context of SNOPB by explaining the facility’s relevance to the Soviet BW
program. Next, we will track the facility’s history and its resulting structural changes through the
end of the Cold War to its present day situation. Part of this description will include a discussion
of the first conversion attempt at Stepnogorsk in the mid 1990s—a conversion effort that failed
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miserably and subsequently led to plans for dismantlement of the facility. Within this context,
we will focus our attention on the efforts made by the U.S. government to assist in the dismantle-
ment effort, as well as redirect the remaining bioweaponeers to sustainable activities. To con-
clude, we will examine the current political, economic, and social climate surrounding the facil-
ity and how these factors have influenced prior and ongoing conversion efforts.
A. The Former Soviet BW Program: The Biopreparat Administration
The USSR’s BW program involved an extensive number of research institutes, produc-
tion facilities, and testing sites spread across Russia and several of the former Soviet republics.30
Although dating back to the 1920s, the BW program was greatly expanded after the USSR
signed and ratified the BTWC.31 Starting in early 1970s, a number of new BW activities were
initiated in civilian and military facilities under several Soviet government agencies to include
the Ministries of Agriculture, Chemical Industry, Defense, Health, Microbiological Industries,
the Academy of Sciences, and the KGB. Under Soviet military doctrine biological weapons were
to be used as strategic, operational, and strategic-operational weapons.32 Agents were developed
against human, plant, and animal targets.
In 1973, within the Main Directorate of Microbiological Industry of the Soviet Council of
Ministers (Glavmikrobioprom), a new directorate was established called the All-Union Science
Production Association Biopreparat (Biopreparat).33 Under this new directorate, a number of new
R&D, production, and mobilization facilities for biological weapons were created. In the mid-
1980s a government reorganization transferred Biopreparat to the Ministry of Medical and
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Microbiological Industries.34 In spite of this administrative change, Biopreparat remained vir-
tually independent and held major funding and management oversight of Soviet BW activities.
At its peak, the Biopreparat complex consisted of 40 facilities, although not all of them were
devoted to BW activities.35 Approximately 30,000 total employees worked in the Biopreparat
administration, of which about 10,000 had weapons-relevant skills, with approximately 5,000
having critical BW knowledge.36 One of the most significant Biopreparat mobilization facilities
was the Progress Scientific and Production Association.
B. Progress Scientific and Production Association: The NCB’s Soviet Ancestor
As with many Soviet defense facilities, the Progress Scientific and Production Associa-
tion (PSPA) was composed of civilian and military components (see Figure 2). The civilian part,
Plant Progress, had two functions: (1) to produce pesticides for civilian use, and (2) to serve as a
cover for the production of biological weapons taking place at the military component of PSPA.
This military part was known as the Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental and Production Base
(SNOPB). SNOPB was established in 1982 by a secret edict from Communist Party Secretary
General Brezhnev, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had signed and ratified the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1975. The facility was constructed in northern
Kazakhstan in the closed city of Stepnogorsk, located approximately 200 kilometers from the
present day capital of Astana.
Although the official establishment of SNOPB took place in 1982, plans to build the
facility were already being developed in the 1960s. Originally, the facility was designed to be
headed by one director, who would direct the civilian production in peacetime, and would
organize the mobilization of the complex and the production of BW in wartime.37 The civilian 
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part, a biopesticide production plant called Plant Progress, was built first.38 This facility also
controlled all utilities (i.e., energy systems, steam production, electricity, hot water) that would
ultimately be used for BW production. The construction of the military side started in the second
half of the 1970s. Strangely enough, the BW assembly lines, bunkers, and storage buildings were
built first. This was followed by construction of the main BW production buildings—buildings
221 and 211.39
The construction of building 221 was still under way when a release of anthrax occurred
at the offensive Ministry of Defense (MOD) BW facility at Sverdlovsk in 1979.40 When the need
arose to relocate BW production activities from Sverdlovsk, three facilities were considered:
Kurgan, Penza, and Stepnogorsk. The Russian BW facilities located in Kurgan and Penza were
already heavily involved in the production of antibiotics. In contrast, since the Stepnogorsk
facility had not been finished, it was the only facility that did not have existing utilization plans.
Therefore, the facility could be designed and modified to accommodate large scale BW produc-
tion.41 By 1982, a decision by the Soviet government had been made to adopt the existing fer-
mentors in Stepnogorsk for manufacturing anthrax biological weapons.42 Under the control of the
USSR’s Biopreparat administration, specialized equipment and personnel were transferred from
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Sverdlovsk to SNOPB.43 SNOPB was further expanded alongside Progress in order to utilize
existing electrical power, heat, water, steam, and communication infrastructure.44
From then on, Plant Progress and SNOPB grew into separate entities, headed by two
different directors, and having their own personnel. Although SNOPB was located within the
same complex as Plant Progress, SNOPB was a restricted facility and required special security
clearances to enter the site. Civilian personnel working at Plant Progress were informed neither
of activities occurring within SNOPB, nor was the training that was given to them to work on
SNOPB production lines in case of war explained.
When SNOPB was first opened, it faced two main objectives: (1) to improve the potency
of the existing Soviet anthrax biological weapon, and (2) to increase the organizational capacity
to manufacture anthrax biological weapons.45 Both of these objectives encountered some obsta-
cles. In order to improve the potency of the existing anthrax biological weapon, SNOPB first
developed its research and experimental capabilities and created a small R&D unit. The unit was
responsible for developing Anthrax 836, the USSR’s strain of anthrax agent that was reproduci-
ble in large quantities, of high virulence, easy to transport, and resistant to a number of Western
medical treatments.46 Initially, however, SNOPB attempted to use a strain of anthrax developed
by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) for their BW production. The anthrax formulation
developed by the MOD, however, had some limitations. The Q50 level for that anthrax strain was
too high—approximately 16 kilos/km2.47 To improve the agent’s effectiveness, the research team
at Stepnogorsk developed a new formulation for an anthrax BW that eventually yielded a much
lower Q50.
In terms of organizational capacity, SNOPB was faced with the difficulty of increasing
and testing its production capabilities in the context of a shortage of qualified labor and energy
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sources. In 1983, the workforce at SNOPB consisted of 40 people, with only 4 or 5 engineers.48
Kanatjan Alibekov was nominated at the head of the facility that same year in order to enlarge
the facility’s production capability.49 By 1987, the facility had grown to 970 employees, approxi-
mately one-third of whom were BW specialists. This increase in qualified personnel was made
possible, in part, by the relocation of about 65 military scientists from the Soviet MOD BW
facilities located in Kirov and Sverdlovsk. These individuals held all of the managerial positions
within SNOPB, such as deputy directors, department chiefs, laboratory heads, senior engineers,
senior scientists. They also served as master trainers and provided the initial on-site scientific
training, lasting 2-3 months, to all new BW technical recruits. To maintain the separation be-
tween SNOPB and Progress, Alibekov was instructed not to hire personnel from Plant Progress
but from a nearby uranium processing mine that was in the process of decreasing its activities.
Frequent scientific collaborations and exchanges between SNOPB scientists and other BW sci-
entists from Russian facilities in Obolensk and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) also took place
during this time, and allowed expansion of the scientific capabilities of the facility and improve-
ment of biological agent formulations.50
SNOPB covered a large complex, spanning about two square kilometers, including sev-
eral large buildings and support structures. Such an industrial structure required large amounts of
electricity to conduct equipment tests as well as production. Unfortunately, the utilities infra-
structure was not sufficient to cover the needs of both Plant Progress and SNOPB. As the origi-
nal plan was to create a dual-purpose facility, there were no plans to build separate energy sup-
plies for SNOPB. In wartime, Progress was to be subordinate to SNOPB and stop all civilian
production, as well as provide the additional workforce to ramp up the military production
capacity. In peacetime however, SNOPB was subordinate to Progress, as the civilian facility had
to complete its own production plan. However, as the facilities grew as separate entities with
different objectives and competing production plans, the competition for resources became a
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constant battles between the management of SNOPB and Progress. For instance, during BW
production trials, SNOPB was allowed to use no more than 20 percent of the entire facility’s
energy capabilities. The testing of four 20-m3 reactors simultaneously was also prohibited by
Progress’ director due to the large-scale energy use it would require.51
From 1987, activity and personnel at SNOPB began to decline. One of the main reasons
was that the facility completed its R&D and scale-up work with the anthrax biological weapon.
SNOPB later started working with glanders and tested Marburg weapons, but no production was
involved. In the late 1980s, there was also a concern that Gorbachev would want to open some
BW facilities for visits by international authorities for confidence building activities under the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of this, SNOPB undertook plans for decon-
tamination and “conversion.” For example, SNOPB worked on developing a commercial anti-
biotic called roseofungin and other biodefense treatments. However, these “conversion” plans
were only designed to serve as a cover for the BW production activities.52
In 1991, Kazakhstan became an independent country. SNOPB, however, remained under
the administrative subordination of Biopreparat in Moscow until 1992. After the break-up of the
USSR, SNOPB’s secret BW-related documents were taken back to Russia.53 As the facility pri-
marily employed ethnic Russians, approximately 70-90 percent of the personnel left Stepnogorsk
in several waves. It is believed that most of them returned to Russia to work at the Sverdlovsk
facility, other Biopreparat facilities, universities, or commercial biotechnology companies. Some
of these individuals subsequently returned to Stepnogorsk if they could not find work or adapt to
the New Russia.
SNOPB’s management had initially planned to maintain its subordination to the Russian
Biopreparat agency and operate the facility for the Russian government from the Kazakh terri-
tory. However, after financial support from Moscow ended in 1992, Gennady Lepyoshkin, who
had succeeded Alibekov as the head of the facility, held negotiations with President Nazerbaev
to transfer the facility to the control of the Kazakh government. By 1993, Stepnogorsk was under
the full control and oversight of the Kazakh government.
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54 Bozheyeva et al., Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan, p. 18.
55 Ibid., p. 17.
56 Ibid., p. 18.
C. New Beginnings: National Center of Biotechnology (NCB)
In 1993, the new Kazakh government made plans to reorganize the state’s BW facilities.
All former BW facilities based in Kazakhstan, previously falling under the Soviet Biopreparat
administration and the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, were merged with other civilian micro-
biology facilities formerly under the control of the Kazakh branch of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences. The result of this reorganization was the creation of the National Center for Biotechnol-
ogy (NCB) of the Republic of Kazakhstan, founded by Presidential Edict on 21 January 1993.54
The purpose of this reorganization was to create a center of excellence in the biotechnology field
and to exploit the technological advances of the former military facilities to meet national needs
in medicine, agriculture and industry. This decision was also triggered by the short-lived and
unsuccessful attempts by the Kazakh Ministries of Health and Agriculture to convert former
Soviet BW facilities located in Kazakhstan during the course of 1992.55 Since its inception, the
NCB has known many changes in its membership and administrative structure due to numerous
government reshufflings, but the SNOPB (now called Biomedpreparat) remains to this day the
leading component of the NCB.
1. The NCB Administration: 1993-1999
When it was created in 1993, the NCB included eight organizations located in various
cities of Kazakhstan, four of which were former BW facilities (see Figure 3). Among them was
SNOPB, which was transformed into a Joint-Stock Company and renamed Biomedpreparat in
1993. The second former BW member of the NCB is the Scientific Research Agricultural Insti-
tute (SRAI), located in Otar. SRAI formerly fell under the authority of the Soviet Ministry of
Agriculture. Its contribution to the Soviet BW program involved studying exotic and infectious
plant and animal diseases. The third former BW facility, Biokombinat, is an Almaty-based
mobilization facility capable of producing animal vaccines and diagnostics for infectious animal
diseases. It was also formerly under the authority of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture.56 In
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57 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
58 These entities were: Lizin, Gerbitsid, Transport, Aminokisloty, Biomedpreparat (different from SNOPB), and
Progress-Dubl 3. Ultimately, most of these facilities went bankrupt, closed, or simply disappeared for unknown
reasons. Those which still operate to this day are: (1) the electricity production and distribution facility (providing
electricity to the NCB), (2) the small enterprise “Biomedpreparat,” which produces industrial alcohol, and (3) Trans-
port, the road transportation enterprise that operates within and beyond Stepnogorsk. See “Proshchai Oruzhie-2,”
Novosti Nedeli, 17-23 October 2000, p. 8. Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan,
April 2000 and Washington, DC, February 2001.
1993, a new entity was created, the Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology (IPB), which
consisted of equipment and personnel originating from Biomedpreparat.
The other four original members of the NCB were civilian facilities. In addition to Plant
Progress, which was also transformed into a joint stock company in 1993, the civilian members
of NCB included the Institute of Medico-biology based in Stepnogorsk, as well as the Institute of
Molecular Biology and Biochemistry, and the Institute of Plant Physiology, Genetics and Bio-
engineering (IPPGB), both located in Almaty. The latter two institutes had been under the con-
trol of the Kazakh branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the Soviet era.
Between 1993 and 1999, several waves of reorganization occurred, resulting in the modi-
fication of NCB’s membership. In particular, three of the Center’s original members left the
NCB. The Institute of Molecular Biology and Biochemistry became an independent entity. The
Institute of Medico-biology was transferred to the Medical Academy of the Akmola region
(under the Ministry of Health).57 Finally, in 1997, by government decision, Plant Progress was
divided into six smaller production and research entities and privatized.58
Two new entities were also created within the Center. In 1998, the Environment Monitor-
ing Laboratory was created within Biomedpreparat with the financial support of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense. Also, a small enterprise named Aspect-pharm was created within the IPB to
produce and market civilian products (see Figure 4).
2. The NCB Today
In 2000, the NCB consisted of six main organizations with two dependent entities under
the oversight of a management entity, also called the NCB (see Figure 4). In 2001, a new reorga-
nization of the Center occurred which resulted in the transfer of the Central Laboratory of Medi-
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59 In order to promote the replacement of imported drugs by locally produced drugs, the CLMCR concentrates on the
development and clinical testing of medical compounds and authorizes their production.
60 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
61 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001.
62 Dr. Gennady Lepyoshkin was General Director of the NCB from 1993 to March 2001. Since April 2001, this
function has been assumed by Dr. Serghazy Adikenov.
63 In April 2001, the director of the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory, Dr. Alexander Kossinov, was demoted to
the position of Deputy-Director.
cal Compounds Research (CLMCR) to the Medical Academy in Astana (Kazakhstan’s new capi-
tal).59 Thus the NCB is now composed of five main organizations and two dependent entities
(see Figure 5). Formally, the NCB operates as a consortium, with each member organization
having its own activities, budget, and management team.60 The NCB members, however, are tied
together, by the implementation of state programs, such as the program on, “The Use of Genetics
for Agriculture, Health and Industry.” Total employment at the NCB is now approximately 1000
employees distributed among its member organizations in Stepnogorsk, Almaty, and Otar.61
Within Stepnogorsk, the following facilities are found:
C The NCB: The NCB is the management oversight entity, composed of 50 administrative
employees, including the General Director of the NCB.62 The NCB has the following
functions: (1) to determine priorities and coordinate the activities of its members; (2) to
implement physical and chemical biological research programs; (3) to develop new tech-
nologies, monitor imports, and increase export potential; (4) to redirect the activities of
its members towards civilian purposes, and more particularly towards the development of
research and production of biological compounds for drugs, food, and pesticides produc-
tion among other things; (5) to monitor the consequences of its members’ activities on
the environment; and (6) to implement international cooperation and research exchanges
in the field of biotechnology.
C AO Biomedpreparat: AO Biomedpreparat is the former BW production facility
(SNOPB). Today it has no other activity but the dismantlement of the BW production
equipment and infrastructure, funded by U.S. government assistance. Biomedpreparat
presently employs 120 personnel in total, which includes all scientific, administrative,
and support personnel.
C The Environment Monitoring Laboratory: The Environment Monitoring Laboratory was
created in March 1998 within AO Biomedpreparat. It has 30 employees, including its
director.63 The Laboratory has state of the art equipment provided under U.S. government
assistance. It can perform biochemical, biophysical and microbiological analyses. The
main tasks of the monitoring laboratory today are: (1) testing of contamination levels
during execution of the dismantlement contract, (2) testing and ecological monitoring of
biochemical and chemical contamination in the regions of Kazakhstan from industrial 
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64 In April 2001, Dr. Vladimir Bugreev, director of the IPB, was fired due to a Kazakh government reorganization.
65 Vladimir Bugreev, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
66 Vladimir Bugreev, presentation given at conference, “Former Biological Weapon Facilities: Dismantlement and
Prospects for Conversion, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 24 July 2000.
67 Vladimir Bugreev, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
and former weapons facilities. In the future, the NCB plans to develop the Laboratory to
serve as a regional environmental monitoring center in Central Asia.
C The Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology (IPB): The IPB was created in 1993 and
located in a remodeled building that used to house a kindergarten in downtown Stepno-
gorsk (off-site of the weapons complex). Its has 70 employees, including its director.64
The technical staff working at the institute previously worked on the production and fer-
mentation of biological agents in building 221 at SNOPB.65 The IPB also inherited part of
its laboratory equipment, such as fermentors of U.S., Japanese and European origin from
the SNOPB. The Institute includes three laboratories: (1) the microbiology synthesis lab,
which conducts basic research and maintains the Institute’s collection of industrial bac-
teria; (2) the applied biotechnology laboratory, which develops drugs for diseases of
microbial, vegetal, and animal origin; and (3) the physical biochemistry laboratory which
performs pre-clinical testing of drugs. The IPB houses a museum of over 130 industrial
cultures of bacteria and fungi, and genetically modified strains for industrial production
of microbiological products. The IPB also has a small production facility for drugs, diag-
nostics, and prophylactic compounds, as well as other biochemical and immuno-chemical
reagents.66
C Aspect-pharm: In 1995, the IPB created a small joint venture called “Aspect-pharm.”
Ninety percent of this small business’ staff is composed of former employees of Biomed-
preparat and Progress. This pharmaceutical enterprise produces most of the new civilian
products developed at the IPB. This includes medicinal herb tonics like “Ovsa,” “Stevia,”
a sugar substitute, antibiotics like “roseofungin,” and food bacteria like “bifidumbacteria”
and “lactobacteria.” This venture was established mostly to facilitate and accelerate coop-
eration between the IPB and foreign enterprises. Since state enterprises, like the IPB,
have too many administrative constraints, foreign investors usually prefer cooperating
with private smaller businesses. Eighty percent of Aspect-pharm shares are owned by
private investors, and only 20 percent of its shares are state-owned.67
The other members of the NCB are located outside Stepnogorsk: two are in Almaty, and
one is in Otar:
C The Scientific Research Agricultural Institute (SRAI): The Scientific Research Agricul-
tural Institute is located in the city of Otar, about 200 km west of Almaty, on a Kazakh
military base. Currently employing 250 people, SRAI specializes in the study of exotic
foreign plant and animal diseases. In addition to research, one of the main activities of
29
68 The institute produces 18 animal vaccines and 38 diagnostics. Brochure provided by S.M. Mammadeliev, direc-
tor of SRAI, “National Biotechnology Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Scientific Research Agricultural
Institute.”
69 Brochure, “National Centre on Biotechnology, Republic of Kazakhstan,” (Stepnogorsk: Ministry of Energy,
Industry, and Trade, 2000).
the Institute is to produce animal vaccines and diagnostics.68 These products are sold in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The institute houses a collection of viral ani-
mal diseases that includes 11 highly dangerous and exotic strains of animal diseases.
SRAI also houses a collection of plant pathogens, and conducts research on the devel-
opment of disease-resistant plants.
C Biokombinat: Biokombinat is a 30,000 m2 production facility, located in Almaty. It spe-
cializes in the production of 35 types of animal vaccines (such as a veterinary anthrax
vaccine) and diagnostics.69 Biokombinat currently employs 150 personnel.
C Institute of Plant Physiology, Genetics and Bioengineering (IPPGB): The IPPGB, located
in Almaty, was created in 1994 on the basis of the Institute of Botanic and the Central
Botanic Garden of the Academy of Sciences. It focuses on the development of genetical-
ly modified plants (rare and economically important plants), the development of biologi-
cal compounds like bio-pesticides, and plant growth and resistance regulators. The
IPPGB has an applied research base of 50 hectares of land.
Because of numerous changes that have taken place since 1993, today’s NCB is a totally
different entity from its Soviet ancestor, the Progress Scientific and Production Association.
Their only common elements are the SNOPB, renamed Biomedpreparat in 1993, and what re-
mains of Plant Progress, i.e., the equipment and personnel transferred to today’s NCB member
organizations located in Stepnogorsk. It is on these common elements that our study will con-
centrate: the NCB management entity, Biomedpreparat, the IPB (Aspect-pharm included), and
the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory, all located in Stepnogorsk.
D. A New Partnership: U.S. Government Engagement
Soon after the creation of the NCB, the U.S. government provided support to the Kazakh
government for converting former Soviet BW facilities located on Kazakh territory. Unfortunate-
ly, the early attempts at conversion in Stepnogorsk were unsuccessful for reasons that encom-
passed technical, political, social, and economic factors. From this initial failure, the belief that
conversion was not possible at Stepnogorsk shifted U.S. assistance from conversion to disman-
tlement activities. But, the question remains as to whether conversion could still occur at Stepno-
gorsk. It is important to analyze both the conversion and dismantlement activities at Stepnogorsk
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70 Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies.
71 At this time, the U.S. government knew about the Stepnogorsk facility from its debriefing sessions with defector
Ken Alibek. When the Kazakh government submitted Stepnogorsk on its initial list of prospective conversion proj-
ects, the U.S. government jumped at the chance to engage this facility. U.S. government official, interview by
authors, Washington, DC, 20 August 2001. The other three “Fast Four” projects involved: (1) Gidromash (missile
and aircraft systems production facility); (2) the National Nuclear Center (basic research and testing of nuclear
weapons); and (3) Kazinformtelecom (maintains Saryshagan missile test range, telecommunications). Although this
to understand the role and effectiveness of U.S. assistance and what this has to say about whether
future conversion efforts are still possible.
1. Breaking Ground: U.S. and Kazakh Agreements
Early on, U.S. government support of defense conversion in Kazakhstan (and the broader
role of U.S. government assistance) was used as both a “carrot” and reward for Kazakh coopera-
tion in the renouncement of its nuclear weapons and ratification of the START I treaty. In addi-
tion, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry was a strong supporter of the idea that nonprolif-
eration involved addressing the economic stability of former weapons facilities and their scien-
tists. Conversion activities within Kazakhstan began under a 1994 U.S.-Kazakh bilateral agree-
ment, known as the Defense Conversion Implementing Agreement. This agreement established
the Joint Committee for Defense Conversion, which included both Kazakh and U.S. representa-
tives.
The Joint Committee for Defense Conversion was tasked with designating a list of eight
Kazakh defense enterprises that would be eligible to receive funds from the U.S. government for
conversion (see Table 1), and with coordinating all Kazakh international conversion programs.
The principal objective of this program was to link U.S. private businesses and Kazakh defense
enterprises in conversion programs that would be partly financed by the U.S. government and
U.S private partners. In this first set of conversion programs, $14.7 million in U.S. government
funding was allocated to finance joint projects between U.S. and Kazakh enterprises. An addi-
tional $21.2 million was to be invested by participating U.S. private enterprises, bringing the
total investment to $35.9 million.70 Facilities formerly engaged in work involving weapons of
mass destruction received priority. Four key facilities, known as the “Fast Four,” were ultimately
selected for conversion funding; the National Center for Biotechnology (NCB) was one of these
enterprises.71 The NCB conversion project would be conducted at Biomedpreparat. Eleven other
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particular U.S. program focused on Kazakhstan, defense conversion projects were initiated in each of the nuclear
successor states. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion
Efforts in the Former Soviet Union, GAO/NSIAD-97-101 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April
1997), p. 22; and Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government Assistance to and Co-
operative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, FY 1998 Annual Report (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, January 1999), p. 154.
72 “Soedinenie Shtati poderzhivaiut konversiu v Kazakhstane” (The U.S. supports conversion in Kazakhstan),
Kazakhskaia Pravda, 13 July 1994.
73 In 1991, U.S. Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, more commonly known as the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. This program provided the Department of Defense with the
authority to fund assistance to eligible states in the Former Soviet Union to dismantle and destroy weapons of mass
destruction, to strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, to prevent proliferation, and to help
demilitarize the industrial and scientific infrastructure involving former weapons facilities in the NIS. See
http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_index.html.
74 U.S. General Accounting Office, Cooperative Threat Reduction, p. 22.
75 Dimitar Antonov, AAI, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 27 August 2001.
76 Apparently, building 211 was never considered for the conversion venture, since Kazakh officials had already
envisioned using this facility for their own commercial production of nutrient media. The project, however, was
never implemented. Dimitar Antonov, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 27 August 2001.
Kazakh enterprises were also selected to participate in the second stage of this conversion pro-
gram.72 The conversion program would be funded under the U.S. Department of Defense’s
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.73
2. The Allen & Associates Project
In March 1995, a $2.7 million contract was awarded to the Biomedpreparat facility for a
defense conversion project designed to manufacture and distribute vitamins, pharmaceuticals,
antibiotics, and pharmaceutical supplies.74 Subsequently, the firm Allen & Associates Interna-
tional (AAI) was selected as the defense conversion partner for Biomedpreparat through a U.S.
government contract bid.75 For its part, AAI was to provide an additional $3.1 million in a cost
sharing agreement for the joint venture, which was to be called “Kamed Resources.”
A few months after AAI was awarded the contract, AAI representatives visited the facil-
ity and determined that most of the Biomedpreparat buildings and other infrastructures were not
suitable for pharmaceutical production. Kazakh officials were interested in using the production
and research buildings, as well as the bunkers for the joint venture.76 AAI, however, was con-
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77 ICN had already been working with its Belgrade-based subsidiary, Galenika, to import and register a variety of
pharmaceutical drugs and products in Kazakhstan. Dimitar Antonov, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 27
August 2001; ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. News Release, “ICN Pharmaceuticals and Allen & Associates To Convert
Former Soviet Scientific Production Complex Into Drug-Manufacturing Facility,”14 May 1996, at
http://www.icnpharm.com/.
Table 1: Kazakh Enterprises Selected for Defense Conversion*
Enterprises participating in the international
conversion program: Stage 1
Enterprises selected for the international
conversion program: Stage 2
- National Center of Biotechnology,
Biomedpreparat (Stepnogorsk)
- Kazinformtelekom (Almaty)/ National
Center for radio electronics and
communications (Druzhnyi)
- National Nuclear Center (Kurchatov city)
- Kaskor (Aktau)
- Heavy Machine Building Plant
(Petropavlovsk)




- Zavod Ispytatelnykh mekhanizmov
(Petropavlovsk)







- Non-organic products plant (Serebriansk)
- Nauka-Vostok (Kokshetau)
* U.S. General Accounting Office, Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in
the Former Soviet Union, GAO/NSIAD-97-101 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 1997): 22; and Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government Assistance
to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, FY 1998
Annual Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, January 1999),
154.;“Soedynyonye Shtaty poderjyvayut konversiu v Kazakhstane” (The U.S. supports conversion in
Kazakhstan), Kazakhskaya Pravda, 13 July 1994.
cerned about the possibility of BW contamination within these buildings. Ultimately both sides
agreed on Biomedpreparat’s infirmary as the site for the joint venture since it was the one build-
ing that had never been associated with BW activities. The infirmary, however, was not without
its problems. Due to recent flooding, the basement of the building was submerged in water.
Because of this, the building required significant renovations to prepare it for commercial activ-
ities. Furthermore, the renovations and implementation of the project were delayed by interrup-
tions in power and water supplies because Biomedpreparat could not regularly pay its utility
bills.
In May 1996, AAI brought in ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to provide additional expertise
in execution of the conversion project.77 In particular, ICN was to prepare a full technical design
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78 Michael Dobbs, “Soviet-Era Work On Bioweapons Still Worrisome,” Washington Post, 12 September 2000, p.
A1.
79 Richard Combs, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Nunn-Lugar Program,” in Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and
NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, ed. John M. Shields and William C.
Potter (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 42-60.
for the conversion scheme in the infirmary. At a later time, ICN would also provide training in
pharmaceutical methods and standards to Biomedpreparat employees, as well as import pharma-
ceutical products for packaging. Given the inherent difficulty in renovating the infirmary to meet
international pharmaceutical production standards, AAI and ICN decided that there would be no
on-site pharmaceutical production. Instead, the focus was on importing and packaging different
types of pharmaceutical products, starting first with vitamins and then moving to analgesics.
Only pills and powdered products were planned since these were much easier and less expensive
to handle than liquid preparations. Once this plan was outlined, AAI shipped one million dollars
worth of pharmaceutical manufacturing equipment, such as pill presses and packaging lines, to
Stepnogorsk. Disagreements between AAI and Biomedpreparat, however, caused additional
delays in project implementation.
Owing to mounting technical and financial problems (further described below, section E),
AAI had difficulty meeting the deadlines set by the U.S. government. Because of this, AAI put
in requests for contract amendments to the Department of Defense to compensate for these logis-
tical problems and delays. However, these requests came too late. By spring 1997 the U.S. gov-
ernment decided to terminate the contract between AAI and Biomedpreparat. AAI quickly filed a
lawsuit for breach of contract, and the U.S. government eventually settled out of court with Allen
& Associates for $2.1 million.78
3. From Conversion to Dismantlement: The Dismantlement Process
Back in the United States, by the time the fiscal year (FY) 1996 budget appropriations
were debated, the Republican stronghold in both the House and Senate opposed future CTR pro-
gram support for defense conversion.79 The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) added
legislative restrictions to eliminate funding authority for defense conversion. Within this context,
when the House authorization bill moved from the HASC to the House floor, an amendment was
added to suspend all CTR funding for Russia until the U.S. president certified that Russia was in
34
80 However, prior year CTR funding (pre FY 1996) that remains unspent can be used or reallocated to support con-
version activities. In addition, non-governmental and international assistance can be used to support current conver-
sion projects.
81 Dana Lewis, “Interview with President Nazarbayev,” http://www.msnbc.com/news/406276.asp, accessed January
2002.
82 At the time, however, Kazakhstan was not a State Party to the BTWC. Therefore, technically speaking, Kazakh-
stan was not bound by the treaty. To date, Kazakhstan has not signed and ratified the treaty.
83 As a caveat, former Soviet bioweaponeer Ken Alibek states that in June of 1992, the newly formed Kazakh Min-
istry of Defense was interested in recruiting him to manage a new Kazakh BW directorate, as outlined in a draft
agreement between the Biopreparat agency (Russia) and the Kazakh Ministry of Defense. Alibek states that the chief
of the defense section in the Kazakh president’s administration was involved in these recruitment efforts. Alibek
compliance with its obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This fur-
ther complicated continued support for funding of defense conversion projects—especially proj-
ects at former BW facilities. Eventually, these HASC restrictions were endorsed by the Senate
Armed Services Committee. In FY 1996, Congress chose to stop funding the Defense Enterprise
Fund (DEF), which underwrote U.S.-NIS defense conversion projects. To date, no new Congres-
sional funding for Department of Defense CTR programs can be used to directly support defense
conversion in Russia or the NIS.80
This Congressional shift also contributed to the final decision by the U.S. government to
terminate the ill-fated conversion project at Biomedpreparat. In 1996, with the AAI project in
shambles, attention turned to the subject of dismantlement of the facility. At the time the Kazakh
government supported dismantlement for two main reasons: threat reduction and commitment to
international norms. The Stepnogorsk facility was designed to produce and load large-scale
quantities of biological weapons during a wartime mobilization period. Therefore, the continued
existence of such a facility was a real security and proliferation threat. President Nazerbaev
recognized these threats and said that upon learning of Stepnogorsk, his first desire was, “to rid
ourselves of that [facility], and more importantly to rid ourselves of the consequences.”81 In
addition, Kazakhstan desired to be a member in good standing of the international community.
The construction of the Stepnogorsk facility started in 1982, seven years after the USSR had
ratified the BTWC and it had entered into force. This was a clear violation of an international
arms control agreement. The new Kazakh government did not want to start off its international
standing by continuing to maintain an illegal facility.82 For these reasons, the United States and
Kazakhstan chose to pursue dismantlement at Stepnogorsk.83
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feels, however, that this desire to retain BW by the new government was not made after a careful military or political
assessment. Alibek speculates that the government’s early interest in BW was possibly due to two reasons: (1) the
initial desire to retain some capability or infrastructure related to weapons of mass destruction since they had already
renounced their nuclear weapons, or (2) to keep the Biomedpreparat facility intact for leveraging purposes related to
future U.S. negotiations for additional nonproliferation assistance. Alibek states that he does not believe that Presi-
dent Nazerbaev wanted to stay engaged in the BW business. Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, pp. 247-50; Ken
Alibek, interview by authors, Manassas, Virginia, 22 August 2001.
84 U.S. government official, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 22 January 2001. For an additional description
of this visit, see Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s
Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 165-82.
The first U.S. government visit to Stepnogorsk occurred in 1995, a few months after the
award for a conversion project with AAI.84 Although the U.S. delegation had received Kazakh
government approval for the visit, this did not ensure open arms in Stepnogorsk. Dr. Lepyoshkin
sent his representative to tell the delegation that they were not welcome either in the town or the
facility. Tense discussions ensued, with U.S. government officials pressing for approval to visit
the site. Eventually, Lepyoshkin granted the team access to the town, but refused to allow them
access to the weapons facility, arguing that he had not received an official statement from the
Kazakh government to allow U. S. government representatives access to the site. Finally, U.S.
officials obtained a letter from the American embassy stating that they had Kazakh approval to
go on-site, and Leypyoshkin relented.
During the tour of the facility Lepyoshkin gave the delegation full access to the buildings
and rooms formerly used for weapons purposes. Yet he refused to tell the U.S. team what work
was done within these rooms or what the equipment was used for in the past. Lepyoshkin main-
tained that the equipment was used for vaccine production. Although the atmosphere was initial-
ly tense, this dissipated as the site visit progressed. In fact, at the end of the visit, Lepyoshkin
ended up accompanying the U.S. delegation on their visit to former BW proving grounds at
Vozrozhdeniye Island. In spite of the initial hostile atmosphere, subsequent U.S. government
discussions and interactions with Lepyoshkin were more constructive.
After this visit, the Department of Defense realized that Stepnogorsk could be a showcase
project of U.S. government BW nonproliferation assistance. Since Lepyoshkin exhibited more
openness and a spirit of cooperation as the visit progressed, the Department of Defense felt that a
constructive working relationship could be arranged. From this, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter and Ambassador William Courtney formulated the proposal to start a major U.S.
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85 Aerosol test chambers (in building 600) and product filling lines (in buildings 241-243) had already been removed
in the early 1990s by the Russian government. Brian Hayes, presentation, “Protection of Biological Weapons Pro-
liferation through Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs,” at conference on “Former Biological Weapons Facili-
ties: Dismantlement and Prospects for Conversion,” Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 24 July 2000; Ken Alibek, interview
by authors, Manassas, VA, 22 August 2001.
86 U.S. government official, telephone interview by Kathleen M. Vogel, 29 May 2001.
87 For a more detailed description of the activities held in each building, see Bozheyeva et al., Former Soviet Bio-
logical Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan.
government effort at Biomedpreparat called, “The Stepnogorsk Initiative.” Separate from the
AAI project, this initiative was envisioned to involve assistance for dismantlement of the facility
and redirection of its bioweapons scientists. Within the U.S. government, an interagency Stepno-
gorsk Initiative working group was formed, with oversight by the Office of the Coordinator of
U.S. Assistance to the NIS, to manage these efforts and develop new peaceful scientific activities
for the facility and personnel. The initial proposal for dismantlement was aimed at only elimi-
nating certain biocontainment (i.e., ventilation, filtration) equipment and not the large-scale
(20,000 liter) fermentors.85 This is because Biomedpreparat officials still hoped to use the fer-
mentors for commercial production of pharmaceuticals (even though they had yet to identify a
viable product or customer).86
In June 1996, the Kazakh government signed an amendment to the existing CTR agree-
ment to include dismantlement of the Biomedpreparat facility. One month later, a U.S. interagen-
cy team visited Stepnogorsk for a technical evaluation of requirements for demilitarization and
discussion of redirection possibilities. A tour of the facility revealed that there was no evidence
of existing BW activity, with the appearance that several of the buildings had gone unheated for
several years. Also, there were visible signs of attempts at conversion, such as the presence of
syringe packing lines. Under consideration for dismantlement were the buildings that had the
capability to produce, process, handle, and store BW materials. Ten buildings were identified as
central to the production of biological weapons and therefore subject to dismantlement:87
C Building 221 was used for the production and fermentation of large quantities of micro-
organisms. The large building (150 meters long; 32 meters high; 24 meters wide) con-
sisted of eight stories, two of which were underground (7 yards below the surface). This
building was equipped with bio-safety equipment (i.e., ventilation system, submarine
doors), autoclaves which sterilized all contaminated material coming from the hot zone,
20 fermentors with a 1,000 liters capacity, 10 fermentors with a 20,000 liters capacity
(each of which was four stories high), as well as a genetics laboratory.
37
88 In fact, the building was virtually collapsing during the 1995 Department of Defense evaluation. U.S. government
official, interview by authors, May 2001.
89 U.S. Department of Defense presentation, “Demilitarization of the Biomedpreparat Facility at Stepnogorsk,” NAS
Committee Meeting, 6 February 1997.
90 Ibid.
91 This section is mainly based on Brian Hayes’ presentation at the Stepnogorsk conference July 2000, supplemented
by further discussions between the authors and a U.S. government official.
C Building 211 was used to produce liquid nutrient media. Building 211 was linked to
Building 221 by a system of pipes transporting the media used for the culture of micro-
organisms that took place in building 221.
C Building 231 was specifically designed for drying and milling of anthrax bacteria. How-
ever, the building was never used for weapons activities.88
C Building 600 was the R&D facility. It housed a unique testing system, a 300-m3 explo-
sive aerosol test chamber, composed of a round cement platform and a dome overhead.
Experimental animals were placed on the platform, the dome lowered, and extremely
dangerous bacterial and viral agents were liberated into the chamber. Subsequently, a
robust ventilation system sterilized the room before scientists were allowed to come in
and work with the infected animals.
C Buildings 241 to 244 consisted of bunkers. Inside these bunkers, BW technicians filled
munitions and storage containers with biological agents.
C Buildings 251 and 252 were bunkers that were used to perform the final assembly and
storage of weapons. The bunkers had two-meter concrete walls and thick metal doors.
In September 1996, a proposal was developed for the initial contract that described the
technical requirements for demilitarization of these facilities. By October 1996, a joint U.S.-
Kazakhstan committee had reviewed and approved the proposed demilitarization project that
would involve two phases. Phase I would consist of pre-dismantlement activities involving:
(1) sampling/analysis, (2) inventory, (3) construction of a safety-monitoring laboratory, and
(4) development of a detailed dismantlement plan.89 Phase II would consist of the actual
dismantlement work. In December 1996, the Department of Defense signed a $1.85 million
contract with Biomedpreparat for Phase I.90
a. Phase I: A Promising Start 91
Under Phase I, U.S. and Biomedpreparat workers conducted an inventory of all BW-rele-
vant equipment/systems. This resulted in a detailed dismantlement plan and protocol for each 
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Overview of the SNOPB complex. The photo was taken in the spring of 2000 from Building 221.
On the left are the mounds where the 240 series bunkers were located. Behind the bunkers are
Buildings 600 and 231.
39
92 Under the sampling procedures, integrity and chain-of-command protocols were developed. Triplicate samples
were obtained which were retained for the U.S., Kazakhstan, and an archived (on-site) sample at the Scientific Re-
search Agricultural Institute in Otar; analyses of the samples were conducted by both U.S. and Kazakh scientists.
During the early 1990s the Soviet government had employed a rigorous two-year decontamination campaign at the
facility to hide prior offensive work at the facility. However, in order to determine any residual contamination, ex-
tensive sampling by U.S. and Kazakh scientists was conducted at each building slated for dismantlement. Through-
out the dismantlement work, additional samples were taken for analysis to ensure no residual contamination. Al-
though all samples returned with a negative result, in some areas some decontamination was used as a precautionary
measure. For example, the fermentors and pipelines that previously contained active biological agents were subject
to decontamination involving a specialized mixture of bleach and peroxide. U.S. government official, interview by
authors, June 2001.
93 Information gathered from a visit of the Stepnogorsk facility in April 2000 with Department of Defense officials.
94 U.S. Assistance to the NIS, 1998 report, p. 155; U.S. government official, interview by authors, Springfield, VA, 1
November 2001.
building floor covering such issues as worker safety, manpower, schedules, and costs. In addi-
tion, a series of sampling and biochemical analyses were made to determine the potential hazards
of contamination and the necessary biosafety protection for the dismantlement work.92 To sup-
port the analysis, it was determined that a local monitoring laboratory was needed. With addi-
tional U.S. government assistance, the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory was established in
March 1998 with a total set-up cost of approximately $1.2 million (separate from CTR funding
for Phase I and Phase II activities).
The Monitoring Laboratory was supplied with new equipment such as gas chromato-
graphs (equipped with electron capture and flame induction detectors), a UV spectrophotometer,
capillary electrophoresis, microscopes, and an automated workstation for immunoenzyme analy-
sis (ELISA). The laboratory would analyze soil, water, and waste samples to determine the pres-
ence of metals, organo-chlorine, organo-nitrogen, organo-phosphate, pesticides, microbiological
organisms, and industrial organic compounds.93 Throughout the course of the dismantlement,
15,000 samples were analyzed at the Laboratory, with another 3,000 samples analyzed in the
United States.94 Although this laboratory was established specifically for dismantlement activi-
ties, the U.S. Department of Defense agreed that the laboratory equipment could remain after
dismantlement to be utilized according to Kazakh interests. Therefore in 1999, the laboratory
was designed as a National Monitoring Laboratory by the government of Kazakhstan. In addition
to analyzing samples from the dismantlement work, the laboratory is equipped to conduct a
variety of other biochemical, biophysical, microbiological, and environmental tests.
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95 The original U.S. plans consisted of dismantling only the equipment that was unique to the pathogenic micro-
organisms (e.g., special bio-containment systems, air handling and waste treatment systems that allowed the building
to maintain negative pressure and protect the environment). The buildings, as well as the large-scale fermentors,
were to be preserved and if possible converted to peaceful purposes. In 1998, a team of U.S. technical experts eval-
uated the facility for additional prospects of conversion. These experts determined that the cost of upkeep and main-
tenance to run the large fermentors for commercial pharmaceutical/vaccine production would be prohibitive. In
subsequent discussions with these experts, Lepyoshkin conceded the futility of using these fermentors for commer-
cial production and recognized the economic gain from their dismantlement (via a CTR contract). As a result,
Lepyoshkin agreed to include the fermentors in the dismantlement contract. U.S. government official, telephone
interview with Kathleen M. Vogel, 29 May 2001.
96 Work had to stop and employees leave the building every 40 minutes in order to ventilate the working area. Yuri
Rufov, presentation at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey,
CA, 13 December 1999. Decontamination efforts at Ft. Detrick in 1972-1973 were also delayed due to difficulties in
maintaining the required temperature conditions for the decontamination process during the winter months. U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, NIH, DHEW Publication No. 74-555, July
1973.
b. Phase II: Progress and Problems
Phase I was completed in May 1998 and a follow-on contract for Phase II was awarded to
Biomedpreparat in September 1998. Phase II involved actual dismantlement of the production
infrastructure (including breathable air-system, submarine doors, butterfly valves, air filtration
system, and certain non-load bearing walls in containment areas), namely in buildings 221, 231,
and 600.95 Plans were developed and the actual dismantlement work started in January 1999.
U.S. Department of Defense officials consider Phase II work a great success. The dismantling
team, however, encountered a number of engineering and logistical problems that they had to
overcome during project execution.
For example, in building 231, dismantling the large drying machines proved challenging;
one dryer weighed over 200 tons. Since this equipment had to be removed from the building,
Biomedpreparat needed to acquire specialized lifting devices and cranes. Perhaps more signifi-
cant, portions of the dismantlement work were carried out during the winter months where the
temperature frequently dropped to -30/C. The buildings had been without electricity, heating,
and water for five years and many pieces of equipment used for the dismantlement would freeze
at -20/C. Electrical shortages, freezing of disinfectants, and poor ventilation conditions were also
problematic during the winter months.96 For example, the power station that provided the facility
with electricity was only intermittently in service. Appropriate physical protection of workers
was also a major issue. Special equipment and clothing that could simultaneously protect work-
ers from hazardous materials and keep them warm were needed. Since the facility was located
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97 Yuri Rufov, “Review Report About Processing Works on DSWA-DTRA Contracts for Destroying of Biological
Equipment Infrastructure at JSC Biomedpreparat,” presentation at conference on “Former Biological Weapon Facil-
ities: Dismantlement and Prospects for Conversion,” Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 24 July 2000. These laborers fre-
quently earned more money than senior bioweaponeers, since the dismantlement activities were conducted in a
hazardous work environment.
98 However, former weapons personnel still remain in Stepnogorsk and pose a brain drain proliferation threat.
outside of the Stepnogorsk city limits, worker transport to and from the dismantlement area was
another problem, especially in winter with snow and poor road conditions.
Because of these issues, certain measures were taken in order to facilitate execution of
the project. A service area (showers, medical point, resting/lunch room, locker room), as well as
a bacteriological laboratory for rapid diagnostics, was created in building 261, which was con-
sidered the cleanest of all the buildings. A diesel power source with a capacity of 15 kW was in-
stalled in building 261. In order to allow a sufficient energy supply for the other buildings being
dismantled, another diesel power station with a capacity of 100 kW was also purchased. Before
the energy supply and portable space heaters were added to the buildings, the workers used to
warm themselves in a rented bus during the cold winter months. Water was transported to the
site by truck and heated using the diesel power station installed in building 261.
In spite of all of these hardships, Phase II stayed essentially on track. After the
completion of work in Building 221, the dismantling team tackled building 600, which was
completed in November 1999. That winter, dismantlement work was conducted in the 240 and
250 series of bunkers, along with building 221. The total costs for Phase I and Phase II
dismantlement work is summarized in Table 2.
In total, 120 people were involved in the dismantlement project, of which 40 percent
were laborers and approximately 60 percent administrative support personnel. Laborers received
approximately US$180 per month (a good salary for the region), with benefits of specialized
medical care and food supplements.97 Once Phase II was completed in September 2000, all BW
equipment and infrastructure had been destroyed; there were no remaining proliferation or
offensive threats from the infrastructure or materials from the facility.98 The work was completed
with no major injuries to the Kazakh work force and done in a safe and ecologically sound manner.
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Former SNOPB employees dismantling a large autoclave in Building 221 with assistance
provided by the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
c. Phases III & IV: An Uncertain Future
Under the original terms of the contract, once Phase II was completed, CTR assistance
for dismantlement at Biomedpreparat would end. During a May 2000 visit by Ambassador
Richard Jones to Stepnogorsk, Biomedpreparat officials told him that although proliferation-
sensitive equipment would soon be destroyed, there would remain residual contamination within
the buildings, posing serious environmental and public health hazards. Biomedpreparat officials
proposed that elimination of these hazards could be achieved only by complete demolition and
decontamination of the buildings. Biomedpreparat officials said they would be glad to continue
cooperation with the U.S. via a new 5-year, $11 million contract to support these additional
dismantlement activities.
The issue of contamination came as a surprise to U.S. government officials. From the
outset and throughout the course of the contract, multiple samples had been taken from all parts
of the buildings undergoing dismantlement. On record, there was no documentation of any 
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Table 2: Dismantlement Costs at Biomedpreparat for Phase I and II
Task Cost (in U.S. dollars)
Labor (salary, supplemental pay, medical benefits,
vacation)
$344,000
Equipment, tools, design documents $343,000
Transportation and equipment rentals $25,000
Power supplies (diesel generators, space heaters) $15,000
Overhead (sanitary and hygienic oversight, water/sewage) $41,000
Labor safety (protective suits and gear) $29,600
Medical equipment and devices $52,000
Daily special diet for workers $7,000
Transportation of employees to and from site $55,000
Social Security payments $184,000
Biomonitoring $55,000
Legal and accounting $10,000
Management and administrative costs $221,000
Total $1,381,600
T. Lychkovska, “Planning and financing works for destruction of biological equipment infra-
structure at JSC Biomedpreparat,” presentation at conference on Former Biological Weapon
Facilities: Dismantlement and Prospects for Conversion, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 24 July 2000.
contamination found either by Kazakh or U.S. scientists. The original CTR contract even stipu-
lated that any samples found with contamination should be retained and logged. Throughout the
course of the dismantlement no mention had been made of any suspect samples. Towards the end
of the Phase II contract, however, Biomedpreparat officials charged that new samples (taken
independently by Kazakh scientists) did show residual contamination. When asked to produce
these samples for U.S. analysis, Biomedpreparat officials stated that they had not kept the sam-
ples. Debates continued back and forth regarding the legitimacy of the contamination claims.
In spite of suspicions about the truth of the alleged contamination, CTR officials did see
merit in the idea of additional dismantlement activities to ensure no possibility of residual con-
tamination or future reversion of the facility to offensive use. Therefore, CTR officials agreed to
support an additional Phase III and Phase IV of the dismantlement. Phase III would consist of
removing all supporting infrastructure not part of the BW production process, such as electrical
power and plumbing from building 600, and preparing the building for elimination; demolition
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99 Note that the unique aerosol testing system that was formerly in this building was destroyed in 1991 by decision
of the Soviet government. This destruction occurred four years before the first American team came to Stepnogorsk.
was to be conducted under the Phase IV contract.99 Although the original $11 million proposal
by the Kazakhs was not acceptable, CTR officials did explore more reasonable cost considera-
tions for these final two phases. Through a series of negotiations between CTR officials and
Capitol Hill, Congress authorized Phase III and IV with a total funding of $5.0 million (using a
reallocation of unspent FY 1998 funds) in the spring of 2000.
Before the end of Phase II, Phase III was initiated in September 2000 to keep the Bio-
medpreparat workforce employed and prevent a loss of momentum in future dismantlement
activities. Phase III was completed in December 2000 at a cost of $300,000. During this period,
Phase IV contract negotiations were being hammered out with Biomedpreparat officials to
finalize complete elimination of all three main production facilities (buildings 600, 221, 231).
Negotiations for this final portion of the project, however, proved to be the most frustrating and
contentious of all.
Prior to Phase IV negotiations, the DOD contracted with two expert engineering firms in
the area of infrastructure elimination. These firms provided a cost estimate of $1.8 million for
U.S. companies to handle all of the elimination (using local equipment and U.S. workers). Based
on these discussions and cost estimates, the U.S. projected costs for Phase IV dismantlement
were internally set at $3.0 million; funding would not be denoted in Kazakh Tenge (see Table 3).
In contrast to using U.S. engineering firms, this contract would be awarded directly to Biomed-
preparat and use local labor and resources. The elimination was determined to take 15 months,
which included no work during the harsh winter months.
Initial Phase IV contract negotiations took place during July 2000. At the outset, the Bio-
medpreparat team (led by Yuri Rufov, president of Biomedpreparat) submitted a new cost and
scheduling estimate for the dismantlement: $12.9 million over a 5-year period. U.S. officials
balked at this proposal and countered with a much lower initial offer of $2.3 million. The U.S.
and Biomedpreparat officials continued to haggle over the cost estimates, with Stepnogorsk per-
sonnel alleging additional contamination problems in the buildings. In the second round of talks,
Biomedpreparat officials proposed a $6 million figure. The U.S. countered with an offer of $3.0
million that would include funds to cover additional sampling tests and equipment for the Mon-
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100 “Biotechnological Development in Kazakhstan: Nonproliferation, Conversion, and Investment,” Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, 24-26 July 2000. See http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/nisnp/research/bioweap/step.htm.
101 Dobbs, “Soviet-Era Work on Bioweapons Still Worrisome,” p. A1.
itoring Lab. This was not deemed acceptable by Biomedpreparat. The negotiation intensified as
the two sides failed to come to an agreement. Biomedpreparat officials, due to their poor eco-
nomic situation, were determined to secure a substantial long-term contract for the demolition to
provide some measure of job security for their workers.
Table 3: Estimated Plan for Phase IV Destruction
Task Cost
Development of Management Action Plan $50,000
Development of Safety/Waste Disposal Plan $50,000
Personnel Training $50,000
Development of Sampling and Monitoring Plan $50,000
Development of Destruction Plan (starting with Building 600, then 231, 221) $50,000
Destruction of Building 600: Removal of equipment, ball and crane operation, clean-up $700,000
Destruction of Building 231: Removal of equipment, ball and crane operation, clean-up $1,000,000
Destruction of Building 221: Removal of equipment, ball and crane operation, clean-up $1,000,000
Completion of Destruction Report $50,000
Source: U.S. government official, personal communication to authors, 29 May 2001.
At the time of this negotiation, an international conference was being held in Stepnogorsk
on the subject of the BW nonproliferation and biotechnological development in Kazakhstan.100
To the surprise of the U.S. officials and other foreign participants, the conference turned into a
forum for complaints concerning U.S. assistance. Several of the Biomedpreparat officials and
other NIS participants openly criticized shortcomings in CTR assistance. One scientist com-
plained, “The Americans just want to destroy, they don’t want to create anything.”101 This
attitude did not do much to soften the U.S. negotiating position on dismantlement. The U.S.
remained adamant in its offer of $3.0 million, which it felt was generous and more than adequate
to fulfill all aspects of Phase IV. This was not acceptable to Biomedpreparat officials, and so the
U.S. team left Stepnogorsk in July 2000 with no contract agreement. Once back in the States and
upon further consideration, U.S. officials agreed to raise the contract offer to $3.5 million to
cover additional expenses for some decontamination activities. One week later, Biomedpreparat
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102 Karaganda is Kazakhstan’s second largest city, with an approximate population of 500,000. It is located 400 km
southeast of Stepnogorsk.
officials came back with a counteroffer of $4.9 million (with no mention of the issue of contami-
nation). With the lack of evidence for contamination, however, the U.S. government refused to
accept the offer. Yet the communication lines remained open between Stepnogorsk and Wash-
ington.
In the meantime, some other administrative and organizational changes within the CTR
program were implemented. In the summer of 2000, Bechtel Group, Inc. was awarded a contract
to execute the Phase IV contract. Bechtel was chosen for this task in connection with the Depart-
ment of Defense’s “long-term strategic plan” regarding the entire BW proliferation prevention
program under CTR. Bechtel was brought on to serve as the prime contractor and in-country
support for all future BW dismantlement and nonproliferation projects in Russia and the NIS.
However, in accordance with company policy at the time, Bechtel employees were not allowed
to work in hazardous environments. Therefore, it was decided that Phase IV would be carried out
via a sub-contract with Biomedpreparat workers. In spring 2001, however, Biomedpreparat had
not yet agreed to the $3.5 million U.S. government proposal for Phase IV dismantlement. With
these uncertainties, the United States informed the Kazakh Ministry of Energy, Industry and
Trade of its intention to stop dismantlement work at Stepnogorsk if the issue of residual contam-
ination could not be resolved. That summer, another round of negotiations between U.S. and
Kazakh government officials led to an agreement to conduct a joint sampling exercise to settle
once and for all the contamination issue.
To add to the tumultuous atmosphere, a May 2001 Kazakh government reorganization
resulted in the removal of Dr. Gennady Lepyoshkin from his post as director of the NCB and Dr.
Vladimir Bugreev as Director of the IPB; Dr. Alexander Kossinov, director of the Monitoring
Laboratory, was demoted. The new director of the NCB, Dr. Sergazy Adikenov, does not seem
to be interested in the Phase IV contract and appears to be more interested in moving existing
equipment from the Monitoring Lab to his home city of Karaganda.102 In October 2001, a U.S.
government sampling mission of Building 221 found positive contamination of Bacillus bacteria
within pipelines located on the 9.6-meter level. Preliminary tests only confirmed the presence of
a gram-positive Bacillus bacteria; additional tests would need to be conducted to identify the
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103 Bacillus thuringiensis (BT) is a gram positive Bacillus in the same family as Bacillus anthracis. The BT bacteria
produce a toxin that is not harmful to humans or animals, but is harmful to certain insects. The bacteria and its toxin
are used worldwide against a variety of plant pests. The Progress Plant is known to have produced B. thuringiensis
for commercial production. In addition, it is known that B. thuringiensis has been used to obscure the development
of B. anthracis as a weapon. For example, Iraq used B. thuringiensis as a simulant for B. anthracis in its BW pro-
gram.
104 “Kazakhstan: U.S. Program to Destroy Bioweapons Plant Needs Compromise,” Novosti Nedeli, 27 March 2002.
105 U.S. government official, telephone interview by Kathleen M. Vogel, December 16, 2002.
exact species of Bacillus. Eventually, detailed analyses determined that the contaminant was
Bacillus thuringiensis and not Bacillus anthracis.103 Since these tests were taken, Biomed-
preparat officials have determined that the spores are localized and have already undertaken
decontamination measures. Given the scope of weapons activities in building 221, the finding of
residual contamination is not completely surprising. However, U.S. officials find it disconcerting
that they were not informed of this problem earlier. Apparently, Kazakh officials admitted that
they had known of this contamination much earlier and failed to report it. Since then, U.S. offi-
cials have received certificates from the government of Kazakhstan ensuring that all remaining
buildings slated for destruction have no evidence of residual contamination.
As of December 2002, U.S. and Kazakh officials are negotiating to iron out the final
details of the building demolition.104 Remaining issues concern whether implosion or a ball and
crane operation will be selected as the method of building demolition. In order to prevent a loss
of momentum while these issues are fully resolved, the Phase IV project will be handled in four
separate contracts. Phase IVA, B, and C has already involved the removal of ancillary equipment
and other preparatory work for demolition from buildings 221, 231, and 600. The Phase IVD
contract, still to be finalized, will handle demolition of all three buildings. If negotiations for this
last contract proceed smoothly, demolition of the buildings should be completed in a matter of
months.105
Privately, some U.S. officials working on the dismantlement project believe that Phase
IV of the contract is not necessary. These individuals feel that since all of the offensive BW
equipment and infrastructure has been destroyed and the buildings are already suffering from
decay, a revival of BW activities could not be conducted there without significant investment of
money and time. These individuals believe that Phase IV of the contract should not have been
pursued, and those monies should have been reallocated to other dismantlement projects in
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description of this conference see Roger Roffey and Kristina S. Westerdahl, Conversion of Former Biological
Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: A Visit to Stepnogorsk (Umea: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, May
2001).
107 Early on, U.S. government officials recognized the importance of economic stability and viability of these former
bioweapons institutes as a means to mitigate the threat of nonproliferation. Therefore, the Stepnogorsk Initiative was
designed along with the dismantlement activities to assist in redirecting these bioweaponeers to peaceful purposes
and improving opportunities for foreign investment. However, U.S. Nunn-Lugar assistance is first and foremost
designed to address specific U.S. national security threats. NAS Committee Meeting, 6 February 1997; Anne
Harrington, “Redirecting Biological Weapons Expertise: Realities and Opportunities in the Former Soviet Union,”
CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 29 (September 1995): 2-5.
Russia or other independent states. However, other U.S. government officials argue that demoli-
tion of the buildings will forever destroy any possible resurrection of a BW program and will be
a symbolic end to the Stepnogorsk legacy. Furthermore, a Phase IV contract will provide for
some employment and additional funding to employ Biomedpreparat weapons scientists. If the
Phase IV contracts are agreed upon and work continues uninterrupted, complete building
demolition should be completed by 2004.
d. Different Conceptions of U.S. Assistance
At the July 2000 conference in Stepnogorsk, “Biotechnological Development in Kazakh-
stan: Nonproliferation, Conversion, and Investment,” presentations on the dismantlement of the
Stepnogorsk facility revealed that the American and the Kazakh members of the audience hold
different conceptions of U.S. assistance.106 Although all the parties agreed on the need and the
objectives of the dismantlement, they looked at the dismantlement process from different points
of view. From the U.S. side, dismantlement mainly has a nonproliferation significance. Elimina-
tion of the specialized equipment and buildings not only removed the threat of a renewed BW
production at Stepnogorsk, but also decreased the risk of proliferation of equipment and technol-
ogies.107 In contrast, the view of the Kazakh participants was more complex. Although they did
not question the nonproliferation objectives of the dismantlement, they clearly stated that the
dismantlement was destroying a scientific and industrial wealth that was greatly needed in this
period of economic transition. Note that these are not opposing points of view. Both sides recog-
nize that the other party’s view is well founded. Each side, however, stressed only one point of
view depending on self-interest: security versus economy.
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108 The “8 Ball” aerosol test chamber was a one-million liter sphere used to test weaponized agent. In 1977, the “8-
Ball” was placed on the National Register of Historic Places by the U.S. Department of the Interior and remains
intact at Fort Detrick.
109 However, in 2001, press reports emerged that the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence community
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munity as to whether they were permitted under the BTWC. Such activities do little to build trust within the former
Soviet BW establishment. See Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, “U.S. Germ Warfare Re-
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Angeles Times, 6 September 2001, p. 15.
110 The former BW facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland was later converted and part of it was transformed into a mu-
seum. The production facilities at Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff, Arkansas have not been used since 1969, and are not
in a state to be used.
For some other Kazakh participants it was unclear why the destruction of the equipment
and the buildings was preferred over their conversion to peaceful purposes, such as production of
drugs or agricultural products. This point was clarified by Stepnogorsk representatives, who
stated that the buildings and some of the remaining equipment could not have been used to pro-
duce products for the medical or agricultural sectors. As mentioned previously, teams of Western
pharmaceutical experts had visited the Biomedpreparat buildings and determined that producing
pharmaceuticals would be impossible due to poor building conditions and lack of Good Manu-
facturing Practices (see Appendix for further discussion). Overcoming these deficiencies would
require large financial investments. In spite of this, some representatives of the facility seemed to
regret the decision made by their government to destroy the facility and its equipment.
In addition, some Kazakh participants at the conference voiced their worries regarding
U.S. motivations in supporting dismantlement at Stepnogorsk and future work in Russia. They
found it suspicious that the U.S. did not destroy its former BW equipment and facilities, such as
the aerosol test chamber at Fort Detrick.108 Some claimed that the United States may be trying to
eliminate potential competitors in order to remain the only world power capable of producing
large quantities of biological weapons. This of course reveals the unawareness of some partici-
pants on the technical state of former offensive BW facilities in the United States.109 President
Nixon had indeed terminated the U.S. offensive BW program in 1969.110 Dr. Lepyoshkin, who
visited former U.S. BW facilities in 1997, confirmed this fact at the conference. Still, suspicions
remain.
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111 As part of the Stepnogorsk conference, foreign participants were to be given a tour of the Biomedpreparat
buildings and dismantlement activities. However, on the day of the tour (which followed the disastrous Phase IV
negotiations), the tour was cancelled by Biomedpreparat officials. Only by persistent entreaties by the conference
organizers and U.S. officials was the tour rescheduled, but foreign participants were only allowed an abbreviated
tour and given limited access to the buildings.
The ambivalent feelings of some Stepnogorsk representatives regarding the dismantle-
ment and destruction of the former facility and the suspicions regarding U.S. motivations were
enhanced the second day of the July 2000 conference, when it became apparent that the initial
Phase IV negotiations between U.S. government and Biomedpreparat officials had not gone
smoothly.111 However, it is worth noting that such an ambivalence was mostly due to the risk of
losing an “economic wealth” (i.e., jobs, production facility) while no alternative solution was
proposed.
E. Conversion Today
With Biomedpreparat dismantled and its main production buildings soon to be destroyed,
one may ask whether it still makes sense to talk about conversion at Stepnogorsk. The failed
conversion attempt of 1995-96 has nurtured the belief that conversion in Stepnogorsk is not pos-
sible. However, there are reasons to believe that this attempt at conversion should not serve as
the basis for determining the feasibility of conversion in Stepnogorsk. As we will show below,
the failure can be explained by the choice of a wrong approach and a wrong partner. The dis-
mantlement and the destruction of buildings and equipment do not eliminate all prospects for
conversion at Stepnogorsk, since only equipment and buildings central to BW production have
been or will be destroyed. Dual-use equipment, and more important, personnel are still available
for conversion. As a matter of fact, since 1995 a certain amount of conversion has been imple-
mented at Stepnogorsk through the dismantlement program, international assistance, or inde-
pendent initiatives. Yet, little commercial success has been recorded so far due to a number of
obstacles created both by inherent characteristics of the facility and its region, and by the
political context surrounding this conversion.
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1. The AAI Joint Venture: Anatomy of a Failed Project
Conversion of former Soviet weapons facilities is always considered difficult, at times
impossible, and yet many facilities have had success stories.112 So, what led to the failure of this
initial defense conversion project at Biomedpreparat? As outlined above, a number of technical
and financial problems plagued the project from the outset. To date, most discussions within the
academic and government circles tend to focus on these shortcomings. It is true that the technical
and financial problems encountered at Stepnogorsk were dire and caused many logistical impedi-
ments. A closer examination of the facts, however, reveals a more fundamental reason for the
project’s failure: conflicting objectives held by Biomedpreparat, Allen & Associates, the U.S.
government, and the Kazakh government. These different objectives were an essential, albeit
shaky, part of the foundation upon which the project was based. When the foundation began to
crumble owing to conflicts among these different objectives, technical and financial problems
hastened the project’s demise. It is important to examine these factors in greater detail to under-
stand how such an important project—the first U.S. government effort at engaging a major
Soviet BW facility—ultimately failed.
a. Technical and Financial Issues
At the outset, the capabilities and condition of the Biomedpreparat facility were not clear-
ly identified or outlined for the project. Prior to the contract award in 1995, no U.S. government
official had visited the facility. Because of this, limited information was available regarding the
production capabilities, standards, location, and power supplies at Biomedpreparat during the
U.S. government contract bid.113 In spite of this, AAI argues that the U.S. government main-
tained that the facility was ready and able for pharmaceutical production.114 Although the reasons
that Allen & Associates were chosen for the contract remain controversial, it is clear that the
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tract. On the other hand, defense conversion expert David Bernstein comments that the Department of Defense’s
procurement process was flawed for these early conversion projects. In their initial “Request for Proposals,” the
Department of Defense stated that the U.S. government would provide cost-sharing funds for the joint venture proj-
ects. Bernstein states that advertising the cost-sharing tended to attract companies for the wrong reasons. Many of
these companies had no experience working in the former Soviet Union nor did they understand the complexities in
the Department of Defense’s procurement rules and regulations. See Dobbs, “Soviet-Era Work on Bioweapons Still
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ate the center because they had been active as a commercial biological research laboratory for over 10 years and had
done a substantial amount of previous contract work for the government. “Prospective Contractors Sent Cancer
Center Applications,” Frederick News-Post; William Graffam, “Bids on Fort Detrick Project, “Confidential,”
Frederick News-Post, 24 March 1972.
company came into the project with some limitations.115 For example, AAI was not a commercial
biotechnology company and eventually partnered with ICN pharmaceuticals for technical assis-
tance on the joint venture. It would have been better if AAI had had a proven track record of
commercial biotech activities in the Former Soviet Union.116
A few months after the contract was awarded, AAI representatives visited the facility. In
contrast to their expectations, AAI representatives found it virtually impossible to locate appro-
priate clean rooms and biosafety/biocontainment equipment where pharmaceutical production
could be initiated. Furthermore, Biomedpreparat’s financial insolvency led to problems in paying
its utility bills, creating intermittent electrical, heating, and water supplies. Heating shortages
caused pipes in several buildings to freeze and break, which later led to flooding problems. For
example, the infirmary basement was flooded due to a large leak from building 221. Since there
was great concern that the flooded waters would have BW contaminants, AAI conducted sam-
pling within the basement and grounds surrounding the infirmary. Fortunately, the sampling did
not find any evidence of BW contamination. With these results, AAI proceeded with its plans to
use the infirmary for the joint venture, which now necessitated major renovations to pump out
the water in the basement, repair the building foundation, and build trenches to protect the build-
ing from any future floods. These renovations caused serious delays in the project schedule and
incurred additional costs that were not included in the initial project budget and timeline.
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121 All power at Biomedpreparat ran through Plant Progress. Since Progress also suffered from economic troubles
—frequently paying its employees with onions—it was not in a position to help Biomedpreparat. Although AAI had
tried to interest other U.S. companies to invest in Plant Progress, not one company responded to the invitation.
Dimitar Antonov, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 27 August 2001.
In terms of project execution, there were considerable differences of opinion between
AAI and Biomedpreparat with respect to the pill presses and packaging lines to be used.117 Bio-
medpreparat officials considered the shipment of equipment upon arrival to be second hand and
inferior—vintage 1970s era of Yugoslav origin—and in no way suitable for production. Because
of this and the lack of documentation or instructions, Biomedpreparat refused the shipment and it
remained unpacked for several months.118 In contrast, AAI insists that state-of-the-art equipment
was not needed for the project. Although AAI did not consult with Biomedpreparat before devis-
ing the production plan, AAI felt that the equipment they provided was adequate for employee
training and project execution, and kept costs low.119
During the course of the entire project, Biomedpreparat received only equipment as part
of the agreement, not hard currency.120 Lack of funding added to Biomedpreparat’s already diffi-
cult financial situation, leading to perpetual problems in paying for electricity service to support
the project.121 A vicious circle therefore resulted between non-payment of utility bills and lack of
service. The financial strain on Biomedpreparat caused further sources of conflict, and the rela-
tionship between AAI and Biomedpreparat soon disintegrated beyond repair.
At the same time, AAI did not initially take into account how the new political environ-
ment could impede commercial activities. When the project started, there was no pharmaceutical
distribution system in Kazakhstan. The centralized distribution system that had existed during
the Soviet era collapsed after Kazakh independence. In order to remedy this shortcoming, AAI
worked with ICN to establish computerized information networks in certain Kazakh regions and
54
122 Some of these technical delays, however, should have been anticipated from prior U.S. conversion efforts at Fort
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local centers on the Kazakh market. Such an information network could have led to a future dis-
tribution system. Unfortunately, this project never materialized. The local person that AAI hired
to set up this network, a corrupt Ministry of Health official, charged AAI $50,000 and then dis-
appeared.
Due to the myriad problems, the project was unable to meet deadlines set by the U.S.
government. With setbacks due to building renovations and other logistical problems, AAI felt
increasingly pressed by the U.S. government to show tangible results for the project. Because of
this, AAI decided to go ahead and set up some packaging lines and start some aspects of the
project—even among concerns that the products were being packaged improperly or in unsani-
tary conditions. At the same time, Biomedpreparat officials felt increasingly marginalized, and
U.S. government officials became more and more frustrated by the lack of progress on the proj-
ect.122 It soon became clear that all parties involved should have conducted a thorough technical
and financial evaluation of the facility and the proposed project before entering into a joint ven-
ture. In spite of these difficulties, even more important factors were involved in the failure of the
project.
b. Conflicting Objectives
At the core, the problems in the conversion project centered on the conflicting objectives
of Biomedpreparat, Allen & Associates, the U.S. government, and the Kazakh government. The
last two parties were mainly motivated by political objectives, while the first two were driven by
economic imperatives. These different objectives created different expectations and approaches
to conversion, as well as different conceptions of the role that each party would play in the proj-
ect. Lack of communication—and at times false communication—between the parties exacer-
bated these misunderstandings. Over time, these conflicts eventually grew to the point that a
successful outcome was not possible.
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bilities rather than on demand. Products driven by this concept are difficult to get into the marketplace because they
usually do not meet customers’ needs. Note, however, that most conversion projects developed during this time were
primarily technology-push. Both the former Soviet and Western partners overestimated the technological achieve-
ments of Soviet defense facilities and their adaptability to the consumer market.
124 Dimitar Antonov, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 27 August 2001.
Biomedpreparat’s main objective was to obtain sufficient funding to support its personnel
and maintain the facility. Similar to many former Soviet defense enterprises at the time, Biomed-
preparat was primarily focused on short-term results. Given the unstable economic situation that
resulted from the ending of Russian financial support to the city and the lack of Kazakh govern-
ment support for conversion, Biomedpreparat’s focus on attracting foreign currency to make
short-term profits is understandable. Biomedpreparat also expected AAI to deal with conversion
the Soviet way. For instance, AAI would provide the funds and tell Biomedpreparat what to pro-
duce and in what quantities; distribution and commercialization would be handled by AAI as
well. It is clear, however, that there was a total lack of understanding within Biomedpreparat of
basic business and market principles, as well as national and international pharmaceutical pro-
duction standards. The persistence of Soviet mindsets also favored a technology push approach
and resulted in unrealistic expectations on what was feasible for the conversion project.123
As a business, Allen & Associate’s main interests in the conversion project were profit
oriented. In contrast to Biomedpreparat, AAI was focused on reducing costs to maximize profit.
This implied a continual reevaluation of the project, its scale, and the time table, which led to a
decrease in the funds for Biomedpreparat and delays in product distribution. AAI was not able to
examine the facility before the contract was awarded, and the lack of information led to a series
of problems and delays. Biomedpreparat and AAI were thrown together without a period of time
in which both sides could evaluate one another and determine whether they could work together,
to include the development of a workable conversion project. Also, AAI did not understand its
contractual obligations or what role the U.S. government would play in the venture, and it failed
to realize the underlying political objectives implicit in the government contract.124
In contrast to Biomedpreparat and AAI, it appears that the U.S. government was moti-
vated primarily by political objectives. From the beginning, the conversion project with Biomed-
preparat was formulated for nonproliferation and defensive purposes. The main objectives of the
contract were to learn more about the former Soviet BW activities at the facility, to dismantle the
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facility, and to stem the proliferation of weapons scientists. Economic or business objectives
were secondary, and U.S. government officials expected AAI to deal entirely with this aspect. At
the time, the U.S. government had a poor understanding of what was involved in conversion of a
former Soviet defense facility, which led to the flawed initial project design and contract bid. For
example, the joint venture, as originally defined by the U.S. government, did not take into ac-
count the context nor the problems involving product distribution. Furthermore, there appears to
have been limited U.S. government oversight on the project. With the various disagreements
between Biomedpreparat and AAI, it would have been useful to have a more visible U.S. gov-
ernment presence on-site during the execution of the contract. This would have been beneficial
not only for mediation purposes, but also to more accurately evaluate the project’s progress, and
show strong U.S. oversight and commitment to the project.
The value of this project for the Kazakh government was to demonstrate its resolve in
eliminating the Soviet BW legacy and supporting nonproliferation policies. However, these
objectives did not translate into a coherent policy supporting or facilitating conversion. To the
contrary, Kazakh government officials, driven by short-term objectives or personal interest,
raised a number of obstacles to the project. The Kazakh Ministry of Health (MOH), which was
in charge of all Kazakh pharmaceutical industries, imposed stiff restrictions and fees to import
and register pharmaceuticals. The MOH’s strategy maximized its ability to collect revenue
through these rules and regulations. Although tariffs on imports can be used to promote domestic
production, the Kazakh MOH’s approach instead served as an obstacle, making it difficult for
foreign companies, like AAI, to consider longer-term investment in the Kazakh pharmaceutical
industry. At the same time, the government did not provide any additional incentives, such as tax
relief or subsidies, to help Biomedpreparat in its conversion efforts.
The bad experience from this initial conversion attempt resulted in many bitter feelings
among all the participants. Biomedpreparat officials felt cheated by both AAI and the U.S. gov-
ernment. John Allen, president of AAI, has publicly criticized both the U.S. government and
Biomedpreparat for the failure of the project saying, “They had no idea what their needs were.
They had never made a pill in their life.”125 At the same time, U.S. government officials blamed
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AAI for its poor management of the project. Resentments run deep for all parties involved in this
project.
c. Wrong Approach, Wrong Partner
With conflicting objectives and expectations, technical and financial problems, and no
information on the local conditions, it is not surprising that the project failed. Judging by the
facts, each party clearly made mistakes but also had to deal with extenuating circumstances.
Nevertheless, the failure of this project can be summed up as the choice of a wrong approach to
conversion and the choice of the wrong partner.
The choice of AAI as the business partner in this program was one of the main mistakes
made by the U.S. government. Before working on this project, AAI had no experience in the
commercial pharmaceutical field. This may be one of the reasons why some basic questions
regarding Biomedpreparat capabilities were not asked prior to signing the contract. It would have
been more appropriate to engage a U.S. enterprise already involved in the pharmaceutical field to
identify the possibilities and potential obstacles to a successful conversion at Stepnogorsk. In
this context, it is surprising that the U.S. government did not make better use of its experience in
conversion at Fort Detrick and Pine Bluff. Due to the lack of first-hand understanding of the
requirements of the pharmaceutical field, both AAI and the U.S. government engaged in an
unrealistic project and took no account of the local situation—until it was too late.
A comprehensive evaluation of Biomedpreparat capabilities should have been conducted
prior to designing the conversion project. A detailed description of the existing infrastructure,
including energy supply, the state of the equipment, and the qualified personnel available, could
have served as a base to determining the type of product to be produced, the targeted market
(domestic or international), and the profile of the U.S. partner needed. Instead, the U.S. govern-
ment proceeded backwards, by determining first the product, then the partner and the market,
before an analysis of the available capabilities had been made. The question remaining now is
whether the outcome would have been more successful using a different approach to conversion.
Perhaps the inherent structural, economic, and regional characteristics of Stepnogorsk would
have still created insurmountable obstacles to conversion. What does the future hold for Biomed-
preparat, the IPB, and the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory?
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2. Conversion In A New Context
To date, a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the failed 1995-96 AAI conversion
attempt has not been made by the parties involved. There has been no attempt to draw important
lessons learned from this first experiment. As a consequence, the analysis of infrastructure,
equipment, personnel, and technologies available for conversion has not been conducted. A clear
description of the obstacles to and potentials for conversion, taking into account the geographic,
economic, political and social environment, is also pending. Yet, without a detailed inventory of
available resources, and a qualified appreciation of the environment in which conversion has to
take place, no conversion strategy can be designed. Instead, conversion becomes a survival
maneuver conducted in the dark. Given the numerous changes that have occurred since the
break-up of the USSR and the implementation of the U.S.-sponsored dismantlement program,
it is important to summarize the conditions under which conversion has to take place today.
a. Resources Available For Conversion
One of the consequences of the break-up of the USSR is that most of the qualified per-
sonnel have left the former BW facility. This decreases the burden of converting former BW
personnel but also raises the question as to whether the remaining personnel are sufficiently
qualified to conduct the appropriate conversion of the facility. This question will be particularly
important when it comes to determining the type of civilian activity to select: production vs.
research, high-tech vs. low-tech production.
The dismantlement of the former BW production plant and the planned destruction of the
three buildings also decrease the burden associated with converting buildings and equipment.
We might argue that the loss of equipment and production space compromised early conversion
efforts. It is worth noting, however, that the buildings were already damaged when the first con-
version program started in 1995, owing to the lack of heating and maintenance after the break-up
of the USSR. Their use for civilian production would have required extensive repairs and up-
grades. Further, the risk of residual contamination of the buildings would have required decon-
tamination procedures. Therefore, conversion would have needed to take place off-site in the city
of Stepnogorsk, using buildings that were never involved in Soviet BW production. As a result,
the destruction of the former BW production buildings does not deprive the NCB of a useful
resource for conversion.
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With most of the equipment destroyed and the buildings dismantled, conversion in Step-
nogorsk mostly concerns personnel: former BW personnel still working today at the NCB, as
well as other support personnel who also need to be ‘converted’ since they are still on the NCB’s
payroll. This constitutes a total of 260 people,126 with about 40 persons with BW knowledge.127
They include the deputy directors of the NCB (management entity) and the monitoring labora-
tory, as well as the scientific teams of these institutions.
Only building 211, the nutrient media production building, remains untouched, and can
be converted to civilian use, since no BW activity took place in this building. Remaining dual-
use equipment (i.e., research scale fermentors, lyophilizers) has been transferred from Biomed-
preparat to the other institutes of the NCB in Stepnogorsk. Therefore, the entities to be involved
in conversion are the IPB, the Environment Monitoring Laboratory, and building 211 at Biomed-
preparat. The social infrastructure of the NCB has been transferred to the state, decreasing the
financial burden on NCB and freeing resources for conversion.128
b. Remote Location and Depressed Economy
The city of Stepnogorsk has changed tremendously since the break-up of the USSR. By
2000, its population had decreased from 90,000 in the Soviet time to 40,000 inhabitants.129 Like
Biomedpreparat, other local enterprises have lost a large part of their personnel as a result of the
break-up of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed. The local economy is domi-
nated by only a handful of industrial plants, such as a metallurgical plant, the NCB, a bearings
plant, a dairy products plant, and a mining company. Due to the poor economic situation, many
of these enterprises have sharply decreased their activities and downsized their personnel.130
Some people have tried to set up small businesses, but this has been rarely successful due to the
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lack of investors and the poverty of the local population.131 The city has little infrastructure, poor
roadways, and undeveloped utilities. Electricity cuts are frequent, and the city is deprived of hot
water or heating for long periods of time. Other infrastructure present during the Soviet time has
been closed or sold after the break-up of the USSR: four cinemas (closed), a cultural center
(closed), sports center (sold), two shopping centers (one closed), airport (closed), bus and train
stations (closed).132
This situation has reinforced the geographic isolation of the city, which in turn has inflat-
ed the consequences of the local economic crisis.133 Many believe that the city’s isolation might
be broken by the relocation of the nation’s capital to Astana, a city located three hours south of
Stepnogorsk. As Astana grows, it may contribute to the renewal of Stepnogorsk and help the
conversion of the NCB. Yet, Astana is still underdeveloped, consisting mostly of a few admin-
istrative buildings and shopping centers. Economic activity has not yet flourished in the capital.
The territory between the two cities is mostly composed of long stretches of steppes, with only a
few villages in between. Any positive effects related to the relocation of the capital won’t be
manifested for several years.
Thus, since the break-up of the USSR, the changes in the facility’s structure and in the
economic and geographic environment in Stepnogorsk have generated a strange mixture of
characteristics. These changes have led to some relief in the scale of conversion required, but
have also introduced greater difficulties in the conversion process due to the depressed state of
the local economy. In addition, there are other factors that we need to take into account to fully
appreciate the complexity of the conversion process in Stepnogorsk.
3. Obstacles To Conversion In Stepnogorsk
a. Legal Status
The NCB is a state facility, which implies that its conversion plans must be approved and
sometimes even initiated by the Kazakh government. The law on conversion of Kazakhstan
states that the Cabinet of Ministers determines the list of converting enterprises and approves
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their conversion plans. Although a state-owned status allows very little flexibility in strategic
planning or cooperation with foreign partners, these difficulties can be overcome by good coop-
eration and communication with government officials. However, this is a great challenge in
Kazakhstan due to the peculiarities of political life. Concentration of power in the hands of the
President and a high rate of government turnovers hinder long-term support for projects, unless it
is a priority determined by the President. Unfortunately, the facts show that conversion of former
BW facilities does not rank high in the Presidential agenda.
Since its inception in 1993, the NCB has been transferred under the administrative con-
trol of three ministries (Ministry of Science and New Technologies, Ministry of Science and
Education, Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Commerce) and one government agency (the
Health Agency under the Ministry of Education and Science). More recently, after the elimina-
tion of the Health Agency in early 2001, the NCB has been transferred under the direct control of
the Ministry of Science and Education (see Figures 4 and 5). In addition to causing damaging
disruptions in project implementation, these repeated changes in administrative control require
high investments of time by the NCB’s management to establish an adequate communication
with the new government officials involved, generate their interest in the NCB’s conversion, and
instill in them the institutional memory that they are lacking.
Frequent changes in administrative control over the NCB have also introduced additional
disruptions in the Center’s management. Until 2000, the NCB’s management was able to con-
vince government officials of the importance of its projects. However, since the government
reshuffle of March 2001 and the ensuing transfer of the NCB to the control of the Ministry of
Education and Science, communication has been more difficult. Dr. Lepyoshkin was fired and
was replaced by Dr. Sergazy Adikenov, a chemist by training, who headed the Institute of Phyto-
chemistry in Karaganda. Dr. Adikenov shows little interest in conducting conversion at Stepno-
gorsk. As mentioned earlier, he is more interested in moving the Environmental Monitoring Lab-
oratory to his hometown of Karaganda and has proposed establishing a new national laboratory
there to develop anti-cancer drugs.134 In addition, the new director has already replaced some of
the existing weapons scientists on U.S. and internationally sponsored research projects with his
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own scientific personnel and is attempting to restructure some of these ongoing scientific proj-
ects. U.S. government officials express concern with these actions and are conducting reviews of
their existing projects. As of December 2002, it is still unknown what effects these personnel and
organizational changes will have on the dismantlement project or on other redirection efforts.
b. Lack of State Support
One consequence of the regular government reshufflings and high turnover in govern-
ment personnel is the lack of coherent state policy and support in the conversion process. For
instance, in its early efforts at conversion, the NCB management had proposed producing insulin
as a conversion project. In order to finance production, the NCB had applied for a loan at the
Barclays Bank which the state originally planned to guarantee. However, when the loan was
awarded, the government unexpectedly changed its policy and decided not to guarantee bank
loans any more.135 As a consequence, the NCB lost the loan and conversion based on insulin
production could not take place.
Similarly, in 1995 a state program, on “The Use of Genetics for Agriculture, Health and
Industry,” was developed by the NCB to promote the technological and production capabilities
of its member organizations, and meet national needs in the field of genetics, agriculture and
industry. The program was approved by the government in 1995 for a five-year period (1995-
2000) and renewed for 5 more years in 2000 (2000-2005). Originally, this program aimed to
benefit the members of the NCB by providing them regular state funding. However, funding was
very low from the very beginning. In the first year only $300,000 was set aside, and then the
funding ran out.136 More recently, a tender system has been introduced. The state program is now
published and any enterprise in the country—civilian and former BW facilities—can submit its
project proposals.137 In theory, projects are chosen on a merit basis. Some people, however,
believe that funds are awarded on the basis of personal ties or preferences. In the aftermath of the
recent reorganization, the NCB has lost its priority status in the government, and therefore one of
its main sources of funding for conversion. On the other hand, the local Stepnogorsk authorities
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are supportive and maintain good relationships with the NCB’s management. Yet, the local econ-
omy is dependent on facilities that have tremendous economic difficulties, including the NCB.
As a result, the local administration does not have sufficient means to support conversion.
c. Lack of Finance and a Difficult Economic Situation
The NCB is a state facility, and it implements state orders, but it is only partly financed
by the state budget. In 1999, only 38 percent of its total budget came from state funds. As shown
in Table 4 below, most of the NCB’s income is generated by foreign assistance and commercial
activities.138 The percentage of state funding in the total budget has decreased dramatically since
the break-up of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the high percentage of outside funds in the NCB’s
total budget is misleading. It does not indicate the generation of high income from commercial
activities or international assistance; rather, it is the regular decrease of State funding since 1994
that has inflated the share of outside funds in the NCB’s budget.


















IPB 918.0 0.0 10,160.1 1834.0 21,174.1 43.4
IPPGB 12,678.0 2966.0 5936.0 0.0 21,580.0 72.5
NISKII 12,106.3 200.0 5754.0 52,300.0 70,360.3 17.5
CLMC 3048.9 162.5 0.0 0.0 3211.4 100.0
Biokombinant 267.0 0.0 0.0 45,442.0 45,709.0 0.6
National
Biocenter
8315.0 0.0 560.1 2847.0 11,722.1 70.9
AO Biomed-
preparat
0.0 0.0 89,237.3 11,883.9 101,121.2 0.0
AOOT
Biopreparat
0.0 0.0 0.0 220,678.0 220,678.0 0.0
Total 45,595.2 3328.5 111,647.5 334,984.9 495,556.1 38.1†
*Information provided by Gennady Lepyoshkin, April 2000; $1 = 145 Kazakh Tenge (KT) 




141 Vladimir Bugreev, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
142 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001.
143 Ibid.
144 Segadippar Mamadaliev, interview by authors, Almaty, Kazakhstan, April 2001.
The members of the NCB are not equally affected by the decreasing state budget. Typi-
cally, the facilities mainly involved in research are better off than those involved in produc-
tion.139 Scientific research institutes of the NCB are more or less financed by state programs, and
they have a smaller workforce than the production facilities. In contrast, production facilities
must try to survive on their meager commercial income. Among the members of the NCB expe-
riencing the greatest financial difficulties are Biokombinat (Almaty) and the Otar facility. The
former faces Russian competition on the Kazakh market for animal vaccines, while the latter has
a large production infrastructure and significant overheads. Biomedpreparat, on the other hand,
has a more favorable situation due to CTR program support.140 The IPB is in a similar situation.
In 1995, the institute depended 100 percent on the State budget, while in 2000 only 40 percent of
its budget originated from the state, with 60 percent generated by its commercial activity and
international assistance programs. For example, 30 percent of the 1999 IPB budget was gener-
ated by two projects in the framework of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Prolif-
eration Prevention program.141 Unfortunately, international assistance is usually only sufficient
to pay debts and utilities bills. Typically, very little is left to support other conversion projects or
pay late salaries.
The average salary within the NCB ranges from $50 to $75 a month (approx. KT 7000-
11,000).142 The average salary of scientific personnel is about $75/month (approx. KT 11,000).143
Due to delays in state funding, wage arrears are very common at the NCB. For example, in April
2000, the employees had not been paid for three months. At the Otar facility, as of April 2001,
salaries had not been paid by for six months.144 According to Dr. Lepyoshkin, about 120 people
in Stepnogorsk—including scientists, laboratory employees, and technicians—participate in
international assistance programs. Contrary to popular belief, these programs provide only a
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145 International assistance programs pay salaries of $50 to $400 per month for work on research projects. The
amount of money that a scientist receives depends on his position, the percentage of time devoted to the project, as
well as an adjustment for the local cost of living.
146 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001.
147 A “department,” however, may consist of only one person.
148 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
portion of the scientists’ regular salaries. This assistance money is received after completion of
work according to contract specifications, a process that can take several months. As a result,
personnel receive international assistance, on average, once every three months. A highly quali-
fied scientist like Dr. Lepyoshkin receives approximately $200 every three months from on-
going assistance programs.145 This money serves as a bonus to his existing salary.146 During
delays in U.S. government assistance, these scientists have to live on their existing salaries,
which, as mentioned above, suffer long arrears.
d. Lack Of Market Knowledge And Market Information
Each member organization of the NCB has created a commercial department for market
research.147 Thus far, this activity has been unsuccessful since the personnel have no knowledge
of marketing techniques. This is not very surprising since they have received no formal training
in market principles. They also lack commercial information, as there are no organizations in
Kazakhstan that can collect, check, and guarantee this type of information. In this context, it is
very difficult to identify future needs or the status of competition, and to determine new activi-
ties for conversion.148 Conducting conversion in such conditions is akin to a beginner playing
darts in the dark. The beginner’s dart may eventually hit the target after many attempts, but only
by chance. Given his inexperience, the player might not realize that the target was hit.
e. Persistence Of Soviet Mindsets
When asked the question, “what is the key measure that needs to be taken in order to set
in motion a series of events that would allow conversion to go smoothly and achieve successful
results,” NCB representatives responded that more funds should be devoted to conversion. Train-
ing of personnel in marketing and other basic knowledge of market economy were not consid-
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149 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001; Vladimir Bugreev, interview by
Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
150 U.S. government official, interview by authors, June 2001.
ered as vital elements. Nor did they mention the difficulties due to the location.149 This reveals a
typical Soviet mindset, by which the volume of resources devoted to production is the main
criterion to measure success.
In a related manner, the NCB’s management also tends to develop large-scale projects
and dismiss the value of smaller scale projects. For instance, during the July 2000 Stepnogorsk
conference, the presentations and comments revealed that the U.S. and NIS participants had very
different evaluations and expectations of foreign assistance programs at Stepnogorsk. Western
participants believed that although the projects (described below) were not sufficient to ensure
the long-term survival of the facility, they represented a base that could be further developed as
the facility better understood the needs of the local and national markets. NIS participants on the
other hand, expected western representatives to provide ready answers to their problems, i.e.,
projects that could be started and bear tangible returns immediately. Other evidence of the per-
sistence of Soviet mindsets is shown in the number of administrative personnel handling the dis-
mantlement contract at Stepnogorsk. Of 120 personnel employed in the dismantlement project,
approximately sixty percent are administrative staff. This is obviously an excessive personnel
capacity.150 Yet, considering the isolation of the city, the lack of contact with foreign investors,
and the lack of market education and information, it is not surprising that Soviet mindsets have
persisted.
f. Unfavorable Environment
The factors described above create a general context that is unfavorable for conversion.
Certain constraints are attached to the NCB’s state-owned status. These include its dependence
on the state for funding and decision-making, and the regular unexpected changes in its adminis-
trative dependence due to government reshufflings. These characteristics have generated a high
level of uncertainty that blocks the NCB management’s ability to make strategic decisions and
plan for the long term. The limitations of the local economy deprive the NCB from developing a
two-way strategy: exploring activities that meet local demands to ensure its immediate survival,
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151 In an uncertain environment it is more coherent to make short-term plans in order to conserve some type of flex-
ibility and more easily adapt to changes.
while also designing other activities for the longer term. The lack of market education and infor-
mation coupled to the lack of market institutions imply that no clear conversion strategy can be
made. If by chance a niche is found, expansion of production and market share will be also very
difficult. Finally, the characteristics of the local economy and the persistence of Soviet mindset
scare foreign investors away, making conversion more dependent on state funding or internation-
al assistance programs and the local, untrained management. In other words, with no decision-
making ability, no funds, no market education and information, and in a depressed economy, it is
an understatement that Stepnogorsk is not a favorable environment for conversion.
This does not mean, however, that conversion is not possible. The ability of the NCB’s
management to conduct conversion will depend on their ability to overcome these difficulties.
This will involve introducing more certainty to their environment, reclaiming their decision-
making ability, finding alternative sources of funding, and becoming acquainted with the market.
This might seem a Herculean task. However, other Soviet defense facilities have gone through
the same difficulties and eventually succeeded in their conversion efforts. Further, the resources
at hand, such as highly qualified personnel and other support labor and equipment at the Envi-
ronmental Monitoring Laboratory, the IPB, and building 211, allow the NCB to contemplate a
conversion based on both research and production.
If, however, the conditions remain unchanged, it is probable that conversion will be di-
rected towards a “known terrain,” i.e., dual-use technologies and/or the intensification of former
civilian production. This strategy will absorb the few resources available without bringing any
return. Owing to the uncertainty of the environment, it is probable that projects will be essen-
tially short-term and aimed at ensuring the survival of the facility rather than meeting a market
demand.151
4. On-going Conversion Projects At Stepnogorsk
In spite of the numerous obstacles described above, some conversion is actually taking
place in Stepnogorsk. So far, however, it has been the result of, or supported by, international
assistance and to a certain extent by dismantlement. These assistance programs primarily con-
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152 If not otherwise stated, the information in this section is based on presentations given at the conference on
“Former Biological Weapon Facilities: Dismantlement and Prospects for Conversion,” Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 24-
26 July 2000.
153 As stated previously, the dismantlement project at Stepnogorsk was pursued after conversion had failed and was
not specifically designed and implemented to promote conversion. Dismantlement was undertaken solely to remove
the offensive and proliferation threats of the facility. However, in spite of this, the Department of Defense did not
hinder Biomedpreparat officials from continuing conversion efforts on their own and were open to the prospect of
revisiting a new conversion plan in the future. For example, the large-scale fermentors in building 221 were not
included in the initial dismantlement contract because Biomedpreparat hoped to use them in commercial production.
See note 95.
154 Note that the NCB can employ only Kazakh citizens.
155 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001.
centrate on former BW scientists of the IPB and the Monitoring Laboratory, as well as some
members of the NCB (management entity) and Biomedpreparat. However important these proj-
ects may be, they are all primarily short-term projects, aimed at employing former BW scientists
to curb proliferation of BW knowledge. Although some of these projects provide instruments
that will have a longer-term use and will help support conversion in the long run, most of them
have allowed the redirection of production resources to civilian use without supporting commer-
cialization. None of these programs have allowed a true economic conversion, i.e., the creation
of civilian activities that generate profits and transform former behaviors and mindsets. To date,
the independent attempts at conversion made by the various institutes of the NCB have been
rather unsuccessful. Yet, some of them have a clear market potential.
a. Conversion Aspect of Dismantlement152
In spite of the fact that conversion was not designed into the dismantlement program,153
we have identified different aspects of the dismantlement and redirection processes that can be
indeed considered as an indirect conversion of production resources. One of the main conversion
results of the dismantlement is the reemployment of former employees of Biomedpreparat and
the creation of new jobs for Stepnogorsk inhabitants who were unemployed.154 According to Mr.
Rufov, Director of Biomedpreparat, the dismantlement work occupies a total of 120 people, of
which twenty are former engineers of Biomedpreparat and the others are laborers.155 Those per-
sonnel employed in dismantlement activities receive an average salary of $180 a month while the
average salary in the Stepnogorsk region is less than $40 a month (Kazakh Tenge 5800). The
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dismantlement contract also covers the salaries of administrative employees of the NCB who are
involved in the management of the contract.
Dismantlement work also supports the activities of the Environment Monitoring Labora-
tory. The Laboratory was established to assist with the dismantlement work, with $1.2 million
support from CTR program. It has performed more than 15,000 analyses of samples taken in the
buildings, as well as samples of land, air, and vegetation taken around the buildings. Further, the
operating expenses of the monitoring laboratory ($55,000 per year), including the salaries of its
personnel, are totally covered by the dismantlement contract.
Dismantlement has also allowed some conversion of equipment. Some laboratory equip-
ment that was formerly used by Biomedpreparat has been transferred to the IPB instead of being
destroyed. This includes small-scale fermentors and lyophilizers that were not formerly used for
weapons purposes. The scrap metal generated by the dismantlement work (iron, stainless steel,
and copper) can also be sold by the NCB. According to the facility’s representatives, however,
the NCB has not derived much profit from this activity.
In addition, dismantlement will indirectly support conversion by providing energy re-
sources. The power stations purchased to facilitate the dismantlement work will remain as assets
that can be reused for other purposes after the completion of the dismantlement. Therefore, even
though significant equipment and infrastructure have been destroyed in the dismantlement, other
resources have been acquired as part of the dismantlement contract which could be used for
peaceful, profitable purposes. Dismantlement also provides direct support to other local enter-
prises. For example, the dismantlement contract covers the purchase of dairy products for dis-
mantlement employees, as well as the cost of transporting employees to and from the dismantle-
ment area in buses that are rented for that purpose.
b. Conversion Programs Supported By International Assistance
Most of the assistance programs for conversion or redirection have concentrated on the
IPB and the Monitoring Laboratory and their personnel. The NCB (management entity) has also













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Research scale fermentor used in the production of an antibiotic, “roseofungin,” by the IPB. This
fermentor, originally used in non-BW activities during the Soviet period, was brought over to the
IPB from Biomedpreparat. The development of this antibiotic for commercial sale is currently
being supported through a Department of Energy IIPP grant.
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156 Information gathered from visit to Stepnogorsk by Sonia Ben Ouagrham in April 2000 with a U.S. Department of
Defense delegation.
157 These studies involve analyzing pesticide contamination of the area around Stepnogorsk (Lake Alkazor), as well
as drinking water and river contamination in the Aksu river. The results of this study will be distributed to the Min-
istry of Health of Kazakhstan, the ministry of the Environment, regional and city authorities. In addition to receiving
in-country training for these projects, Kazakh scientists have traveled to the U.S. to receive additional specialized
training. Recently, the EPA has started three new projects with ISTC funding at Stepnogorsk (see Table 5). These
are to study (1) the anti-carcinogenic effects of lactobacillus bacteria to determine whether it could be used as a food
supplement; (2) remediation technologies for mercury contamination in the area; and (3) pesticide contamination of
the grounds around Stepnogorsk and using novel biological organisms as remediation tools. These projects involve
not only the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory, but also scientists from the Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotech-
nology, the Institute of Microbiology and Virology (Almaty), and the Institute of Genetics (Almaty). U.S. govern-
ment official, interview by authors, Washington, DC, 21 February 2001.
Early support for the NCB was provided by the International Science and Technology
Center (ISTC), as well as the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program of the U.S.
Department of Energy. Both projects focused on upgrading the communication systems within
the NCB and between its members. In 1997, IPP helped set up a telecommunications system at
Stepnogorsk. This project was initially designed by IPP to include set up of internet/email access
and up to one year of technical and financial assistance. The cost of maintaining the service,
however, turned out to be extremely expensive—about $4000 per month.156 Due to financial dif-
ficulties, Biomedpreparat was unable to pay for continuing Internet connection and the service
was terminated. In 2000, however, the Center signed a contract with a new carrier at the cost of
$1000 per month. In addition, the ISTC has undertaken a project to develop telecommunications
among all of the NCB institutes. Although these are not conversion programs per se, an im-
proved communication system will help develop and support future conversion efforts and break
some of the isolation of these facilities.
The Environment Monitoring Laboratory cooperates with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to develop its laboratory capabilities. Although primarily initiated to support dis-
mantlement activities, the collaboration is designed to also support redirection efforts. This work
was financed by a two-year ISTC grant of $650,000 awarded in April 2000. This project has
three objectives: (1) to set up additional laboratory equipment (atomic absorption, high pressure
liquid chromatography, mass spectrometry) and train personnel in analytical methodologies, (2)
to evaluate contamination in the Stepnogorsk area,157 and (3) to assist the laboratory to attain
national and international laboratory accreditation. In addition, the project has been designed to
provide assistance in the development of a business plan, marketing brochures, and introduction
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158 Elizabeth George, “Cooperation between U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Monitoring Laboratory in
Stepnogorsk” (presentation at conference on “Former Biological Weapon Facilities: Dismantlement and Prospects
for Conversion,” Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, 25 July 2000).
159 Two U.S. government officials, telephone interview by Kathleen M. Vogel, 8 August 2001.
160 According to this agreement, any profits from the sale of this antibiotic in Kazakhstan will go directly to the IPB;
any profits made from the sale of this antibiotic outside Kazakhstan will go to the U.S. company.
161 Vladimir Bugreev, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000. Beta-carotene is a
precursor of Vitamin A and has anti-oxidant properties.
to potential clients (business, government, oil companies).158 In the longer term, this program
should allow the laboratory to develop its clientele beyond Stepnogorsk to cover other regions of
Kazakhstan and the NIS.
Former bioweaponeers in the IPB receive support from three IPP research projects in col-
laboration with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).159 In the first project, the IPB
has developed a new antibiotic called “Roseofungin.” This project originated from an idea sug-
gested by the IPB to conduct basic research on a unique strain in their existing collection. The
IPP is currently evaluating the project for patent consideration. If successful, the project will
enter into consideration for commercialization, although the IPB has sold its rights on this
product for $175,000.160 The second IPP project involves research using fungal fermentation to
produce Beta-carotene. The Beta-carotene would be used as a food additive for products in the
local agricultural/food industry.161 A third IPP project deals with phytoremediation. This project
will analyze unique Kazakh plants that can absorb metals in contaminated soils. Progress on
these projects was slowed by delays in receiving tax-exempt status on IPP funding via a new
U.S.-Kazakh government-to-government agreement. This situation delayed funding on all of
these projects for one full year. The IPB also receives ISTC funding, consisting of two small
grants for scientific project development (see Table 5).
c. Independent Conversion Initiatives
In addition to conversion efforts influenced by foreign assistance or disarmament work,
the NCB has also tried to develop independent conversion projects. The NCB management has
plans to convert the former media nutrient production building (building 211) for the production
of motor oil additives. The project cost is estimated at $300,000. At present, motor oil additives
75
162 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
163 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by authors, Washington, DC, February 2001.
164 The development of these new products was initially financed by a state program to develop biotechnology.
However, funds very quickly ran out. Vladimir Bugreev, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakh-
stan, April 2000.
are imported from Russia by Shell Oil Company to sell on the Kazakh market.162 The NCB man-
agement has tried to involve a U.S. partner in this venture, without success. The NCB is now
contemplating a cooperation with a Russian company to implement that project.163
The IPB has also developed several products for the domestic pharmaceutical and food
industry (see Table 6). For instance, the IPB has developed new enzymes that can increase the
quality of kefir (fermented milk), whipping cream, yogurt, bread, and other food products. These
items are staples in the Kazakh and Russian diet. Microbial agents that can improve their quality
and taste are likely to have market potential. In collaboration with a research institute in Novosi-
birsk, the IPB has also developed a drug called “aspinat” (aspirin + natrin). They are now
looking for funds to initiate production.164
d. Evaluation Of Current Conversion Projects
Successful conversion in the former Soviet Union encompasses two kinds of adjustment
(see Appendix). Technical conversion consists of the redirection of buildings, technologies, and
knowledge towards civilian activities. Economic conversion involves a significant change in
behavior to allow for operating in a market environment. This involves the design of a clear
strategy for a period of at least five years that would include: (1) a restructuring of the facility in
order to eliminate unused resources (buildings, personnel, equipment) and decrease the cost of
future activities, and (2) development of market research to evaluate the ability of the facility to
meet a real demand using its available resources. This in turn implies that personnel, and more
particularly the management, understand the basic principles of the market. It also presupposes
the existence of a market.
Judging by the description of the various conversion projects at Stepnogorsk, conversion
has clearly taken place at the technical level. New civilian activities have been identified to co-
herently exploit the dual-use capability of personnel, their knowledge, the equipment and build-
ings. On the other hand, economic conversion has not taken place. It is true that dismantlement
76
has generated a certain amount of restructuring by eliminating buildings and equipment that can-
not be used for civilian purposes. If kept, they would have represented a financial burden to the
facility (i.e., cost of maintenance, taxes). However, this restructuring has been imposed by cir-
cumstance. It is not the result of a well-planned strategy: NCB management has been reactive
rather than proactive in planning for commercialization activities.
Table 6: Products for Sale at the Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology
(as of July 2000)*
Description Use
Drugs
Imozimasa, 10 ml (ointment)
90g tubes (toothpaste)
Treatment of purulent, necrotic processes, infected wounds,
frostbite, stomatitis, dental caries, peridontitis; endometritis,
laryngitis, pneumonia, reduces inflammation and stimulates
regeneration processes; Active ingredient: imozimasa
Dextranase, 90 g tubes Toothpaste for cavity prevention; Active ingredient: dextranase
Homeopathic oat tincture, 250 ml Radionuclides release,treatment for anemia, insomnia,
pharyngitis, tonsillitis, dry cough, prevention of influenza and
acute respiratory diseases; Active ingredient: flavonoids 
Alcohol 5% iodine solution, 20 ml Antiseptic
1% Antiseptic solution of brilliant green, 10 ml Antiseptic
Hydrogen peroxide solution, 40 ml Antiseptic
Food Supplements
Bifidumbacterin starter, 10 ml Production of therapeutic-preventative fermented dairy
products
Bread (wheat) starter, 10 ml Prevents dough “potato” disease caused by Bacillus subtilis
and Bacillus mesentericus; reduces dough fermentation period;
improves bread taste and flavor; Active ingredient: lactic acid
bacteria strains L.fermenti-27 and L. plantarum-149
Sour Cream starter, 10 ml Sour cream production on the basis of cow milk
Tablets at the Stage of Registration
Aspinat No. 20 Nesteroid anti-inflammation and cooling medicine; Active
ingredient: 2-(Acetoxi) benzoic acid
2% Roseostein ointment, 30 ml Anti-fungal drug for treatment of all mycotic diseases;
effective anti-candidosis drug. For external use; Active
ingredient: polene anti-fungal antibiotic roseofungin
* Information provided by Vladimir Bugreev, July 2000
Similarly, the choice of conversion projects in most cases has been imposed by circum-
stance. For instance, IPB projects conducted under the IPP umbrella are based on ideas devel-
oped in the Soviet time to serve as cover stories for BW activities (i.e., beta-carotene and roseo-
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165 Ken Alibek, interview by authors, Manassas, VA, 22 August 2001.
166 One former IPP project with a former Soviet BW institute, “Nematode Biocontrol Agent for Agriculture,” is
projected for commercialization in 2003-2004. This project involves Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the
State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) in Russia, and the California based company
AgraQuest, Inc. See United States Industry Coalition, Inc., Commercial Partnerships in the Former Soviet Union
(Arlington, VA: United States Industry Coalition, Inc., July 2001).
167 Gennady Lepyoshkin, interview by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, April 2000.
fungin).165 In essence, these projects had no market basis and it is not clear today whether the IPP
will be able to launch the commercialization phase. The other projects sponsored by international
assistance have been generated through the dismantlement project, and their beneficial effect
will stop as soon as dismantlement is completed. This includes the employment of local labor in
dismantlement activities and other related support (e.g., transportation, dairy products), as well
as the Environmental Monitoring Laboratory. In particular, the Laboratory is more dependent on
this short-term financial support as the dismantlement program covers its operating expenses.
Further, IPP and ISTC programs usually last three years and do not necessarily lead to a com-
mercial outcome. So far, very few IPP projects with former BW institutes have gone beyond the
research stage.166 In other words, conversion at Stepnogorsk is composed of separate pieces of
unrelated activities, which do not constitute a coherent strategy.
No significant change in behavior by Stepnogorsk management took place in the course
of the conversion process from 1993 to the present. The projects developed independently by
IPB and the NCB (building 211) are primarily technology-push. Some of them have identified
market opportunities (i.e., lack of domestic oil additives, improvement of popular dairy prod-
ucts). Yet, these projects have not been supported by a study demonstrating that these products
actually respond to a potential demand, i.e., that there is an interest from targeted producers or
customers to actually switch to such new products. Nor have they determined what would be the
cost of developing the products and introducing them on the market, or what would be the time
frame for achieving profitability. Further, these products do not at present provide profits to the
NCB, since payments are usually made with barter or not made at all.167
The lack of economic conversion was to be expected, owing to: (1) the lack of market in-
frastructure in Kazakhstan (i.e., no developed banking system, chambers of commerce providing
reliable commercial information, or reliable and non-expensive communication systems); (2) the
lack of market education among employees of the NCB; and (3) the uncertainty imposed by the
78
168 World Health Organization, Highlights on Health in Kazakhstan, 1999, http://www.who.dk/document/E72497.pdf.
regular reshufflings in the government and the remoteness of the city, which did not allow the
market to reach Stepnogorsk. It is clear that with no market economy there cannot be any con-
version at the economic level. In these conditions it would have been very surprising if conver-
sion actually had happened on the economic level in Stepnogorsk. Nonetheless, should we
conclude that, owing to the characteristics described above, conversion is impossible in
Stepnogorsk?
Some would argue that it would be more cost-effective to provide the small number of
remaining bioweaponeers at Stepnogorsk (about 40) with: (1) an option for early retirement, with
a lifetime pension, or (2) assistance to relocate to a more job-friendly environment. At face
value, these options appear to be more simple and economical than trying to support conversion
at Stepnogorsk. Yet, there are drawbacks with these approaches that involve cost, political
issues, and proliferation risks.
In terms of cost, even the small number of bioweaponeers at Stepnogorsk can incur sig-
nificant lifetime costs under a retirement plan. Most of these former bioweaponeers are 40-50
years old. Given that life expectancy in Kazakhstan is approximately 65 years,168 this means that
retirement support for these bioweaponeers would need to cover 15-20+ years. On the other
hand, supporting these bioweaponeers to relocate to a more dynamic city, such as Almaty, would
involve costs of moving the bioweaponeers plus their families, providing a housing allowance
(or buying a new apartment) for them, well as providing some temporary financial assistance
while they look for new employment. However, if they are unable to find alternative employ-
ment, then these scientists would need additional support until they are able to become self-
sufficient.
Although, theoretically speaking, both of these options could be supported on a financial
level, they would be difficult to support on a political level. It is clear from examining the history
of U.S. government assistance that foreign aid programs are not politically viable. In particular,
given the recent U.S. economic downturn, it is unlikely that Americans would support U.S. tax-
payer dollars going to Kazakhstan to support housing and jobs for Kazakh citizens. Therefore, it
is useless to consider U.S. assistance for retirement support or relocation funds as a realistic
option.
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Perhaps more important, however, both the retirement and relocation options carry their
own proliferation risks. For example, if there is no reliable way to monitor the activities and
movement of retired or relocated bioweaponeers, it would be difficult to ensure that they are not
engaging in proliferant activities. This is a problem particularly in Kazakhstan and other Central
Asian countries that have open borders, where bioweaponeers and illicit businessmen can move
about freely. Because of this reality, the options of retirement and relocation are not a panacea
for the proliferation dangers posed by these bioweaponeers. As a caveat, however, it would be
possible to envision support of relocation activities coupled with a new commercial or research
activity that would be designed with conversion in mind. Conversion of these scientists to new
activities that can provide them with long-term economic self-sustainability is the only way to
address the brain drain proliferation threat. In the following section, we will describe some
potential strategies that could be pursued to support a new conversion effort with Stepnogorsk
bioweaponeers.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR CONVERSION
Analyzing the Biomedpreparat BW production facility has helped us to identify a number
of key principles governing conversion of BW facilities. These principles are not necessarily
new. In fact, some of them were applied to conversion efforts at the Fort Detrick facility in the
early 1970s. At the same time, the Biomedpreparat facility and other former Soviet BW facilities
are forced to convert in an environment that is radically different from Fort Detrick or other for-
mer BW facilities. Therefore, a new approach is needed that incorporates basic principles of con-
version and yet takes into account the unique conditions facing Soviet facilities. The first part of
this section will outline the key steps of the approach for conversion in the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) which we consider appropriate in light of present conditions and past experiences. The
second part will apply this approach to the Stepnogorsk case and recommend ways to increase
the chances of successful conversion for this facility.
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A. Appropriate Approach for Conversion of Former Soviet BW Facilities
Considering that the main challenge for former Soviet defense facilities is to perform
their conversion on the economic level, it is important to provide them with the tools that will
allow them to adjust to a market environment. This will include four main steps outlined below:
C Conduct a technical and financial audit of existing resources: It is important to clarify
what resources are available for conversion and what is the financial situation of these
facilities before conversion starts. A technical and financial audit of these facilities will
help attain that goal. In terms of a technical audit, this will involve a detailed inventory of
the strains, equipment, buildings, and other infrastructure on site. It will be important to
determine the composition of the employees still working at the facility, from senior sci-
entists, junior scientists, engineers, technicians, administrative workers, and other support
personnel. For the scientific staff, it will be important to specify their age and prior work
experience (i.e., expertise, work with particular equipment and materials). This informa-
tion will identify which employees will be able to convert to new activities and which
employees will need to be fired or supported through various incentives, such as early
retirement. In addition, since Soviet facilities were dual use, it will be important to deter-
mine what civilian activities were formerly conducted and what activities are currently
underway. All of this information will help determine what capabilities are present on-
site, how these pose proliferation risks, and what skills and resources could be used to
create commercial activities and products.
Secondly, it will be important to conduct a financial audit of the facility. This will
involve studying the present and past financial situation of the facility to see how it has
evolved over time. This will consist of examining the current budget, including the share
of state funding, outside assistance, and debts. Other important questions will include:
What are the energy requirements of the facility? Does the facility still support social
infrastructure? Is the facility part of a larger consortium? Also, it will be necessary to
determine the current partners or clients of the facility. How were these business relation-
ships formed? What is the financial situation of these clients and how do they pay for
their services (i.e., cash, barter, or surrogate money)? Additional questions should target
the influence of the local economic environment: How important is the facility in the
local economy? How does the facility contribute to tax payments and local employment
(directly and indirectly) in the region?
C Identify potential products and activities: From the technical portion of the audit, it will
be possible to determine what the facility could do with its available resources and then
generate a list of possible products and activities. In terms of products, either high tech or
low tech products can be considered. Both types of products have benefits and draw-
backs. High tech products are favorable if they can gain a competitive edge and fill a
niche. Such products typically give a high unit price, but foreign competition can be stiff.
In contrast, low tech products have a lower starting/production cost and a lower unit
price. But, if the product is geared towards mass consumption, then this can offset the
lower unit price. Also, the low tech product might be adapted or expanded to target a
wider range of clients, which can increase the overall profit. For example, this could
include production of enzymes for the food, chemical, and textile industries.
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Other potential activities could involve renting space or conducting consulting
work. For example, some facilities could work to attract new businesses to their facility
in order to utilize unused building space. This approach could be designed to create busi-
ness incubators around former BW institutes, stimulating local or regional biotech devel-
opment and innovation. In addition, facilities could pursue consulting work for profitable
sectors of the economy. For example, former BW facilities could conduct environmental
analysis and monitor infectious diseases around national/regional oil and gas extraction
sites or previously contaminated sites.
C Conduct feasibility studies: Once potential products and activities are identified then the
facility should conduct an in-depth study of these prospects. This study should identify:
Who are the potential clients and are they solvent? Where are they located? Could they
be interested in the product or service? What incentives or policies could be used by the
government to motivate the customer? What are the potential obstacles (i.e., economic,
political, technical) to the project? Those products or activities that would be the least
costly to implement and generate profits in the short term could be prioritized over longer
term projects. On the other hand, if one product or activity looks particularly promising,
then the facility could concentrate its resources on that project.
C Conduct market research: Once background feasibility studies have been done, then the
facility should conduct market research on a specific product or activity. This will iden-
tify what resources (i.e., buildings, equipment, personnel) could be used and what others
could be eliminated. Detailed market research could also identify the potential market
(local, national, regional), and a likely partner. This will help the facility concentrate its
resources on a potentially profitable activity. Once market research is finished, then the
product could be field tested to gauge producer/consumer interest. Alternatively, for con-
sultancy work, a small field study could be carried out to obtain results that can be used
to show prospective clients. Information campaigns could also be launched to inform the
client or customers about the product or the importance of the work. In addition, once
potential products or activities are identified, then the facility could start building a base
of support for these projects, to include local and national officials. In particular, govern-
ment support could be very useful in establishing favorable policies for these conversion
efforts (i.e., providing subsidies, tax benefits, new regulations for certain industries).
At first glance, the approach described above looks like a technology-push approach, and
we may ask how different it is from the one already implemented unsuccessfully by defense
directors. In the absence of a proper market environment in the Former Soviet Union, it is
extremely difficult to apply a strict market-pull approach. Further, in contrast to the approach
usually implemented by defense directors, the one proposed here has two advantages: (1) it is
based on a clear inventory of the resources available for conversion, (2) it is supported by an
analysis of the existing or potential demand. With these concepts in mind, let us see how we can
apply these principles to conversion at Stepnogorsk.
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B. Appropriate Approach for Conversion at Stepnogorsk Facilities
1. Technical and Financial Audit
The present study provides a brief inventory of the resources available at Stepnogorsk
and some figures regarding the financial status of the facility. However, a proper audit should
provide a clarification on the composition of personnel, their age, expertise, and prior work. A
full inventory of the equipment still available with a description of its condition is also needed.
Financial information should clarify the budget of the NCB and of its members, as well as the
level of their debts and a list of their creditors. It should also provide a breakdown of the salaries,
the cost of utilities and other information mentioned in the paragraphs above.
2. Potential Products and Activities
Preliminary research has shown that the pharmaceutical and food/agricultural industries
are two sectors with long-term potential in Kazakhstan. The fact that the NCB has chosen to
produce products for these two sectors of the economy is encouraging. For instance, the enzyme
starter developed by the IPB has high market potential. Since fermented dairy products are a
staple of the Kazakh diet, the use of this starter in making better tasting fermented dairy products
such as yogurt and kefir could have wide consumer appeal. In addition, selling the starter to local
dairy producers would have low upfront costs.
In general, due to the shortage of funds at Stepnogorsk, projects based on research should
be preferred over large-scale production. Production requires significant start-up costs while the
returns may show only in the longer term. Further, production requires the supply of raw mate-
rials and other products, which would need to be transported to Stepnogorsk. In addition to the
cost of transportation, the bad condition of local roads would hinder a regular supply flow and
would make the distribution of finished products more difficult. On the other hand, research
activities do not require as much start-up funds. The facility can also use the small-scale pro-
duction equipment to conduct pilot production and test its products.
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169 European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health Care Systems in Transition: Kazakhstan (Copenhagen:
European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1999), p. 47.
170 In 1997, only 10 percent of the State Health budget was devoted to pharmaceutical expenditures. Patients must
purchase their own drugs, including patients admitted to hospitals, even though the official Kazakh government
policy requires drugs to be supplied by the hospital. See European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health
Care Systems, p. 48.
Aspect-pharm staff bottling “Ovsa,” a medicinal oat-based tonic useful in treating anemia,
insomnia, influenza, and physical and mental exhaustion. The tonic is sold in local Stepnogorsk
pharmacies.
3. Feasibility Study
Today Kazakhstan produces only 5 percent of its domestic drugs consumption, and the
agricultural sector is one of the main fields of activity in Kazakhstan.169 However, these two sec-
tors are in a bad financial state. Hospitals and other medical organizations, as well as farmers, or
food-processing enterprises do not have the means to order and buy products from biotech facili-
ties.170 In this context, there is a dire need for a state policy supporting these sectors by offering
84
171 Some of these programs are financed through European Union programs dealing with countries of the former
Soviet Union such as: (1) TACIS, which provides grant-financed technical assistance, (2) PHARE, which provides
financing for institution building, technical assistance, and investment support, and (3) the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which provides financing for banks, industries, and businesses. See:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm; http://www.ebrd.com/about/index.htm;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare.
fiscal incentives (such as tax exemptions) to encourage cooperation with former Soviet biotech
facilities.
To increase the chances of commercial success of the starter developed at the IPB, the
Ministry of Agriculture or Health could subsidize the production costs of the IPB starter and, at
the same time, impose taxes on other starters that are currently being used by the dairy produc-
ers. The other productions started by the IPB, would also benefit from a properly conducted
feasibility study, in order to help the institute concentrate its resources on a range of product with
market potential.
4. What Role Can Foreign Assistance Play in Conversion?
There is also a dire need for international assistance to help the facility conduct a proper
market research and feasibility study. The NCB will require some assistance to conduct an ap-
propriate market research, identify a limited number of activities with market potential, and link
with solvent customers. It is essential that NCB employees receive training in order to under-
stand the basic principles of the market. This type of education can easily be provided by inter-
national assistance. For example, the European Union commonly finances this type of assistance
in Russia and other FSU countries.171 Assistance can also be provided to help the NCB to con-
duct market research and identify the products that it can provide using its available resources. In
addition, the NCB will need a regular flow of information regarding the target market. This also
can be done with the support of international assistance. For instance, a marketing department
could be set up at the NCB, employing people with training in marketing and the required equip-
ment to conduct their work (i.e., computers, internet, access to information).
In the case of the enzyme starter developed by the NCB, foreign assistance could train a
small group of people from the IPB and designate a consultant to guide them while conducting
the feasibility study of manufacturing the starter, and help them identify several local dairy pro-
ducers in the region that are solvent. Assistance would also be required for the follow-on market
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172 This small company was created to avoid government restrictions and decrease administrative hurdles involved in
cooperation with foreign partners. Interview of Vladimir Bugreev, by Sonia Ben Ouagrham, Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, April 2000.
173 Certification of drugs produced by local producers is also a major issue that needs to be addressed. Certification
of new drugs in Kazakhstan is currently so expensive that the cost of new locally-produced drugs would exceed the
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increase the production of drugs in Kazakhstan. This state company was to be composed of state and private enter-
prises of the pharmaceutical sector. Little is known about the status of this project. Similarly, in 1999, a program to
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the status of this program. The frequent turnover within government administrations and frequent policy changes are
probably the main reasons why these programs have not been implemented yet. “O bednoi zolushke po imeni
pharmatsia,” (A poor Cinderella called Pharmaceutical Industry) Kazakhskaia Pravda, 16 September 1992, p. 4.
174 For instance, the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) of Almaty conducts environmental research around oil
deposits located on a former nuclear test site in the north west of Kazakhstan for a consortium of foreign oil
companies. This contract provides the INP with $2 million per year over 20 years.
research, exploring the interest of both local and national dairy producers, as well as some pro-
ducers in countries consuming the same type of dairy products, like Russia, other New Indepen-
dent States, Mongolia or China. Foreign assistance could also help the IPB field test its starter in
one local dairy producer to gauge producer and customer interest in the product.
Guidance from a consultant could also be helpful to explore the possibility of expanding
the now limited market for the production of the small company Aspect-pharm.172 This enterprise
now implements IPP projects for the IPB, and in the future, other cooperative projects could go
through Aspect-pharm. A proper business training of its personnel would help build a bridge
between nonproliferation projects and commercialization for the local market, thus increasing
the long-term effects of nonproliferation programs.
Foreign assistance could also be used to encourage the Kazakh government to develop
and implement policies regarding promising sectors for conversion of its BW facilities. This
assistance can take the form of studies detailing the status of these sectors today and projecting
their development potential for the next decade or so. Assistance can also be provided to simpli-
fy and rationalize the certification process of domestic drugs.173 State and foreign assistance can
be used to help design policies to encourage sectors of the economy that are already solvent,
such as the oil industry, to cooperate with former defense enterprises. For instance, the Environ-
mental Monitoring Laboratory could do environmental research around oil deposit sites to
evaluate their contamination level. One Almaty-based nuclear facility already does this type of
work quite successfully.174
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175 Secrecy is defined here as classified information related to national security, not secrecy involved with protecting
of proprietary information. Two publications have outlined in greater detail some specifics of this: Leitenberg, “The
Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses,” in Control of Dual-
Threat Agents, pp. 103-05; and Ernst Buder and Erhard Geissler, “Conversion of Former BTW Facilities—Questions
and Problems,” in Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, p. 5.
A distinguishing characteristic of Kazakhstan is the concentration of governmental power
on priorities defined by President Nazerbaev. If conversion were to become a presidential priori-
ty, more particularly through the development of the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries,
the chances would be much greater that national programs would be more consistently developed
and implemented. However, even if the required policies are implemented by the state and inter-
national assistance, these programs will need time to bear fruit. Therefore, it is essential that
short-term programs be continued or new ones started in order to ensure the “survival” of the
facility. However they need to be structured in such a way that the projects started today will be
integrated into a long term strategy. Nonproliferation programs for instance can help support the
facility in the short-term, but to be efficient these projects should be designed and structured in
the context of a longer term conversion plan. Otherwise, these programs will only serve as a
band-aid to the underlying economic difficulties, without contributing to sustainable economic
development, thereby maintaining the long-term brain drain proliferation threat.
5. Role of U.S. and International Assistance in Promoting Nonproliferation at Stepnogorsk
In terms of nonproliferation, reliable assessment of whether complete demilitarization has
occurred at a former BW production facility is difficult. At the core, this involves analyzing the
following: (1) assessing the establishment of a national policy outlawing offensive BW work,
adherence to the BTWC, and upholding the norm of BW disarmament and nonproliferation; (2)
credible documentation of prior and present work at the facility and a reasonable means to check
this; (3) verifiable destruction of specialized equipment and infrastructure used for prior on-site
weaponization activities; and (4) an end to secrecy, with open access to the facility and person-
nel by the international community.175 These principles have been used in the development of
domestic and international BW verification methods, as well as in U.N. inspection activities in
Iraq. Continual evaluation of these characteristics can also track whether future reversion is pos-
sible. In light of these criteria, how well do the Stepnogorsk facilities measure up to these stan-
dards? What role has U.S. assistance played in promoting nonproliferation in Kazakhstan?
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176 Dual threat agents are defined here as bacteria, viruses, fungi, and toxins that cause disease in humans, animals,
and plants, and are also putative BW agents.
C The establishment of a national policy outlawing offensive BW work, adherence to the
BTWC, and upholding the norm of BW disarmament and nonproliferation: Kazakhstan
holds a mixed picture on this point. Kazakhstan has not declared an official policy
against biological weapons, is not a state party to the BTWC, nor a member of the Aus-
tralia Group. President Nazerbaev, however, has declared Kazakhstan’s commitment to
the nonproliferation of BW and their technologies. Kazakhstan has also been an active
partner in the dismantlement of Kazakhstan’s largest BW facility under the CTR pro-
gram.
Kazakhstan may be waiting to act on the BTWC until it receives some indication
of international assistance for conversion of its former BW facilities. Although Kazakh-
stan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, it only ratified the treaty in
March 2000. Part of the delay has been attributed to the lack of funding for conversion or
dismantlement of its chemical weapons and CW production facilities. A similar reason
may hold for Kazakhstan’s participation to the BTWC. International assistance for con-
version could be a positive influence in helping Kazakhstan become a full member of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.
On a related note, the Biomedpreparat facility has been under the control of pure-
ly civilian ministries since the beginning of the new Kazakh government. In fact, the Na-
tional Center for Biotechnology was established to create a civilian administrative body
to have jurisdiction over most of the former BW facilities in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, as
of April 2001, the directorship of the NCB transferred from Lepyoshkin (former bio-
weaponeer and colonel in the Soviet army) to a purely civilian scientist. With this reorga-
nization, the directors of the IPB and Environmental Monitoring Laboratory (former bio-
weaponeers) also have been replaced by civilian scientists who were never involved in
weapons activities.
C Credible documentation of prior and present work at the facility and a reasonable means
to check this: Since 1997, CTR’s dismantlement effort has documented all prior offensive
BW equipment on-site. As of September 2000, U.S. Department of Defense officials had
documented that there is no remaining equipment or infrastructure at Biomedpreparat that
remains as an offensive BW threat. Continuous U.S. oversight (via visits and scientific
exchanges) since the start of dismantlement offers definitive proof that offensive work at
Biomedpreparat has ended. All of the scientific research work that has been sponsored by
U.S. or ISTC assistance does not involve dual-threat agents or defensive BW projects.
Due to the dismantlement of the facility, all research is conducted off-site of the former
BW complex.176 To date, this is the first time that the offensive threat has been eliminated
from a former Soviet BW facility.
C Verifiable destruction of specialized equipment and infrastructure used for prior on-site
weaponization activities: As of September 2000, Biomedpreparat (working with CTR)
had destroyed all former equipment that was deemed critical to BW production. This
included fermentors, centrifugal separators, air handling systems, weapons filling equip-
ment, drying and milling equipment, and others. Also, the CTR program is still negoti-
ating a contract to completely eliminate remaining buildings associated with former
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BW production activities. Once this is accomplished, the threat of reversion at Biomed-
preparat will be eliminated.
C An end to secrecy, with open access to the facility and personnel by the international
community: Since the dismantlement project started in 1998, U.S. government officials
have had complete and continued access to the entire complex. In addition, international
journalists, scientists, educators, and businesspeople have been able to visit Biomed-
preparat. For example, in July 2000, an international conference, sponsored by the ISTC,
was held in Stepnogorsk. This conference included a half-day visit to the site of the for-
mer BW production facility. As this study shows, the Biomedpreparat management and
scientists are open to discussing current program activities, funding, and personnel. In
addition to granting press and academic interviews, Lepyoshkin and his managers dis-
cussed current activities at Biomedpreparat, IPB, and the Monitoring Laboratory at a
1999 conference in California, and a May 2001 conference in Almaty.177
Through a variety of U.S. and international assistance programs (i.e., ISTC, IPP,
and other travel grant programs), Stepnogorsk scientists have been able to attend biotech-
nology conferences and meet with foreign collaborators. Biomedpreparat, IPB, and the
Environmental Monitoring Laboratory all conduct open, civilian activities. There are no
restrictions imposed by the Kazakh government for Stepnogorsk scientists to present
their research findings.
Three out of the four characteristics listed above would not have been met without U.S.
and international assistance. Such assistance has been crucial in meeting demilitarization re-
quirements that serve as prerequisites to conversion, and to the nonproliferation of sensitive BW
technologies, equipment, and materials at Stepnogorsk. Despite conflicts in the AAI project,
subsequent relationships between U.S. government officials and Stepnogorsk bioweaponeers
have been more positive. For example, U.S. Department of Defense officials developed close,
personal relationships with Dr. Lepyoshkin and other managers which have increased dialogue
and resolution of conflicts regarding dismantlement contracts and implementation of ISTC/IPP
projects. These relationships have increased transparency into these facilities and their on-going
activities. It is important that the U.S. government continues to work on these relationships. Posi-
tive working relationships with Stepnogorsk bioweaponeers will help building a good reputation
for U.S. assistance in the region, which can then facilitate additional dismantlement and redirec-
tion projects at other former Soviet BW facilities.
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179 U.S. government official, personal communication to authors, 23 April 2002 and 22 May 2002.
Since the dismantlement of the facility was completed in 2000, there is no longer a prolif-
eration or offensive military threat from the former equipment or infrastructure at this facility.
Yet, as mentioned above, proliferation concerns still remain regarding existing personnel. In
contrast to nuclear weapons technology, materials and equipment used to develop biological
weapons are inherently dual-use. Therefore, the ability to develop potent biological weapons is
primarily dependent on expertise. This makes bioweapons-related knowledge particularly sensi-
tive. As mentioned previously, there are approximately 40 former bioweaponeers in Stepno-
gorsk, some of whom have extensive knowledge of the complete stages of BW development,
production and weaponization.
Since Spring 2001 several former bioweaponeers in Stepnogorsk have been fired and
remain unemployed. For instance, in Spring 2002, Dr. Lepyoshkin was reported to have plans to
move to Kirov, Russia to work with the Volga-Vyatsky Center for Applied Biotechnology. At
the Center, Lepyoshkin planned to establish a research program devoted to developing technolo-
gies for the destruction of chemical weapons.178 In spite of Lepyoshkin’s plans, he was still in
Kazakhstan as of July 2002. It is unclear what problems are preventing his move to Russia. Simi-
larly, as of April 2002, Bugreev and some of his co-workers in the IPB (former bioweaponeers)
have moved to the Novosibirsk region of Russia, reportedly looking for work at the Berdsk bio-
chemical plant. From discussions with U.S. government officials, it is unclear whether long-term
job opportunities exist at these Russian institutes for these scientists. According to U.S. govern-
ment officials, there are no current plans to support either Lepyoshkin or Bugreev with CTR
funding in their new work plans.179
In light of these actions, concerns have been raised about the potential “brain drain” of
these bioweaponeers. Since 1997, these former bioweaponeers have not actively worked with
biological agents in offensive or defensive work. Therefore, how much of a proliferation threat
do these scientists pose? Over time, does this weapons knowledge erode from a lack of use?
Perhaps.
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Sociological studies have shown that various scientific and technological developments,
from the building of lasers to the creation of new biological procedures, contain important ele-
ments of tacit knowledge.180 Tacit knowledge is knowledge that has not been formulated explic-
itly (i.e., as recipes, diagrams, computer files, or protocols), but is acquired and retained by direct
laboratory experience, interaction with other scientists, and other personal or social means. Be-
cause it is person specific and local, tacit knowledge can be difficult to transfer effectively and
can be lost through lack of use. Once lost, the reacquisition of tacit knowledge is not necessarily
easy and may involve a relearning and development process similar to the original effort.
In the field of arms control and nonproliferation, Donald MacKenzie and Graham
Spinardi have applied these sociological theories regarding tacit knowledge to successful nuclear
weapons design and production.181 Through extensive interviews with former weapons designers
and examination of the historical record on global nuclear weapons development and prolifera-
tion, MacKenzie and Spinardi find unique and important aspects of tacit knowledge. In the con-
text of a global nuclear test ban, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that if nuclear weapons design
and testing cease and critical tacit knowledge is not transferred to a new generation of designers,
then eventually the technology involved in nuclear weapon development will be lost. MacKenzie
and Spinardi contend that, “after a sufficiently long hiatus, we would expect the effort needed to
re-create nuclear arsenals to become quite considerable, even for those who possessed detailed
documentary records from their original development.”182 In essence, nuclear weapons will have
to be reinvented virtually from scratch.
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The arguments that Mackenzie and Spinardi put forward are controversial, yet intriguing.
The salience of these arguments to the development of other weapons of mass destruction is
unknown. To date, there have been no studies that have examined what tacit components exist in
biological weapons technology and development, and how this type of knowledge erodes over
time. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the bioweaponeers remaining at Stepnogorsk
have lost some important tacit aspects of their BW knowledge. Arguably, ten years have passed,
no work with dual-threat agents has continued, and no new generation of bioweaponeers has
been trained in weapons work during that time in Stepnogorsk. Yet, it is important to note that a
small number of these Stepnogorsk scientists possess twenty or more years of experience work-
ing with anthrax and other biological weapons agents. A few, like Dr. Lepyoshkin, have knowl-
edge of the entire weaponization process. It is likely that such breadth and range of knowledge
regarding bioweapons development has persisted and will continue to pose some proliferation
risks. The future risk of this knowledge is unknown. Detailed studies are needed to understand
the tacit components involved in the development of bioweapons knowledge and the ability of
this knowledge to erode over time.
6. The Relationship Between Nonproliferation And Conversion
In many cases, there appears to be a close relationship between nonproliferation and con-
version. For example, long term economic sustainability for these facilities and their personnel
can decrease incentives to engage in illicit activities. Therefore, successful conversion can play
an important role in decreasing proliferation threats. At the same time, some nonproliferation
policies can assist in conversion. CTR destruction of weapons equipment and infrastructure has
eliminated excess resources and expenses that would have otherwise hampered conversion
efforts. Yet, it is important to realize that sometimes nonproliferation and conversion can come
into conflict with one another. Although these conflicts are not irreconcilable, they are worth
identifying and analyzing. We have identified three instances at Stepnogorsk where there is a
contradiction between nonproliferation and conversion.
First, recent Kazakh government administrative changes have brought a new civilian
director to the NCB and have placed the former weapons facilities under a new Ministry. From a
pure nonproliferation perspective, these are positive developments since the new authorities have
never been associated with prior biological weapons activities and will likely continue to support
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redirection of these facilities to civilian and commercial activities. However, the new director of
the NCB has developed his own agenda, which has involved restructuring of the activities of the
NCB, IPB, and Environmental Monitoring Laboratory. This restructuring has resulted in the
firing of some critical bioweaponeers, such as Dr. Lepyoshkin and Dr. Bugreev. Although these
scientists are still involved in some U.S. government research projects, their future is now uncer-
tain in Kazakhstan. It appears that the new director sees these former managers as threats to his
agenda. Further, the new director has expressed his desire to move the Monitoring Laboratory
from Stepnogorsk to his home city of Karaganda, potentially leaving the Stepnogorsk bioweap-
oneers behind. The departure of Lepyoshkin and Bugreev, as well as the uncertain future of other
bioweaponeers, may open new “brain drain” proliferation threats. In addition, the removal of the
Monitoring Laboratory and other biotech equipment would greatly impede future efforts at con-
version in Stepnogorsk.
Second, prior to 2001, Biomedpreparat and the IPB enjoyed consistent support from Min-
ister Shkolnik. The shuffling of Biomedpreparat and the IPB to a new Ministry has destroyed
important government support that could have been used to prioritize and implement conversion
projects. Biomedpreparat and the IPB have lost their influence in the government and will now
have to justify their existence to the new Ministry. It will take time and significant effort to
develop relationships between the Stepnogorsk facilities and the new Minister. U.S. government
officials are currently evaluating ways to constructively deal with these restructuring activities
and encourage the new NCB director and Minister to consider the proliferation implications of
future reorganization decisions.
Another contradiction between nonproliferation and conversion involves the formation of
small businesses, such as Aspect pharm, under the IPB and other state owned facilities. Eighty
percent of the shares of Aspect-pharm are privately held; 20 percent are state owned. The estab-
lishment of businesses like Aspect-pharm creates more favorable avenues for joint ventures with
foreign companies and provides mechanisms to circumvent the obstacles posed by continual
government reshuffling. However, these businesses can also introduce some proliferation risks.
Although they employ former weapons personnel, these businesses are not controlled or regu-
lated like the state-owned facilities. Even if the enterprise and the shareholders are registered, it
is possible that these shares can change hands with no documentation. In theory this is illegal,
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but in practice it occurs frequently. Therefore, unknown foreign entities could buy shares within
these businesses. This may open a conduit for technology transfer of bioweapons knowledge.
This nonproliferation problem encountered with Aspect-pharm points to a need to make
state-owned facilities, such as Biomedpreparat and the IPB, more flexible in conducting their
conversion activities. For example, instead of submitting every proposed project and joint ven-
ture to the government, the facilities could develop the contracts independently. Then, once the
contract is ready, the government could step in to evaluate the proposed work and decide
whether to approve the contract. This approach would provide for oversight of activities that the
facility is undertaking, but would give the facility greater flexibility and independence in pur-
suing commercial activities. Such approaches have been used successfully in Russian defense
facilities to reconcile conflicts between nonproliferation and conversion.
V. CONCLUSION
The road to conversion has been rocky for Biomedpreparat and its sister facilities. To
date, there has been no successful conversion project at the facility. Several extenuating circum-
stances, such as a difficult political and economic situation and flawed U.S. government assis-
tance, can explain this outcome. Yet, we have determined that conversion is not doomed at
Stepnogorsk if an appropriate long-term strategy for economic development can be crafted and
implemented. This will not be easy and will likely take years to bear fruit. But, with Kazakh gov-
ernment and international assistance, there are possibilities. Important nonproliferation objec-
tives have been reached—more remain. The continued proliferation of BW sensitive technology
to countries hostile to the United States, makes Nunn-Lugar assistance programs at Stepnogorsk
and other former Soviet BW facilities a national security priority. Given the lessons learned at
Stepnogorsk, what broader issues affect conversion prospects at other former Soviet BW facili-
ties?
 Most former Soviet BW facilities remain shrouded in a veil of secrecy and mystery.
Even ten years after Yeltsin’s decree abolishing offensive BW work and Ken Alibek’s revela-
tions, there is still much that is unknown about the history of these facilities, their former activi-
ties, as well as the number and expertise of their former bioweaponeers. Such information is im-
portant to ensure the cessation of offensive activities and to design appropriate conversion and
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184 Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the
Former Soviet States, CRS Report for Congress, 10 April 2002, p. 14.
nonproliferation projects.183 In May 2001, a new Russian scientific council was created to serve
in an advisory capacity to the Russian government on matters regarding chemical and biological
weapons issues and facilities. This council is composed of several directors from the former
chemical and biological weapons establishments and well-known “hawks.” Although the status
and influence of this committee are unknown, this development reinforces concerns about Rus-
sia’s future plans for its former BW facilities. Without full transparency, a measure of stigma is
likely to remain at these facilities that can dissuade foreign investors from pursuing joint com-
mercial ventures.
Furthermore, in many cases, the administrative control of former Soviet BW facilities is
ambiguous. In Kazakhstan, the Stepnogorsk facilities have been continually shifted to the control
of different government ministries, with constant reshuffling of government personnel. In Rus-
sia, the enigmatic Biopreparat administration still exerts its control over several former BW insti-
tutes—although to what extent remains unknown. At the same time, some former BW institutes
in Russia are under the control of more than one ministry. For most collaborative research proj-
ects, such as the ISTC programs, projects can be designed and implemented without receiving
approvals of specific government ministries. For dismantlement or conversion projects, however,
the United States must negotiate an implementing agreement with the government agencies that
own and control the facilities. In Russia, mixed jurisdiction involving former BW facilities can
complicate and delay agreements for dismantlement or conversion projects.184 In addition to the
difficulties experienced in Kazakhstan and Russia, other administrative problems may exist
within other former Soviet republics. Such uncertainties can make foreign investors wary of
former Soviet BW facilities.
Although a complete understanding of the former Soviet BW complex remains elusive,
U.S. and international assistance has greatly increased access and transparency into many facili-
ties. Since 1995, more than 40 former Soviet BW facilities have been involved in cooperative
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projects with the United States.185 In one particularly noteworthy development, one former BW
facility under the Ministry of Defense has become a civilian entity. As of 2001, the Kirov-200
Institute of Microbiology in Strizhi, Russia, has been transferred from the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. Through informal discussions Kirov-200
officials have expressed interest in receiving U.S. nonproliferation assistance and there are on-
going discussions for plans to allocate some State and DOD funding for dismantlement and
redirection projects.186 It is important to note that Kirov-200 officials made this request for
assistance after hearing of the Nunn-Lugar activities at other former BW institutes, as well as
through subsequent dialogues with U.S. government officials. Future U.S. government involve-
ment at Strizhi will mark a major milestone in increasing transparency into the reticent Ministry
of Defense facilities.
Nunn-Lugar assistance, however, currently lacks one important tool to assist facilities
like Strizhi in redirecting to peaceful activities—Congressional support and funding for conver-
sion. To date, most Nunn-Lugar assistance to former BW facilities involves programs that can
indirectly (passively) promote conversion. These include CTR dismantlement projects and the
development of research and technologies under the ISTC and IPP that have commercial appli-
cations. Yet, there is no explicit U.S. government program focused on conversion. In part, this
stems from a 1996 Congressional restriction prohibiting any new CTR funds to be used for
defense conversion, as well as the general aversion to appropriate U.S. taxpayer dollars to
support any programs that smack of “foreign aid.”
This study has shown, however, that piecemeal research and dismantlement activities,
although important for short-term nonproliferation priorities, do not necessarily promote long-
term economic stability to former bioweaponeers—a key factor in mitigating the long-term brain
drain proliferation threat of sensitive BW expertise. Although they are aging, many bioweapon-
eers face twenty or more years before retirement. Without sustainable employment to support
themselves and their families, they may be tempted to profit from selling their knowledge to
questionable entities. Apart from the brain-drain concerns, without a well-developed plan for
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long-term economic sustainability of these former bioweaponeers, it is difficult to construct and
implement appropriate exit strategies for U.S. and international assistance.
New U.S. government assistance for conversion efforts involving former bioweaponeers
and/or their institutes, along with continuing complementary nonproliferation support can start
addressing these long-term issues. Five years have passed since the Biomedpreparat-AAI con-
version debacle. In light of the current situation, should Congressional restrictions be reversed to
authorize conversion activities under the CTR program? Can it be guaranteed that U.S. taxpayer
dollars will lead to successful conversion efforts that benefit U.S. national security?
As mentioned previously, successful conversion of any defense facility, whether in west-
ern countries or the Former Soviet Union is exceedingly difficult. There is no guarantee that fu-
ture U.S. assistance will lead to successful conversion. Yet for some facilities, what other alter-
natives exist? In the Stepnogorsk case, although dismantlement of the facility is almost com-
plete, 40 bioweaponeers remain with an uncertain future. It is likely that in other institutes this
number will be higher. Conversion plans, if designed and implemented properly, can provide
some measure of hope for these scientists to become economically self-reliant. A reversal of
Congressional restrictions on funding for conversion activities would play a crucial role in mov-
ing these scientists and their facilities towards the goal of self-sufficiency. In supporting conver-
sion, there are two different strategies that can be implemented depending on the nature of the
threat present at specific facilities. This threat will depend on the environment surrounding the
facilities and on their needs.
The first type of conversion strategy can be qualified as a “Disarmament conversion.”
The aims of this strategy will largely focus on employing former BW personnel for a few years,
in order to generate a gradual loss of their weapons knowledge (i.e., tacit knowledge) and/or
their gradual integration into the local economy. This type of conversion is appropriate where the
local economy can offer alternative jobs to the excess personnel, or where the facilities have
developed successful commercial activities. As economic development is not the prime objective
of this type of conversion, piece-meal assistance programs as they are implemented today under
a variety of Nunn-Lugar programs, could constitute a disarmament conversion. A crucial aspect
of this strategy is to design these assistance programs in way that does not employ former BW
personnel in activities that can maintain that specific BW-related knowledge (i.e., biodefense
projects). Being a short termed program, with the objective of destroying a resource (knowledge)
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that can be of proliferation concern, this type of conversion fits the mandate of the CTR pro-
gram.
The second type of conversion strategy can be qualified as “economically-sound conver-
sion.” This type of conversion aims to generate long-term sustainable development. This strategy
takes into account situations where the local or regional economies cannot offer outlets to the ex-
cess weapons personnel, thus creating a probable risk of proliferation through brain drain. Step-
nogorsk is a good example of this type of environment. This type of conversion will require a
long-term effort and investment. However, this long-term program can be divided into several
short-term stages that can be implemented by various agencies or organizations. In this context,
CTR can also efficiently serve this type of conversion by designing its projects at BW facilities
as first stages of longer-term development programs. This would increase the efficiency of each
dollar invested in nonproliferation programs and would also allow the planning of an exit strat-
egy from the outset. It must be kept in mind, however, that this type of strategy requires a high
level of coordination among the various players providing assistance to ensure that a long-term
strategy is consistently pursued. Although the Stepnogorsk Initiative provided a model for this
type of U.S. interagency coordination, much more coordination and planning will be needed over
a longer period of time.
As this study has illustrated, a conversion plan should consist of developing short-term
projects to address immediate economic concerns, as well as programs and activities to promote
long term economic development when needed. Regardless of which federal agency takes the
lead, conversion must be seen as a medium to long-term policy objective, requiring committed
funding over a period of time. Also, conversion programs need to be designed in ways to insulate
them from the pressures of showing quick results—something that plagued the Stepnogorsk and
other defense conversion projects.187 Conversion plans also need to be site-specific, and take into
account the technical, political social, and other characteristics comprising the environment, this
information should guide the level of U.S. investment and effort required. In some cases, conver-
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sion may only involve the former bioweaponeers and be small in scale; in other cases conversion
may involve the entire facility. There can be no “cookie cutter” approach to conversion—each
site must be evaluated individually to assess its strengths and weaknesses. Such a site-specific
approach to conversion can direct U.S. government funding where it is needed most and mini-
mize waste of resources.
Dismantlement needs to be a key component of a long-term conversion strategy at former
BW facilities. Both research and production facilities will have excess laboratory and building
structures that will need to be eliminated. Such dismantlement will reduce offensive concerns,
mitigate proliferation of sensitive equipment, and decrease the financial cost of maintaining such
structures. From the outset, a dismantlement contract needs to be negotiated as part and parcel of
any conversion assistance. Unfortunately, in the Stepnogorsk case, this requirement was not
articulated from the beginning of U.S. involvement and led to serious misunderstandings and
resentments between the parties. As of 2001, the new Bush Administration has started adopting a
policy of requiring dismantlement activities for new Nunn-Lugar assistance in its public discus-
sions with former Soviet BW officials.188
A call for reinstatement of Congressional support for conversion begs the question,
“Which U.S. federal agency is best qualified to receive funding and implement the conversion
plans at these facilities?” Is the DOD’s CTR program the best mechanism for implementing
conversion projects? Arguably, many federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense and
Department of Energy, possess notoriously bad track records in converting defense facilities.189
Moreover, the DOE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which provides conversion assistance for
Russia’s closed nuclear cities, has repeatedly suffered from Congressional attacks.190 Frequently,
these agencies lack the in-house expertise to lead conversion efforts, particularly in the context
99
191 EU Workshop on “II International Working Group for European Nuclear Cities Initiatives,” Brussels, Belgium,
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of the former Soviet Union. Obviously, the early CTR conversion efforts failed at Stepnogorsk.
Nevertheless, CTR is probably the most qualified to lead new conversion activities, in partner-
ship with other relevant U.S. government agencies, for various reasons:
C DOD has developed extensive contacts in the BW sector in the FSU. This has generated a
context of greater transparency and trust within these facilities. It should not be underes-
timated the cultural importance of developing and cultivating good working relationships
in the context of the Former Soviet Union.CTR could build on these existing relation-
ships to develop adequate conversion programs and implement them quickly;
C The “Stepnogorsk Initiative” launched the start of a successful interagency team working
on BW nonproliferation issues, bringing multiple U.S. government resources to bear on a
particular facility. This initiative led to more constructive working relationships with for-
mer Stepnogorsk bioweaponeers and their management, highlighting the importance of
pervasive, hands-on U.S. government involvement in Nunn-Lugar activities at former
BW facilities. This successful interagency collaborative spirit has been replicated in sub-
sequent work with other former BW facilities. In addition, this well planned collaborative
effort forced a variety of U.S. government agencies to learn how to work together, and
learn from their collective experiences (good and bad).
C The Department of Defense’s CTR program can design dismantlement programs consis-
tent with conversion. In contrast to State Department nonproliferation programs (which
can be attacked as foreign aid), the CTR program has consistently garnered bipartisan
support in Congress. If seen as part of an integrated CTR program, conversion activities
may be able to receive new and sustainable Congressional support.
Finally, there is a need for greater international participation in nonproliferation and con-
version efforts at former Soviet BW facilities. To date, the bulk of international contributions
have involved ISTC projects—projects that have not involved significant monetary investment.
Yet the prevention of brain drain and proliferation of BW technologies is an international prob-
lem. Given U.S. hesitation on providing funds for conversion projects, perhaps this is one area
for complementary international involvement. As an example, the Landau Network-Centro Volta
and the Italian government have recently proposed a European Nuclear Cities Initiative
(ENCI).191 This program is designed to be smaller than DOE’s NCI program but would comple-
ment and support U.S. assistance. The ENCI program is proposed to start in two closed cities
and will target senior nuclear weapons scientists. The initial projects will involve the develop-
ment of energy efficient and environmental remediation technologies that can be used by
European companies.
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U.S., Kazakh, and Russian participants at “Biotechnological Development in Kazakhstan:
Nonproliferation, Conversion, and Investment,” conference held July 24-26, 2000, in Stepno-
gorsk, Kazakhstan. During the conference several complaints were raised by former Soviet
bioweaponeers on the nature of U.S. assistance. The conference, however, did provide an
opportunity to openly discuss differences on this issue between U.S. and Kazakh officials. In
addition, the conference was able to showcase existing research accomplishments by former
Soviet bioweaponeers to several international participants.
A similar effort could be developed to target former Soviet BW scientists and facilities.
For instance, former Soviet BW facilities have extensive experience in the monitoring of danger-
ous human, animal, and plant diseases. These facilities could be engaged in an international
effort to create a global disease monitoring network, a good alternative to continuing biodefense
work. This would allow them to apply their knowledge for the good of humanity, and would give
them a sense of belonging to an international scientific community. This sense of community
could eventually lift the remaining resistance to greater transparency into these facilities.
In sum, this study has shown that former Soviet BW facilities possess a unique combina-
tion of resources, characteristics, and environment that pose challenges to proliferation and long-
term economic sustainability. The key proliferation threats at these facilities involve dangerous
pathogen collections, dual-use equipment, and expertise on using these resources towards offen-
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sive ends. Export controls and increased security measures can mitigate the threat of illicit diver-
sion involving material resources, but there are few existing tools that can deal with the brain
drain proliferation threat. This threat remains poorly understood. More research is needed on the
mechanisms of acquisition and destruction of tacit knowledge in the development of BW tech-
nologies in order to design and implement effective brain drain nonproliferation programs. Until
we have a better understanding of these mechanisms, support for conversion activities is the only
way to address these critical brain drain concerns.
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facility. Many times, defense enterprises possess units that produce civilian goods, although these are frequently
physically and financially separate from the military activities. Furthermore, micro-economic conversion can be par-
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APPENDIX
AN OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE CONVERSION
I. ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
The term “conversion” has been used rather loosely to describe a number of different
changes within defense facilities. Conversion can be simply defined as a shift from military to
civilian activities. Behind this simple definition, however, lie various layers of complexity,
giving conversion a multitude of faces. In the case of Russia and the New Independent States,
additional features from the legacy of the Soviet system complicate the conversion process.
A. Types of Conversion
Conversion of defense enterprises is defined as reallocating resources formerly used for
defense purposes towards civilian ends. These resources include personnel, equipment, technol-
ogies, buildings, and capital. Historically, conversion has been triggered by four major events,
either alone or in combination: (1) the end of a war, (2) a political decision to stop a military
program, (3) a decrease in demand for military goods and/or budgets, and (4) a strategic change
involving a modification of military doctrines. Depending on the circumstances that generated
conversion and the period (postwar or peacetime) during which it occurs, conversion can be a
large-scale or small-scale phenomenon. Conversion can also take place at two different levels
—at the macro-economic or micro-economic level—and be completed in a short or long time
frame. The section below highlights the main characteristics of these different aspects of con-
version.
1. Micro-Economic Conversion
Conversion is defined as micro-economic when it takes place at the facility level, e.g.,
when the share of civilian activities increases in relation to defense activities within the facility.
Defense activities are stopped or reduced, and new civilian activities are started.192 Within the
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decreased level, and uses a portion of its resources to start new civilian activities or expand existing civilian activi-
ties, this is partial conversion. A complete conversion implies the end of defense-oriented activities with a total shift
to civilian activities. For instance, when a biological weapons facility completely stops producing antibiotics for the
army and starts using all its resources to fill orders for a civilian hospital, this is a complete conversion.
193 Note that when a biological facility shifts from the production of biological weapons to the production of
vaccines for the army, this is not considered as a conversion, since the client remains a military entity.
194 For instance, a major strategic change, like disarmament, can lead to a decrease in military expenditures. This
event will cause a decrease in the amount of weapons ordered and can lead to the closure of state defense production
sites and military bases. In defense-dependent regions, such actions will have repercussions on the level of economic
activity. The closure of defense enterprises and military bases also indirectly affects the civilian side of these re-
gional economies. To prevent an economic crisis and the creation of large pockets of unemployment, government
authorities typically provide support to compensate for the loss of economic activity in the defense and civilian
fields. For example, they can design various types of incentives to encourage job creation and boost civilian activ-
ities, such as tax exemptions for new businesses, financial support for the creation of small and medium-size busi-
nesses (SMBs), financial support for the creation of jobs in existing SMBs, and/or creation of technical innovation
centers (incubators/technoparks).
facility, the resources that were formerly used for defense purposes are shifted to civilian pur-
poses. For example, when a biological facility shifts from the production of biological weapons
to the production of vaccines for public health, this is a micro-economic conversion.193
Micro-economic conversion does not imply that the former defense facility must directly
re-use or convert all its original resources for civilian purposes. Resources can be sold (equip-
ment), rented (buildings), licensed (technologies), or transferred to other civilian enterprises
(personnel). As long as these resources are used for civilian purposes, this is conversion. In
addition, some of these resources may be destroyed if they cannot be reused. For instance, con-
taminated equipment will generally be destroyed, and personnel with a too-narrow specialization
may be fired.
2. Macro-Economic Conversion
Conversion is said to be a macro-economic phenomenon when the reallocation of re-
sources takes place at the level of the economy, not at the facility-level. In this case, the total
share of military activities in the economy decreases and the share of civilian activities in the
economy simultaneously increases. Unemployment in one region or sector may be offset by
gains elsewhere.194 Resources can be converted by destruction (facility closure, equipment
destruction) or transferred to a civilian field. Generally, macro-economic conversion involves
local, regional, state, and/or federal authorities, which participate directly in the conversion
process.
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typically considered to be the most successful example of conversion in recent history because it allowed a quick
transition from a war-time economy to a peace-time economy without causing major disturbances (e.g., large unem-
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Jack Stokes, The Shock of Peace (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983).
196 Alexander J. Davidson, “Military Conversion Policies in the USA: 1940s and 1990s,” Journal of Peace Research
31, no. 1 (1994): 19-33.
3. Post-War and Peace-Time Conversion
Conversion can happen during a post-war period or in peacetime. A post-war conversion
is usually a large-scale macro-economic phenomenon that involves the entire economy of a
country. When a major war ends, the economy is demobilized. Defense expenditures in the state/
federal budgets are sharply decreased, and civilian and military personnel demobilized. Facilities
that were temporarily converted to military production during the war to meet defense needs,
return to their pre-war civilian activities (re-conversion). Military facilities and equipment cre-
ated during the war to meet defense needs are generally destroyed or sold if not needed in peace-
time. Sometimes, but rarely, some defense facilities are preserved and converted to new civilian
activities (micro-conversion). Usually under these circumstances, the government implements a
reconstruction policy to support and accelerate the recovery of the civilian economy.195 General-
ly, however, the attempts to convert defense facilities (micro-conversion) have been unsuccess-
ful.196
In peacetime, conversion may be caused by a decrease in demand for military goods or a
decrease in military budgets, indicating a shift in economic priorities. In this case, conversion
will usually be a micro-economic phenomenon, where the shift from military to civilian activi-
ties will take place within defense facilities. In reality, conversion will take place only if the
decrease is significant enough to encourage facilities to shift towards civilian activities. Few
defense enterprises have shifted to the civilian sector by starting new civilian activities or
acquiring existing civilian enterprises. In fact, most of them reinforced their positions on the
military market through mergers and alliances. The internal reallocation of resources towards
civilian activities rarely took place, either because the existence of defense facilities was not
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endangered (i.e., they were still needed for defense purposes) or because it was considered too
costly. In this context, conversion mainly concerned the downsized personnel who eventually
found jobs in other sectors of the economy or received unemployment benefits. Conversion in
peacetime can also be the result of strategic changes, which bring about a change in military
doctrines.
For instance, disarmament agreements and the end of the Cold War generated changes in
the U.S. nuclear doctrine, with important decreases in military expenditures. As a result, the
share of defense activities in the economy decreased and defense facilities had to adjust indi-
vidually to the decrease in the defense budget and in demand for military goods. Therefore, con-
version in the United States in the 1990s was both a micro- and macro-economic phenomenon,
with the federal and state authorities providing assistance for the macro-economic component.
For instance, in 1992, eleven states had adopted or were in the process of adopting laws regu-
lating conversion. These included legislative provisions such as mandatory advance notice of
planned lay-offs, technical and financial support to employees and communities hit by conver-
sion, as well as financial incentives to encourage the creation of new businesses in these commu-
nities. In addition, municipalities created more than 5000 Local Economic Development Organi-
zations to help absorb the shock of conversion. However, similar to the situation in European
countries, very few cases of micro-economic conversion have been observed in the United
States. U.S. defense facilities generally preferred consolidating their positions on the defense
market by concentrating their activities on a narrow military sector. Some facilities exited the
military sector altogether, for instance by closing their defense components. As in Europe, the
lack of micro-conversion in the United States is attributed to the cost of conversion, which was
considered too high given a stable market environment that could absorb the downsized
personnel.197
B. Commercial vs. Non-commercial Conversion
The cost of conversion can be born by facilities or by the community. In the case of
macro-economic conversion, the cost of conversion is usually borne collectively by the commu-
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nity. This involves the direct intervention of federal, state, regional or municipal authorities,
which provide the financial or technical support required in the conversion process.
In case of micro-economic conversion, the cost of conversion can be born by facilities
individually or collectively by the community. When a micro-economic conversion is initiated
and implemented by the state, and aims to meet collective needs, the cost of conversion is usu-
ally borne by the community. In this case, the facility need not look for the funds required to
perform its conversion as they are given by the state. This type of micro-economic conversion is
usually non-commercial as the new civilian activities are not subject to market forces. The con-
version of the former U.S. BW facility at Fort Detrick into a cancer research center is a good
example of non-commercial micro-economic conversion. The nomination of a private contractor
to manage the facility created more cost-effective management practices without dramatically
altering the culture of the facility.198
Conversely, when conversion is implemented by facilities, and aims to transform a for-
mer defense facility into a civilian business, conversion takes on a commercial character. In this
case, the cost of conversion is usually borne individually by facilities. Even if authorities provide
a certain amount of financial or technical support, the burden of finding the resources required to
implement conversion lies on the facility’s management. This commercial aspect of conversion
is often overlooked. Yet this is a major stumbling block on the road to conversion because tradi-
tional defense facilities do not operate in a competitive market. As described below, defense
facilities also have a specific culture, management style, and structure that prevent them from
functioning properly in a market environment.
C. Characteristics of Defense Facilities
The defense industry is generally considered as a nest for technological innovation,
which may have civilian applications. We could conclude from this that defense facilities have
ready assets that can facilitate their conversion. This would be true if conversion had to take
place only on the technical front. Because of the nature of military goods, however, the charac-
teristics of the defense market are very different from those of the civilian market. The manage-
107
199 For instance, aircraft carriers constitute naval systems with four main elements: (1) the aircraft carrier itself,
which holds about 5000 people and constitutes the cornerstone of the system, (2) helicopters and fighter planes
carrying bombs and missiles, to protect the carrier in the air, and conduct military operations, (3) surface ships
(destroyers, cruisers, frigates) with guns, missiles and radar systems, to ensure the defense of the carrier on the
surface, and (4) submarines, which ensure the underwater protection of the carrier. All of these elements work
together to reach a common objective; a communications network connects all the elements of this system.
200 By faulty, we mean design or production fault. Designers plan for failure caused by circumstances (e.g., battle,
accident, weather) by incorporating back-up or redundant elements into the system and each component. For in-
stance, the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise has five nuclear reactors that can serve as back-ups if one of them fails.
201 The average development cycle of military goods—from design to production—ranges from 10 to 15 years.
202 Note, however, that since the late 1980s many states have developed measures to stop the regular increase in the
cost of weapons.
ment style prevailing in the defense field places defense facilities at the other end of a spectrum,
far from civilian businesses practices. In this context, defense conversion involves not only a
reallocation of resources to the civilian field, but also a major cultural shift.
1. Nature of Military Goods
One of the main characteristics of modern military goods is that they are designed not as
separate products to be used independently, but to be part of complex weapons systems. These
systems include various components, which are interdependent.199 Each element of the system
has a specific function, and a faulty component200 may compromise the efficiency of the whole
system. During a war, this may cause the death of many soldiers and defeat by the enemy, with
lasting repercussions beyond the battlefield. Because of the military’s mission and the lives of its
personnel, military goods are designed and built to achieve high quality and maximum perfor-
mance. This quest for performance implies important investments in research and long years of
development.201 Simultaneously, in order to maintain a technological edge, research has to be
continuous, with existing weapon systems regularly modernized. They are usually produced in
small quantities, which seldom cover the cost of the original investment or allow economies of
scale. As a result, the determining factor in the decision to produce military goods is maximum
performance, not the cost of production, which is usually covered by the client (state).202
In contrast, on the civilian market, the cost of production is the determining factor in the
decision to produce. Depending on the market segment, quality and performance are subordinate
to the cost of production. For instance, goods like TV sets or CD players with varying quality/
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performance/price ratios—ranging from poor to excellent—can co-exist on the market. The con-
sumers will select the goods that meet their financial and technical requirements. This concept of
varying quality and prices is foreign to defense facilities. Converting these facilities to the civil-
ian field will require them to accept the idea that high quality/high performance goods are not
necessarily preferred or needed by consumers.
2. A Non-Competitive Market
The military market is not a competitive market. On the demand side, it has only one
client—the state—who defines the rules and controls the market. On the supply side, there are
usually a limited number of producers who often hold a monopoly in specific products and have
the ability to develop complete systems. In France, for instance, there is one main producer per
segment of the defense industry; in the United States, producers tend to specialize in specific
types of equipment.203
The characteristics of the military market are due to the nature of military goods. The
cost of R&D and the length of the development cycle limit the number of producers and create
barriers to entry. They also create barriers to exit, as continuity is required, which implies the
permanence of certain facilities. This is one of the reasons why government agencies in charge
of procurement tend to deal with a limited number of producers/designers and ensure them regu-
lar profits in exchange for high quality goods. In this way, the state saves on transaction costs
(i.e., systematic evaluation of producers’ performances, comparison of prices, delivery sched-
ules, firms’ reputations) which it would incur in a competitive market. This is quite different
from most civilian markets, where the supply side is composed of a large number of producers
who compete for shares of the market. In this context, profits are not guaranteed and the survival
of producers depends on their ability to face competition and adjust to the changes in demand,
which can be volatile.
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3. A Peculiar Culture
The nature of military goods and the special relationship existing between defense pro-
ducers and the State generate a unique culture that can be qualified as “performance culture.”
This culture is also reinforced by the rules regulating military production imposed by the State
and military. Indeed, the military usually imposes strict specifications and production norms,
while the state imposes operating rules that do not exist on the traditional market (i.e., secrecy,
controls on production and sales).204
At the same time, defense facilities have had to develop a certain expertise and skills to
process government contracts and negotiate with their particular client. Acquisition of this
knowledge is facilitated by the fact that industry representatives and state representatives often
have the same backgrounds. For example, in France, these individuals usually come from the
same schools; in the United States, they rotate from industry to government and vice-versa. This
creates an environment where the client’s needs and desires are well known and predictable. The
type of expertise and skills that defense enterprise managers have are very different from those
needed on a competitive market, where consumer preferences are changing and have to be ana-
lyzed (i.e., market research) to make sure that the supply is in tune with the demand. Conse-
quently, conversion of defense enterprises requires an adjustment of their managers’ skills and
expertise to fit the needs of a market economy. This can be achieved by a retraining of existing
managers, the hiring of experts of the chosen market, and/or by a complete change in manage-
ment.
4. Financial Specificity
Military programs and their financial support are planned in the long-term. For instance,
in the United States, military programs are integrated into the federal budget and included in the
National Defense Authorization Act every fiscal year. Once a military program is started, its
financial support is generally guaranteed. For instance, in France, military goods production is
financed through “reimbursable advances,” whereas in the United States production is usually
based on cost-reimbursable contracts. Changes in designs of military goods and increases in
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costs during the development or production process are also common. These changes, however,
are usually agreed upon through a negotiation between the client and the producer/designer.
Because of the cost and length of R&D and the limited number of producers, pulling out of a
program due to unplanned price increases would be very costly for the state.205 In this context,
once a contract is obtained, the control over the negotiations shifts from the client to the pro-
ducer. This is very different from a competitive market environment, where the client usually
remains in control and can more easily shift to a different producer when the characteristics of
the goods change (i.e., price, quality, technical specifications, performance).
5. Specificity of Location
Defense industries are usually concentrated in a limited number of regions due to eco-
nomic and strategic considerations. In general, the location of any industry is based on economic
imperatives (i.e., proximity to raw materials, clients, existence of labor and transportation sys-
tems). As far as the defense industry is concerned, strategic motivations also play an important
role in determining their location.206 Strategic considerations may also lead to establishing
defense facilities far from economic/financial centers. Such factors can serve as major obstacles
to conversion as remotely located defense facilities may encounter difficulties in accessing
potential clients and markets.
As a result of all of the unique characteristics described above, defense facilities are not
fit to operate in a civilian competitive market environment. Instead, they traditionally operate in
a relatively protected environment where performance is more important than cost, and where
their client, who is known and predictable, ensures their survival. Transforming defense facilities
into civilian businesses requires their adaptation to a parallel universe—a universe where cost
becomes a major element of decision, where competitiveness ensures their durability, where
competition is high and sales techniques are almost as important as the product itself, and where
clients are numerous and changing.
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Therefore, conversion of defense facilities will require major adjustments in terms of
structure, culture, behaviors, and financial practices. The facilities will also need to acquire suf-
ficient flexibility to adjust to changes in demand and face competition. The degree of flexibility
required is a function of the goods that the facility chooses to produce.207 In short, the further
away from its original activities and market a defense facility chooses to place itself, the greater
will be the adjustment, financial investment, and time required to perform conversion. In this
context, it is not surprising that when facing the need to convert, European and American
defense facilities have either preferred to avoid the process by: (1) exiting the military market,
(2) consolidating their positions on the military market, or (3) adopting an activity where the
state remains a major partner.
D. Distinctive Characteristics of Soviet Defense Facilities
At first sight, the characteristics of Soviet defense facilities are similar to those of defense
enterprises in market economies: (1) strong ties with their unique client, who controlled, regu-
lated, and financed their production; (2) a product—military goods—which had to obey specific
norms; (3) a peculiar structure and culture; and (4) a specific location. A closer examination,
however, reveals that these features have been modified by Soviet culture and ideology, pro-
ducing marked differences with those observed in western countries. This section identifies the
specific features of the Soviet defense industry that will constitute additional obstacles to con-
version.
1. A Peculiar Structure
The Soviet defense industry was composed of very large organizations called “Scientific
Production Associations”(Nauchno-Proizvodzvenoe Obedinenie, or NPO), which specialized in
the production of a specific weapons system (e.g., naval, aviation, tanks). Typically, NPOs in-
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cluded a large research institute, generally located in the European part of Russia, and various
production sites scattered all across the former Soviet Union. NPOs had from 50,000 to 100,000
personnel on their payroll. The individual facilities comprising the NPOs were also characterized
by their large size. For example, research institutes employed on the average 2,000 people, with
production sites employing about 10,000 people. Each production site was itself divided into
several entities that could be located in the same city or in different towns.
Soviet defense facilities were also social agents, organizing education, health, and leisure
services. They were in charge of building, maintaining, and financing local hospitals, clinics,
kindergartens, schools, universities, summer camps, amusement parks, sports centers, theaters,
movie theaters, housing, agricultural farms, and other social infrastructures. These services were
open to their own employees as well as to the other residents of their communities and regions.
2. Mobilization, Specialization, and De-specialization
“Redundancy” was one of the principles on which the Soviet defense industry was based.
Soviet military strategists believed that the country had to be prepared to fight a war as soon as it
was declared and to maintain this ability during the hostilities. This idea gave birth to the con-
cept of peacetime mobilization, under which defense and civilian facilities were structured and
operated as in a wartime context. For defense industries, this led to the creation of oversized
facilities, which produced large quantities of military goods. Production sites and research insti-
tutes also had “twins,” located in other cities or regions of the Soviet Union, which duplicated
their activities. The purpose of this strategy was to ensure the supply of military goods, should
one of the twins be destroyed during a war.
The Soviet division of labor also commanded that NPOs form production chains distinct
from one another. These chains would consist of members that were specialized in a specific
stage of the production process (i.e., assembling, production of specific parts, research, develop-
ment). However, owing to the deficiencies of the Soviet supply network, NPO members unoffi-
cially developed side activities and formed a web of ties with other entities of separate NPOs.
This arrangement lessened the impact of the Soviet system deficiencies on each NPO’s activities
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and also met local needs.208 As a result, each member of the NPOs was both specialized, due to
the distribution of work imposed by the NPOs, and de-specialized, due to their side activities.
3. Dual-purpose Facilities
Soviet defense facilities were also dual-purpose entities, usually composed of a military
component and a civilian component. This duality often served the purpose of secrecy, as the
civilian activity could help cover the military activity. At the same time, however, defense facil-
ities were also the central element of the Soviet production system as they produced a sizable
share of the civilian goods.209 For instance, the defense industry had a monopoly or quasi-
monopoly in the production of a certain number of consumer goods (e.g., TV sets, sewing
machines, radio sets, washing machines, refrigerators) as well as other specialized goods (e.g.,
civilian aircraft, communication equipment).210 This duality may be viewed as an advantage
when it comes to conversion. However, the civilian goods were usually of poor quality, as they
were perceived to be of secondary importance in relation to military goods. Civilian production
was also perceived by many defense directors as a means to maintain a pool of personnel that
could be transferred to the military component when production needed to be accelerated, usu-
ally at the end of the plan period.211 The rotation of personnel from military to civilian activities
and vice-versa is uncommon in western defense facilities, where boundaries between military
and civilian components are clear.
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4. Location
The location of Soviet defense facilities was primarily based on strategic imperatives and
often went against economic logic. As mentioned above, NPOs consisted of large research cen-
ters located in the European part of Russia, mostly Moscow and St. Petersburg, and productions
sites usually located east of the Urals. This type of organization, however, implied that facilities
were dependent for supplies on distant NPO members, sometimes located thousands of kilome-
ters away. In order to protect the secrecy of their work, some facilities were located in isolated
areas, where no other activity existed. This led to the creation of factory towns that were often
closed, with no economic links with neighboring communities. In other cases, facilities were
located in areas that were incoherent from the point of view of their production. For instance,
some naval enterprises were located in regions with no access to a major river or to the sea. This
type of location would increase the cost of conversion, because it sharply increased operating
costs at the facility.
5. A “Culture of Quantity”
Similar to their western counterparts, Soviet defense facilities did not generate a culture
of cost. Unlike western facilities, however, they developed a culture of quantity, not a culture of
performance. Indeed, in the 1930s the Soviet leaders used a military build-up as a means to off-
set the weakening of the economy caused by collectivization and internal political tensions. For
defense enterprises, this resulted in an extensive development mode, aimed at compensating for
the weaknesses of the economic and industrial base. It translated into the development of simple
weapon systems with low unit costs, but which were difficult to modernize. As a result, the total
cost of military production was higher in the West, even though the unit cost of military goods
was lower.212
6. Implication for Conversion
Like their western counterparts, Soviet defense facilities are not fit to operate in a market
environment. Their unique characteristics create additional difficulties for these facilities to
operate in a market economy. For instance, the size of Soviet defense facilities increases their
115
operating costs. Their organization in NPOs further increases their operating and production
costs, due to the expense of transporting supplies and final products to and from distant regions.
Under the NPO structure, the specialization of these facilities in one stage of a production chain
limits the range of choices and flexibility for conversion activities. On the other hand, de-
specialization (accumulation of unrelated activities) of these facilities also leads to a dispersion
of scarce resources, which compromises their conversion. The duplication system developed in
the Soviet Union created a situation in which there is an excess of production capabilities, im-
plying that many of these defense facilities will probably face competition with their former
“twins.” Finally, as former Soviet defense facilities have favored quantity over quality, they will
face tremendous difficulties in competing with foreign enterprises in an open market.
7. Additional Obstacles
As if all of the above characteristics did not pose overwhelming hurdles to conversion,
Soviet defense facilities have to face additional obstacles created by the dissolution of the USSR
and its transition to a market economy. The break-up of the USSR, and the political and eco-
nomic reforms launched simultaneously in 1992, not only resulted in the disruption of Soviet
industrial production networks but also generated a high level of economic instability. Public
expenditures were dramatically decreased, leaving defense enterprises without state support. The
banking system, due to its nascent development, could not provide relief to defense facilities.
This situation, which continues today, forces defense facilities to rebuild their production net-
works (i.e., find new partners, new suppliers, new clients) and perform their conversion with no
financial support from the state. Moreover, this must be done in an environment that is in con-
stant flux.
A second consequence of the break-up of the Soviet Union was that conversion was
launched without prior demilitarization. Generally, when a facility is converted to civilian use, it
is first demilitarized; e.g., defense activities are stopped or decreased, and the resources unique
to military activities, including personnel, equipment, and buildings, are destroyed or converted.
Owing to the sudden dissolution of the USSR and the simultaneous implementation of economic
and political reforms, conversion was launched without a prior demilitarization. As a result, the
burden and cost of demilitarization lies on the shoulders of individual facilities. Yet in an eco-
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nomic crisis and with no outside funding, demilitarization cannot take place because there are no
potential candidates in the economy to absorb the excess resources, including personnel.
Another outcome of the break-up of the USSR was the destruction of the NPO infrastruc-
ture and the disorganization of the communications system. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, many
of defense facilities’ partners were located in other republics of the Soviet Union, now indepen-
dent, or in remote regions. Without state support, the cost of maintaining such links was too high
for individual facilities. This eventually deprived defense facilities of their network of suppliers
and partners.213 The destruction of the NPO infrastructure implies that defense facilities have to
reorganize their production network, e.g., find new partners, suppliers and clients in order to be
able to convert. At the same time, the defense facilities need to maintain a certain level of activ-
ity in order to keep their skilled workers, make some type of profit, and increase their chances of
conversion. This is quite a challenge when former economic ties have been cut, new ties have
not yet been forged, and the economic environment is unstable. In addition, in many regions,
especially east of the Urals, it is not easy to envision or create new economic ties. Some cities/re-
gions are dependent on a small number of facilities whose activities, technologies, and skills may
not be compatible. The isolated location of some facilities, far from economic and industrial cen-
ters, makes contacts with new partners or clients difficult. This situation further compromises the
chances for conversion.
In spite of the economic logic that necessitates the closing of unproductive/unprofitable
enterprises, Soviet defense enterprises cannot be immediately closed even if they fail to convert.
The main reason for this paradox lies in their importance to the national production infrastruc-
ture: shutting these facilities down would deprive the country and/or regional economies of their
industrial backbone. Unlike western countries, civilian enterprises in the Former Soviet Union
cannot replace the defense industry in the economy for three main reasons. First, the longevity
(about 60 years) of the Soviet peace-time mobilization system resulted in decreasing the contri-
bution of the civilian economy. Second, the behaviors and routines specific to any mobilized
economy (i.e., hoarding of resources, administrative competition in the allocation of resources,
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artificial inflation of resource needs) have become norms both in the Soviet civilian and defense
industry. This implies that, unlike the western civilian sector, Soviet civilian industry is not more
efficient economically than defense industry, and therefore cannot serve as an example nor as a
locomotive for conversion. Third, the Soviet economy became structurally mobilized, which
implies that the transition to a civilian economy cannot take place without important state invest-
ment to build the required infrastructures. For instance, the Soviet transportation system was
built to bring resources from the eastern and southern parts of the USSR to its western part
where the battles were to take place. As a result, inter-regional transportation systems east of the
Urals remained underdeveloped. Today, this situation does not allow a sufficient mobility of
goods and labor. Finally, due to the transition to the market, all converting Soviet defense facil-
ities have to start operating as commercial enterprises and become profitable. In other words,
they have to endure the most difficult conversion path, so far avoided by western defense
facilities.
II. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BW FACILITIES
In addition to the factors noted above, all biological weapons facilities possess special
characteristics that influence their conversion. These characteristics are distinct from those
facing conversion of nuclear or chemical defense facilities and encompass technical, financial,
and environmental considerations. It is important to understand these differences to appreciate
the complexities involved in converting these facilities. For comparison, we will also discuss the
historical precedents of conversion involving former BW facilities in Western countries. As we
will illustrate, however, these examples are problematic for comparison with the current situation
facing BW facilities in the former Soviet Union.
A. Technical Issues
Technical issues involved in converting BW facilities to peaceful purposes include a con-
sideration of not only the existing equipment and materials, but also the scope, configuration,
and prior BW activities within a particular facility. Other related issues that need to be addressed
before starting new commercial activities include the need for remediation of contaminated
areas, necessary upgrades or renovations, and determination of operating costs. All of these
factors play a role in determining the prospects and pathways for conversion of a BW facility.
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1. Possibilities: Reallocating Available Resources
Former BW facilities typically possess a large quantity of standard biotechnology equip-
ment useful for growing and processing pathogens and other biological materials (see Table
A-1). Most of this equipment is considered dual-use.214 Specific equipment varies by facility
depending on whether bacterial or viral agents were formerly studied or produced. It is possible
Table A-1: Some Equipment Found in BW Facilities
Equipment Use
Fermentors
    Bench top (up to 3 L)
    Laboratory Scale (5-50 L)
    Pilot Scale (50-1000 L)
    Industrial Scale (> than 1000 L)
Growth of bacterial cultures
Bioreactors (i.e., hollow fiber) Cell culture system to grow viruses
Lyophilizers Freeze drying of microorganisms for storage
Centrifugal Separators Allow for continuous separation of pathogenic
microorganisms without the propagation of aerosols




Coats droplets or particles of agent with thin layer of
protective material to prevent environmental
degradation or particle clumping; can produce small
(1-25 micron) particle sizes (aerosol droplets)
Milling equipment Machines producing microorganisms in the 1-25
micron size.  
Biosafety equipment
    Glove boxes,  Safety cabinets
    Clean air rooms, HEPA filter units
Barriers used to promote safe work/handling with
microorganisms
Aerosol chambers Chambers designed for aerosol testing using
microorganisms, viruses, or toxins; study of varying
environmental conditions on agent and/or effect of
agent on animals
Aerosolization equipment, spray nozzles Capable of producing particles in the 1-25 micron size
Autoclaves Sterilization of equipment, media
Ovens Drying of glassware or dry weights, melting agar
Incubators/Shakers Cultivation of stock cultures and production of inocula
HPLC/GC Analytical product separation
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to envision reallocating some of these existing material resources for new commercial or re-
search activities. As an example, the 20,000-gallon fermentors from the former U.S. Vigo BW
production facility were sold to the Pfizer pharmaceutical company and reused for the produc-
tion of veterinary antibiotics.215 In addition, by the 1970s, laboratories from the former BW ex-
perimental production plant at Porton Down in Britain were used by the commercial company
Cadbury-Schweppes (of chocolate fame) to study various aspects of cocoa-related fermenta-
tions.216
Culture collections are perhaps one of the most valuable material assets present at former
BW facilities. BW facilities generally possess a wide range of pathogens and other bacterial and
viral strains. These strains have a number of commercial applications. For example, bacterial and
viral strains could be used in the development of diagnostics, vaccines, or antibiotics for medical
purposes. Moreover, many bacterial strains can be particularly adaptable for commercial uses.
These include the production of microbial biomass (yeast, single cell protein as food supple-
ments), microbial enzymes (useful in the food, chemical, textile industries), and microbial me-
tabolites (vitamins, alcohols, acids). Bacteria can also be used to improve production processes
of many high value compounds (steroids, antibiotics) and in remediation of contaminated areas.
Such uses are relevant for environmental, human, plant, and animal products and applications. In
addition, other existing raw materials and resources such as water, oxygen, and energy formerly
used in BW production can be utilized in commercial activities.
The material resources are not the only assets within BW facilities. Organizational and
personnel resources also influence the prospects for conversion of a BW facility. Typically, BW
facilities are classified as either research or production facilities. Frequently, however, strict dif-
ferentiation between these two categories is not always possible. Some research facilities may
have only conducted basic research on pathogens whereas others may have possessed small-
scale production capabilities. For example, although the State Research Center for Virology and
Biotechnology (VECTOR) in Russia is a premier viral research center, it also possesses pilot
scale bioreactors. On the other hand, some large BW production facilities have had substantial
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basic research and weaponization divisions. Prior to 1969, the U.S.’s Fort Detrick offensive BW
facility had large-scale production and testing capabilities, as well as research divisions in
aerobiology, immunology, and bacteriology, and other biological sciences.217 Because the line
between research and production facilities is often blurred, it is important to look at each facility
individually to evaluate its resources and capabilities for conversion to commercial activities.
We can, however, outline some important distinctions between BW research and production
facilities.
BW production facilities range in size and scope, but would bear some resemblance to
civilian pharmaceutical, vaccine, or beer production facilities. Typically, these are large indus-
trial facilities, composed of many large building and utility infrastructures devoted to producing
thousands to tens of thousands of liters of material. In terms of personnel, BW production facili-
ties can employ hundreds, if not thousands, of workers. For example, at the Pine Bluff BW pro-
duction complex, 300 people were involved in the offensive activities.218 The majority of the
staff at production facilities would consist of industrial biologists and their technical support
staff (e.g., biological plant operators). Other staff could include scientists such as microbiolo-
gists, virologists, biochemists, chemists, physicists, as well as biological, chemical, and mechan-
ical engineers.
In contrast to production facilities, BW research facilities tend to be smaller in terms of
industrial equipment and production capabilities. BW research facilities can, however, consist of
several large buildings with a significant amount of high-containment laboratory space, which
could be used to support existing activities or renovated to support lower containment activities.
These research facilities can also support a number of scientific personnel studying a variety of
bacterial and viral pathogens. For example, at its peak in the 1980s the VECTOR facility had
more than 4000 total employees, with 300 devoted exclusively to pathogen research, and another
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1000 employees studying the molecular biology of a variety of viruses.219 Typically, the majority
of scientific personnel at these facilities would have advanced training in basic and applied bio-
logical research, with a smaller number having industrial training.
Since biotechnology is inherently dual-use, the scientific personnel at former BW
research and production facilities could adapt their prior training and knowledge to work with
other non-pathogenic microorganisms. In contrast to the technology behind nuclear weapons, the
potential application of biotechnology is vast. In addition, because many of these facilities pos-
sess both research and production capabilities, a number of new activities could be envisioned
spanning the research to production spectrum. Converting scientific researchers to become in-
dustrial scientists (and vice versa) would require additional training. This characteristic is not
unique to the BW field, but is a necessary criterion for conversion in many technology sectors.
Converting BW facilities and equipment for peaceful production of drugs or vaccines to
benefit public health has been touted as a highly desirable goal.220 In part because many former
BW facilities previously conducted some biodefense work to protect military troops, there is a
belief that these biodefense or other medically related products can be easily produced and sold
on the commercial market. This outcome, however, is rare. To understand why, we must
examine the challenges involved in producing commercial public health products.
2. Problems: Quality Control and Contamination
Some of the problems stem from the rigorous standards necessary for the production of
public health products. For example, pharmaceutical production for sale on an international
market requires rigorous standards and quality control involving Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMP) and Good Laboratory Practices (GLP).221 These practices consist of rules and regulations
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gover/ning all aspects of production such as organization, personnel, buildings, facilities, equip-
ment, control of components, drug product containers, laboratory controls, production and pro-
cess controls, packaging and labeling controls, holding and distribution, records and reports.222
Such practices ensure the integrity and safety of pharmaceuticals and other biological products
from the beginning to end of production.
These practices, however, require a standard of control and operation that far exceeds
those used in former BW research or production activities. For example, there are stringent
criteria for the quality of steam, water, and air that come in contact with the product and the
equipment used in a GMP production process.223 The introduction of these new quality control
processes may require significant changes in the existing production line. Retrofitting an existing
facility to meet these requirements is often tedious and costly. Even if conversion activities are
conducted off-site, significant personnel training will be needed to comply with GMP/GLP pro-
tocols. Also, the facility will need national and international accreditation. In order to maintain
production standards, employees and plant processes will need to be continually monitored for
performance and quality control. Attaining international accreditation, however, may not be
necessary to support some conversion efforts. If the identified market is national, only national
production standards may be required.
Furthermore, there must be definitive proof that no contamination remains from BW
agents where new activities will take place. This poses a difficult challenge to conversion. Since
these facilities have been used to produce large quantities of agent, conduct aerosol tests, and fill
munitions, contamination of buildings and equipment is usually widespread. If evidence of con-
tamination exists, the equipment and buildings may be prohibited from being used in certain
commercial activities. For example, in the United States, equipment that has been previously
used in work with spore-forming bacteria, such as anthrax bacteria, cannot be used for pharma-
ceutical production involving non-spore forming bacteria.224 If, however, contaminated equip-
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225 For example, decontamination and renovation efforts to turn the Pine Bluff BW facility into a National Center for
Toxicology Research cost $10.8 million (in 1977 dollars). These cost estimates do not mean to imply that future
decontamination efforts at other BW facilities will be equally costly; they do, however, indicate that some significant
investment will be necessary to re-use buildings and equipment formerly involved in weapons activities. Building
470, the anthrax production facility at Fort Detrick, was decontaminated three times. In spite of this, the review team
could not state that the building was 100 percent clean, due to the persistent nature of the spore-forming anthrax
bacteria. Therefore no plans were made to convert this facility. Norman M. Covert, Cutting Edge: A History of Fort
Detrick, Maryland, 1943-1993 (Fort Detrick: Public Affairs Office, Headquarters U.S. Army Garrison, 1993), pp.
48-49; Senate Committee on Human Resources, Examination of Serious Deficiencies in the Defense Department’s
Efforts to Protect the Human Subjects of Drug Research: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scien-
tific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Session, 8 March and 23 May 1977 (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 229.
226 However, contamination issues are also a problem in conversion of other defense facilities (chemical, nuclear,
missile) where toxic substances or toxic by-products are used or generated.
227 These two categories can be further subdivided: (1) low price bulk chemicals (e.g., solvents, biomass, high fruc-
tose syrups that cost US$102 to 103/ton); (2) mid price chemicals (e.g., organic acids, amino acids, biopolymers that
cost US$103 to 105/ton); (3) high price microbial and animal-cell products (e.g., enzymes, vitamins, antibiotics, cor-
ticosteroids, vaccines that cost US$105 to 107/ton); (4) very high price animal cell products (e.g., monoclonal anti-
bodies, tissue plasminogen activator that cost US$107 to 109/ton). These last two categories can only be produced by
a microbial or animal-based process. Peter F. Stanbury, Allan Whitaker, and Stephen J. Hall, “Fermentation Eco-
nomics,” in Principles of Fermentation Technology, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1995), p. 334.
228 Accurate, detailed costs associated with specific industrial fermentation processes and products are not widely
published, but some studies are available which outline general costs. Typically, these costs involve four main
factors (in decreasing importance): raw materials, fixed costs, utilities, and labor. Raw materials, such as media or
ment and buildings are to be re-used, this frequently involves costly and lengthy decontamina-
tion procedures.225 Frequently, this factor is under-appreciated in considering the requirements
for conversion of former BW facilities.226 In many cases, it may be better to purchase new
equipment for conversion activities and/or move new activities off-site of the former weapons
complex. However, since former BW facilities include several buildings never involved in
weapons production (e.g., nutrient media production, infirmaries, warehouses), new activities
could be re-located to these “clean” areas.
3. Problems: Production Costs
Another important prerequisite for conversion involves a detailed study of the total in-
vestment necessary for the new activities. As an example, let us examine some of the cost issues
encountered in commercial fermentation processes. Fermentation products are usually classified
as either low cost-high volume or high cost-low volume.227 Although many BW production facil-
ities have large-scale fermentors that would be suited for low cost-high volume productions, this
type of production may not be feasible from a market perspective.228 There are only a limited
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solvents, may take up from 38 to 70 percent of the entire production costs. The unit cost of a bulk product is also
affected by the fermentation yield, process productivity, and purification demands. Compared to other expenses,
labor is typically a small portion of the overall costs for production and this reduces some of the incentives to
employ FSU employees. See L.K. Nyiri and M. Charles, “Economic status of fermentation processes,” Ann. Rep.
Ferm. Processes 1 (1977): 365-81.
229 M. Pape, “The competition between microbial and chemical processes for the manufacture of basic chemicals and
intermediates,” in Microbial Energy Conversion: The Proceedings of a Seminar, ed. H.G. Schlegal and J. Barnea
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977), pp. 510-30.
230 William H. Bartholomew and Harold B. Reisman, “Economics of Fermentation Processes,” in Microbial
Technology, 2nd ed., ed. H.J. Peppler and D. Perlman (Academic Press: New York, 1979), pp. 463-96.
231 Former BW research facilities can consist of several large buildings with a significant amount of high-contain-
ment laboratory space. Continuing to maintain and run such laboratories will incur a high lifetime operating cost. For
example, maintenance, repair, and use of the Biosafety Level 3 maximum containment biodefense research
laboratory at Dugway Proving Grounds in the United States was estimated to cost in excess of $1 million per year in
1990. Dynamic Corporation, Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Biological Aerosol Test
Facility. New Alternative Action to Construct and Operate a Consolidated Life Sciences Test Facility at Dugway
Proving Ground, Utah (Dugway: Department of the Army, Dugway Proving Ground, November 1990).
232 In some cases, improvements or developments in strains and media can increase yields and decrease some utility
costs associated with particular products. Government assistance, either in terms of money, supplies, or tax relief,
could help support some fermentation processes. For example, U.S. agricultural aid programs provided low-cost
supplies of grain and potatoes for fermentation processes that were previously cost-prohibitive in the current market.
See D. Perlman, “Some Prospects for the Fermentation Industries,” Wallerstein Communications 33 (1970): 165-73.
number of low cost-high volume products produced by fermentation. These include solvents,
organic acids, and single cell protein. Unfortunately, for many of these products the microbial
process is less economical than chemical production.229 In contrast, more opportunities may exist
for high cost-low volume products. These products would include compounds that have a com-
plex or unstable structure, or are too expensive to produce by chemical methods. Antibiotics,
steroids, amino acids, and vitamins fall into this category.
For certain processes, utilities may constitute a major share of the operating expenses.
For example, large requirements for steam, heating, cooling, aeration, agitation, water usage, and
waste treatment may significantly increase utility costs.230 For former BW production facilities
the high utility costs associated with heating and lighting the large production area, running
large-scale fermentors, and using inefficient process streams not originally designed for com-
mercial activities pose difficulties for conversion.231 Renovations of existing facilities would
need to be organized to minimize expenses associated with these factors.232
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233 The United Kingdom was one of the first countries to propose a separate international treaty to deal with biologi-
cal weapons. Prior to the U.K. proposal, the general international consensus was to try to deal with chemical and
biological weapons under one combined treaty. In 1968, the United Kingdom began to publicly argue that since bio-
logical weapons and chemical weapons were so different, particularly in terms of verification, it was better to focus
international efforts on dealing with the problem of biological weapons first because it was the most despised class
of weapons. See Ambassador James F. Leonard, “The Control of Biological Weapons: Retrospect and Prospect,” in
Inspection Procedures for Compliance Monitoring of the Biological Weapons Convention, ed. J.B. Tucker
(Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, December 1997), pp. 21-26.
234 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction,” at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/bwc1.html,
accessed 18 October 2001.
B. Political Climate
In addition to the economic principles, the prevailing political climate can have a pro-
found influence on conversion. As described above, conversion of defense facilities can be sup-
ported by a political or strategic decision made by a state to stop or decrease a military program
(i.e., disarmament). In the case of biological weapons, the decision of a country to become a state
party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) can provide the impetus to
close or convert former offensive BW facilities. However, as the following section will show,
due to the time period when the BTWC was negotiated, its content, and subsequent entry into
force, the declaration of existing (or recent) offensive BW facilities for conversion is prob-
lematic. This situation holds particular relevance for former Soviet BW facilities.
1. Arms Control Aspects
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975, was
the first international treaty to ban a whole class of weapons of mass destruction.233 Specifically,
the BTWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of BW agents and
technology for warfare purposes. Article II of the Convention is explicit in its requirement for
dealing with BW related materials:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful
purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force
of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery
specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its
jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary
safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environ-
ment.234
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235 The Chemical Weapons Convention states in Article V that upon entry into force, chemical weapons production
facilities must close and be destroyed within 5-10 years depending on the former use of the facility. Conversion of
facilities is approved only on a case-by-case basis and must be completed within six years after entry into force of
the CWC.
236 One of Yugoslavia’s proposals suggested a declaration of all facilities that could engage in prohibited activities.
This suggestion was never incorporated into the final draft treaty. Also, in the treaty negotiations there were a num-
ber of proposals submitted for a range of possible verification measures. At the time, however, the Soviet Union was
opposed to on-site verification, and so there was no possibility of including these in the Convention. It was only at
the 1986 Second Review Conference that Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were adopted. The CBMs would
be politically binding, but not mandatory, mechanisms to exchange information between States Parties to the
Convention on high-risk laboratories, research, and unusual outbreaks of disease. CBMs involving declarations on
past offensive programs were not adopted until after the 3rd Review Conference in 1991. For more information and
analysis of these measures see, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Yugoslav Working Paper Submitted to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Elements for a System of Control of the Complete Prohibition of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 6 August 1970” in Documents on Disarmament 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 383; Erhard Geissler, ed., Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
by Confidence-Building Measures, Vol. 10, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990); Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons Arms Control,” pp. 2, 43-53; Nicholas Sims, The
Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-1985 (New York, St. Martin’s Press,
1988), pp. 52-60; Marie Isabelle Chevrier and Iris Hunger, “Confidence Building Measures for the BTWC:
Performance and Potential,” Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2000): 24-42; Jez Littlewood, “Chapter
Two: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” unpublished manuscript.
Facilities where such agents are developed, produced, stockpiled, or weaponized, how-
ever, are not explicitly mentioned in the Convention. During the original BTWC negotiations, no
proposals on conversion were submitted. This is in sharp contrast to the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC), which specifically outlines procedures and protocols for dismantlement and
conversion of facilities.235
It is difficult to say why the BTWC never included a requirement for conversion, al-
though there are at least two plausible explanations. First, there was no requirement for declara-
tions involving facilities and prior offensive activities, nor any on-site verification measures,
written into the draft Convention.236 Without this information, it would have been difficult to
identify facilities and differentiate a change from offensive to legitimate activities. Typically, the
same materials and much of the equipment used to make biological weapons can also be used to
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237 In spite of this, the multilateral Australia Group has defined materials and equipment that would be particularly
useful for BW production. The Australia Group was established in 1984 as an informal and voluntary gathering of
nations designed to limit proliferation of dual-use materials and technologies that could be used in development of
chemical and biological weapons. There is no formal charter or constitution, and therefore no formal coordination,
monitoring, or enforcement of policies. However, the Group does have informal agreements to share intelligence
information and notice of export denials, and works to harmonize national export control policies. In 1992, the Aus-
tralia Group decided to add to its control list organisms, toxins, and equipment that could be used to make biological
weapons. In addition to the Australia Group, individual countries have developed their own national export control
policies regarding sensitive BW equipment and technologies. See http://www.australiagroup.net/index.html,
accessed 1 December 2001. Furthermore, there are “signatures” for detecting potential BW activity which relate to
funding, personnel, facility design equipment, security, biosafety, and process flow. See Milton Leitenberg, “Bio-
logical Weapons and Arms Control,” pp. 54-58.
238 This was evident in the disastrous 1994 Russian-U.S.-U.K. trilateral visit to the U.S.’s WWII-era Vigo BW pro-
duction plant in Terre Haute, Indiana. After the war, the plant had been sold to the Pfizer pharmaceutical company.
Although the fermentors were used to make penicillin for a few years, Pfizer soon abandoned the old buildings and
built a new drug manufacturing facility nearby. When the Russian delegation saw the fermentation capability of both
the abandoned and new facilities, they charged that the U.S. government was maintaining BW production. Although
these charges were not true and were never credibly substantiated, they were difficult to convincingly refute. For a
description of this event, see Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, pp. 200-08.
239 Matthew Meselson, Martin M. Kaplan, and Mark A. Mokulsky, “Verification of Biological and Toxin Weapons
Disarmament,” Science & Global Security 2 (1991): 241.
240 In 1991, states parties to the BTWC agreed to Confidence Building Measures that included declaration of past
offensive activities. Under these measures, Canada, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
declared past offensive programs. Except for Russia, all of these countries ended their offensive activities before the
entry into force of the BTWC. In addition, these countries, aside from Russia, have met the requirements under
Article II by closure (sealing), conversion, destruction, dismantlement, or a combination of these. See Geissler et al.,
eds., Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, pp. 209-10; Chevrier and Hunger, “Confidence Building Measures for
the BTWC,” p. 32; Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research,
Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, no. 18
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
make vaccines or other medical treatments for diseases.237 Therefore, “conversion” of a BW
facility would have been difficult to assess.238
Second, in 1969, prior to the BTWC treaty negotiations, the United States unilaterally
renounced its biological weapons capability, followed shortly with the destruction of stockpiles
and conversion of facilities.239 By the time the treaty entered into force in 1975, no other country
had specifically disclosed past offensive activities or facilities.240 As stated previously, Article II
requires that all former BW capabilities be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes within
nine months of the treaty’s entry into force. Since the U.S. government was already in the pro-
cess of converting its facilities by 1971 and no other countries had declared facilities, the ques-
tion of conversion among other state parties was moot. After 1976, any remaining evidence of
facilities needing conversion would have indicated retention of an offensive capability—a clear
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241 This again is a difference with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), under which ten countries
have declared chemical weapons production facilities. Such a discrepancy between the two conventions is probably
explained by the time period when these treaties entered into force. The CWC entered into force only in 1997,
whereas the BTWC has been in force for almost 30 years. Iris Hunger, “Facilitating the Conversion of BTW Facili-
ties Through International Technical Cooperation: BTWC Implications,” in Conversion of Former BTW Facilities,
pp. 195-97.
242 Since 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts has met to consider potential verification measures in the
development of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC.
243 Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons Arms Control,” Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (April 1996):
53-79.
violation of the Convention. As a result of these factors, conversion never obtained widespread
support within the BTWC negotiations or early Review Conferences.
 Since 1973, only Russia and the Former Soviet Republics have declared the existence of
recently active offensive BW facilities (from the USSR period) and the need for international
assistance to support their dismantlement and conversion.241 In spite of the number of facilities
composing the former USSR BW complex, Ad Hoc Group meetings have failed to discuss con-
version issues either as an independent concern or within the framework of technical cooperation
(Article X) under the treaty.242 Iris Hunger, professional secretary to the Ad Hoc Group, specu-
lates that since conversion would apply only to a limited number of states, it has not been priori-
tized by the Group compared with other issues that affect a larger number of states parties. Hun-
ger also explains that conversion has not been considered as part of Article X because such
technical cooperation has been targeted to countries with limited biotechnological capability and
not those with former BW programs. There has also been an implicit consensus that conversion
should be the sole responsibility (financial and otherwise) of the individual states concerned. It is
clear that the former Soviet BW program operated and was expanded after the USSR signed and
ratified the BTWC and for at least 25 years after the treaty’s entry into force.243 Therefore, con-
version of former Soviet BW facilities is likely to be a thorny issue for state parties to the
Convention.
Some of these same issues, however, have been dealt with in the CWC, where conversion
has been specified. It is likely that conversion has not been revisited under the Ad Hoc Group
due to the historical precedent and the priority of resolving larger and more difficult verification
concerns. Some state parties to the CWC have found the approval process for conversion to be
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244 Biodefense work is defined here as the development of medical diagnostics and treatments (e.g., antibiotics and
vaccines) to detect biological agents and defend military and civilian populations against biological weapons. Note:
if a former BW facility engages in defensive work for only the military (e.g., customer is the military), then no con-
version has occurred. However, if the facility also is able to sell a vaccine to protect civilians then this can be con-
sidered conversion. For example, the anthrax vaccine can be given to a variety of individuals in high-risk environ-
ments. This includes not only soldiers, but veterinarians, farmers, and employees of industries dealing with animal
hides and products (e.g., wool-sorters).
245 David L. Huxsoll, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Hearings before the Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 201. For an interesting discussion of the risks of defensive
work see Jonathan King and Harlee Strauss, “The Hazards of Defensive Biological Warfare Programs,” in Prevent-
ing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 120-32.
costly, tedious, and slow. Perhaps these experiences have also lowered the incentive for lobbying
for conversion measures in the current BTWC Protocol negotiations.
2. Problems: Biodefense Work244
In the past few years, there has been growing interest in redirecting Soviet bioweaponeers
to develop new biodefense products to protect civilian and military populations. In the United
States, this interest has been enhanced since September 11th and the anthrax attacks. Biodefense
work would involve the least amount of effort for redirection for former bioweapons scientists
since such work would use many of the same pathogenic organisms, similar protocols, tech-
niques, and existing expertise formerly used in offensive activities. Therefore, in theory, new
biodefense activities would be a quick and straightforward way to jump start former BW sci-
entists to peaceful work.
This strategy, however, has its dark side. Although the intent of a defensive program is
different from an offensive program, biodefense work still retains components of an offensive
BW program.245 The differences between offensive and defense work can be ambiguous, particu-
larly on the research end of the spectrum (see Figure A-1). However, the ambiguity decreases as
one moves from the research bench to production activities, with the differences involving the
amount of agent produced, whether the agent remains virulent or is attenuated, process differ-
ences between vaccine and weapons production, and the level of secrecy surrounding the
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246 In 1993, the U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center further expanded these characteristics and created a
set of five categories to assess whether a facility was involved in offensive work. These categories examined: (1)
funding and personnel; (2) facility design, equipment, and security; (3) scientific work; (4) safety conditions; and
(5) process flow. See “Signatures for Biological Warfare Facilities, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center,
1993, as cited in Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons Arms Control,” pp. 55-58; Barry J. Erlick, Global Spread
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1990), pp. 33-42.
247 There still exists, however, support within the national and international community to adopt unilateral or multi-
lateral mechanisms to address compliance issues such as creating global disease surveillance networks, establishing
United Nation’s procedures for investigating suspicious disease outbreaks, and enacting national criminal legislation.
Although these measures will not provide for verification of activities within former BW facilities, they serve as
useful tools.
work.246 In this blurred context, stringent oversight or verification measures could help clarify
that new activities are legitimate.
The problem with verification of legitimate versus illicit activities within a former BW
facility has been raised in international negotiations to develop a legally binding Protocol to the
BTWC. If adopted, the Protocol would provide for specific verification measures such as decla-
rations, visits, investigations, and provisions for international cooperation. These measures will
allow for monitoring of ongoing activities at former BW facilities and high-risk laboratories.
Unfortunately, however, negotiations for a new Protocol were suspended at the 5th Review Con-
ference (November 2001) at the request of the U.S. government delegation. Negotiations have
adjourned and delegations to the Ad Hoc Group are scheduled to meet in November 2002 to
determine the future of the Protocol. Due to the current lack of U.S. support for the existing
Protocol, and the lack of political will among other states parties to override U.S. objections, it is
unlikely that the Protocol will ever be adopted.247
With no legally binding verification measures, it is impossible to certify with 100 percent
assurance that no biodefense research within former BW facilities is being redirected towards of-
fensive ends. Since many BW research and production facilities are large, covert activities could
continue. Therefore, reallocating resources to conduct biodefense work at a former BW facility
could raise suspicions detrimental to securing commercial investment for conversion. Full trans-
parency into biodefense work can help alleviate these suspicions. Unfortunately, transparency is
still a problem in certain countries. For example, the international community still has limited or
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248 Three Russian Ministry of Defense facilities located in Yekaterinberg (formerly Sverdlovsk), Kirov, and Sergiev
Posad (formerly Zagorsk) remain closed to the international community.
249 Martha Raver, “The Sword Gone, What of the Warriors? Detrick Scientists Look to the Future,” Frederick News-
Post, 19 October 1971.
no transparency to several Soviet BW facilities, particularly those remaining on Russian terri-
tory.248
Figure A-1: Defensive Versus Offensive Research
 
Source: David L. Huxsoll, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Hearings before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
United States Senate, 101st Cong., 17 May 1989 (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1990): 522.
In light of these problems, it might be best for a former BW facility to stop or significant-
ly downsize its biodefense work in order to remove any doubts about continuing illegal activi-
ties. Yet, many former BW facilities find it easiest to switch their work from offensive to defen-
sive. Study of conversion efforts at Ft. Detrick shows that senior biological warfare specialists
(those working for 10-15 years on weapons work) had the most difficulty in redirecting to totally
new research activities since their experiences were not readily adaptable.249 A 1997 National
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250 U.S.-Russian Collaborative Program for Research and Monitoring of Pathogens of Global Importance Commit-
tee, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Blueprint for U.S.-Russian Cooperation (Washington, DC: U.S. National
Academy of Sciences, 1997).
251 Milton Leitenberg, “The Possibilities and Limitations of Biological Weapons Conversion” in Conversion of
Former BTW Facilities, pp. 125-31.
Academy of Sciences report used this argument in their recommendations to support a handful of
biodefense research projects in initial U.S. government engagement of Soviet BW facilities.250
Although bilateral and multilateral agreements could be designed and implemented to
monitor new biodefense activities, they would be limited in their ability to prevent the future
leakage of this knowledge by a rogue scientist or group of scientists, the so-called “brain drain”
proliferation threat. Employing former BW scientists to continue defensive work maintains their
skill base of knowledge on dangerous pathogens and weapons-related work, which can pose
long-term proliferation risks.251 Therefore, it is important to recognize that complications and
trade-offs exist when a former BW facility chooses to conduct defensive work as part of its
conversion strategy.
